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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS 
by 
JIAJIN CHEN 
Adviser: Professor Suhan Chan 
This dissertation is composed with two essays on real estate investment trusts. The first 
chapter examines REIT IPOs initial-day, short-run and long-run performance using a large 
sample of 370 REIT IPOs from four continents (14 different countries) during the 1996-2010 
period. The result shows that (1) the newly-established REITs in other countries exhibit similar 
initial-day return pattern as in the U.S., (2) the low initial-day return might be caused by the fund-
like structure of REITs together with the real estate assets they hold, (3) the slightly positive 
initial-day return is offset by the poor performance in the 190-day days subsequent to the IPO, 
and (4) the change in U.S. REIT IPO performance before and after 1990 is more likely due to a 
change in the REIT structure than to the growing maturity of the REIT industry or an increase in 
institutional investor participation in the REIT market.  
The second chapter analyzes the announcement dates and market dates of 483 entry and 
439 exit events of publicly-traded Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). The study finds that 
changes in asset supply (via entries or exits of REITs) affect the stock returns of incumbent 
REITs. Furthermore, the study partitions the sample based on the reasons for entries and exits as 
well as REIT asset type and management style in order to disentangle alternative explanations for 
the stock responses to the entry and exit events. The conclusion is that the stock responses 
documented in this study cannot be explained by the signaling, changes in competitive 
environment or market timing hypotheses. 
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Chapter 1  
 
Are REIT IPOs Unique? The Global 
Evidence 
 
1. Introduction  
One of the most puzzling phenomena in the finance literature is the pricing behavior 
of initial public offerings (IPOs) of equity securities. For the U.S. industrial firm IPOs, Table 
1 of Ritter (2012a) reports that the initial trading-day return of 7,617 IPOs issued during the 
1980-2011 period is, on average, 17.9%.  Table 18 of Ritter (2012b) reports that the average 
3-year buy-and-hold market-adjusted return for the 7,433 IPOs issued during the 1980-2009 
period is -19.9%.  
While the IPOs of industrial firms consistently show a significant initial-day 
underpricing, U.S. Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) IPOs are different from that of U.S. 
industrial firm IPOs. For example, Wang, Chan, and Gau (1992) show that U.S. REIT IPOs 
in the pre-1990 period, on average, were significantly overpriced (-2.82%) while Ling and 
Ryngaert (1997) find that REIT IPOs in the post-1990 period were significantly underpriced 
(3.6%). The initial-day return of REIT IPOs is much lesser than that of industrial firm 
counterparts. The above two studies attribute the anomalous evidence of low initial-day 
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return of REIT IPOs and the change in IPO pricing to the structure of REITs (fund-like and 
externally advised in the pre-1990 versus operating-oriented and internally advised in the 
post-1990) and to the level of institutional involvement in REITs (relatively low in the pre-
1990 period versus high in the post-1990 period). 
With overlapping sample periods, Hartzell, Kallberg, and Liu (2005) study the 189 
REIT IPOs issued during the 1980-1998 period and report an insignificant 0.27% initial-day 
return, while Buttimer, Hyland and Sanders (2005) find a significant 2.47% initial-day return 
for the 163 REIT IPOs issued during the 1980-2001 period. Recently, however, Bairagi and 
Dimovski (2011) report that, while the initial-day return of the 55 REITs issued during the 
2002-2006 period is a significant 3.43%, the initial-day return of the 20 REITs issued during 
the 2007-2010 period is an insignificant -1.19%. Panel A of Table 1.1 provides a summary of 
the initial-day returns of U.S. REIT IPOs reported in the literature.  Clearly, the results of the 
studies vary by sample periods and by sample selection criteria.  
In this study, we report that the mean initial-day return of the 323 U.S. REIT IPOs 
during the 1971-2010 period is a significant 0.94%. It should be noted that the average initial-
day return of industrial firm IPOs during the 1980-2011 period is 17.9%.  Clearly, regardless 
of whether we compare the returns of sub-periods or the entire period, it is safe to conclude 
that the average initial-day return of REIT IPOs is much lower than that of industrial firm 
IPOs. 
In addition, the evidence on the aftermarket performance of U.S. REIT IPOs is also 
mixed. Wang, Chan and Gau (1992) find that pre-1990 REIT IPOs substantially 
underperformed several benchmarks during the 190 trading days after issuance. This result is 
consistent with the result reported by Ritter (2012b), where he finds that the average 3-year 
market adjusted buy-and-hold return for industrial firm IPOs is -19.9% during the 1980-2009 
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period.  However, Ling and Ryngaert (1997) subsequently find that equity REIT IPOs in the 
1990s outperformed seasoned equity REITs moderately in the 100 trading days after issuance.  
Buttimer, Hyland and Sanders (2005), using Fama-French type factor models, find that U.S. 
REIT IPOs during the 1980-2001 period exhibit either no or positive abnormal returns in the 
3 or 5 years after issuance. Recently, Joel-Carbonell and Rottke (2009) report that REIT IPOs 
issued during the 1991-2008 period earn significantly lower accumulated market-adjusted 
returns over longer intervals. They find that the one-year cumulative market-adjusted return 
is -4.1%, three-year cumulative market-adjusted return is -8.3%, and five-year cumulative 
market-adjusted return is -24.7%.  Clearly, the results of longer-run performance differ 
significantly among the REIT studies. However, since the objectives, methodologies and 
sample periods of those REIT studies differ significantly, it is not feasible to make a 
meaningful comparison of their results.   
Given the different findings, it is necessary to examine both the initial-day return and 
the long run performance of REIT IPOs under one model framework and over the same 
sample period.  More importantly, given the abnormal performance of U.S. REIT IPOs, it is 
also necessary to see if this performance pattern holds true universally. This can be done by 
examining the performance of REIT IPOs around the world. Previous studies report some 
evidence on REIT IPOs from selected countries, but the evidence is scarce and random. 
Panels B and C of Table 1.1 list the related studies.  Recent establishments of REIT markets 
in Asia and Europe provide  this study a great opportunity to examine non-U.S. REIT IPOs in 
a systematic way and provide results that will tell us if the U.S. REIT experience is unique, or 
if the U.S. REIT experience is universally true.  In addition, it might be interesting to know if 
the lessons learnt from the U.S. REIT market during the past 40 years are followed by other 
countries when they developed their new REIT markets. 
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This study gathers 370 REIT IPOs from 14 different countries during the 1996-2010 
period to analyze if the stock performance of REIT IPOs is systematically different from that 
of industrial firms around the world.  Since the REIT structure and regulatory requirements 
differ across countries, we might be able to exploit cross-sectional variation in the initial-day 
return to uncover some possible explanations for the low initial-day return we have observed 
for U.S. REIT IPOs. Section 2 reviews the literature on IPO theories and studies on the 
performance of international REIT IPOs. We also identify research issues in the field that are 
related to REIT IPOs.  Section 3 discusses the global REIT market and provides a brief 
description of the REIT structure and regulatory environment in each county. Section 4 
reports the data gathering procedure and summary statistics. Section 5 describes the 
methodologies for calculating the REIT IPOs initial-day return, short-run as well as long-run 
abnormal returns. Section 6 reports the empirical evidence. The last section concludes.  
 
2. Literature review and research issues 
The literature on IPO tries to answer two questions.  First, why do issuers (with the 
aid of underwriters) offer new shares that are consistently underpriced and leave about 18% 
of the capital on the table for aftermarket investors to pick up?  Second, why do IPO firms 
underperform the market over the long-run? The various answers to these two questions can 
be divided roughly into the following groups.  
There are several theoretical studies providing explanations for the IPOs underpricing. 
The first group is the “winner’s curse” or “adverse selection” explanation.  Rock’s (1986) 
posits that due to information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors and 
information ex-ante uncertainty about firms’ value, informed investors always compete for 
the “good” IPOs  and can get large shares in these “good” issues based on their private 
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information. As compensation for the risk of trading against the informed investors and for 
receiving a disproportional number of “good” issues, underwriters underprice new issues on 
average to counteract the winner’s curse and attract the average investors in equilibrium. 
Based on “winner curse” explanation, the increased informed investors (institutional 
investors) participation in subscribing REIT stocks will be associated with increased 
underpricing level for IPOs.  
The second group is “signaling” model according to the basic assumption that issuers 
have superior information than investors. The firms know their prospects.  (See, for example, 
Allen and Faulhaber (1989) and Welch (1989)). Therefore, the issuers rationally price IPOs 
below their market value in order to signal their firm type, and investors can distinguish the 
firm type because they know only the best firms can recoup the cost of revealing information 
from subsequent issues.  
The third group of explanations is “principal-agent” model which based on the 
assumption that underwriters have superior information about the demand of IPOs than 
issuers. Baron (1982) focuses on potential agency problem between investment bank and 
issuing firm. The model assumes that underwriters have (1) superior information about the 
demand for the new shares over issuers and (2) their marketing efforts are unobservable or 
verifiable by the issues so that issuers rationally let underwriters underprice the IPO. 
Recently, more emphases are placed on the agency problems between underwriters and 
issuers by examining issues such as (1) the allocation strategies used by underwriters, (2) the 
possibility that IPO investors are deceived by analysts’ aggressive growth forecasts, and (3) 
the monopoly power enjoyed by underwriters.  (For a list of representative papers in this area, 
see Loughran and Ritter (2002), Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2008), Edwards and Hanley 
(2010), Field and Lowry (2010) and Liu and Ritter (2011).) 
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With regards to the underpricing level, prior evidence suggest that IPOs are more 
underpriced when they are underwritten by investment banks with lower prestige. Beatty and 
Ritter (1986) offer the standard explanation for this behavior, which is that prestigious 
underwriters maintain their reputation by “producing” the firms they underwrite. Prestigious 
underwriters obtain a higher offering price for the IPO, in part by managing IPOs with a low 
variance of possible firm values. By agreeing to be associated with an offering, prestigious 
underwriters “certify” the quality of the issue.  
Carter and Manaster (1990) provide a ranking of underwriters based on their position 
following the completion of IPOs. Megginson and Weiss (1991) measure underwriters’ 
reputation using market shares. The results from these empirical works are typically not very 
sensitive to the choice of underwriter reputation measure.  
Another group of explanation includes the “hot market” theories, which state that the 
issues are fairly valued but investors are irrational and those investors who purchase shares 
on the first day of trading of the IPO stocks pay too much for the shares. The model assumes 
that the IPOs are fairly priced but investors are irrational. Therefore, the investors might pay 
too much for the IPO shares on the first day of trading and in the longer-run price decline to 
restore rationality. (See, for example, Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) and Ljungqvist, 
Nanda and Singh (2003)).  
While the aforementioned explanations are suitable for analyzing IPOs with large 
positive initial-day return, they might not be suitable for REIT IPOs because the initial-day 
returns of REIT IPOs are either negative or low in magnitude.  
Chan, Stohs and Wang (2001) examine whether the underlying real estate holdings 
might explain the observed low initial-day return for REITs IPOs.  They study the Hong 
Kong market and find that the initial-day return of real estate related firms’ IPOs is in line 
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with that of non-real estate related firms’ IPOs. The result suggests that the underlying real 
estate holding alone does not explain the observed low-initial-day returns for REIT IPOs and 
suggests that the impact of the fund-like structure on REIT IPOs should be re-examined.  
Chan, Wang and Yang (2009) provide a model explaining why REIT IPOs can be 
overpriced or slightly underpriced. Their model suggests that the IPO offering price increases 
in the deadweight costs if an IPO fails. For a firm with significant amounts of tangible assets, 
it will have less incentive to reduce its offering price because the firm may be able to sell its 
assets to the market at a price similar to its IPO price if the IPO fails. On the other hand, a 
firm with significant intangible assets will want to set its IPO at a low price to avoid a failure 
because the deadweight costs are high for these firms. Their model implications are very 
suitable for explaining the REIT IPO patterns. Before 1990, U.S. REITs have a fund-like 
structure, and the deadweight costs for a failed IPO are quite small. Therefore, the firm will 
price its IPO close to or above its perceived intrinsic value, which leads to IPO overpricing. 
After 1990, U.S. REITs changed their structure from a traditional fund-like trust to one with 
an operational component. Management became the intangible assets of firm value. 
Therefore, the deadweight cost for the new REITs increased and REIT IPOs changed from 
being fairly priced or overpriced to being underpriced. 
To date, only a handful of studies have examined the pricing and/or performance of 
REIT (or REIT equivalent) IPOs in countries outside of the U.S., namely, Canada, Australia, 
Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and the U.K.  Panels A (last line), B and C of Table 
1.1 provide a summary of the findings on REIT IPOs conducted for Canada, countries in the 
Asia-Pacific, and Europe, respectively.  For example, Londerville (2002) examines 13 
Canadian REIT IPOs during the 1993-1998 period, Dimovski and Brooks (2006a and 2006b) 
study 37 and 58 Australian LPT IPOs in the 1994-1999 and 1994-2004 periods, respectively, 
while Dimovski (2010) examines 45 A-REIT IPOs from 2002-2008.  Kutsuna, Dimovski and 
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Brooks (2008) study 40 Japanese REIT IPOs during the 2001-2006 period, Wong, Ong and 
Ooi (2013) examine a total of 78 REIT IPOs from several Asian countries in the 2001-2008 
period, and Sahi and Lee (2001) examine 26 U.K. property investment companies 
(considered as REIT equivalents) going public during the 1986-1995 period. 
In general, these studies find relatively low (when compared to industrial firm IPOs in 
the same market) and sometimes insignificant positive returns on the first trading day. 
However, the initial-day return is, in general, positive.  In Australia, the first-trading day 
return is found to be insignificant in the pre-2000 period but positive and significant in the 
post-2000 period.  There are also a handful of studies that examine the IPO performance of 
property companies (Gerbich, Levis and Venmore-Rowland (1995), Sahi and Lee (2001), 
Chan, Stohs and Wang (2001), Brounen and Eichholtz (2001, 2002), and Freybote, Rottke 
and Schiereck (2008)).  These studies, in general, find that the IPOs of property companies 
are more positive and significant on the first-trading day than the IPOs of REITs.  However, 
since the time periods and sample selection criteria differ significantly amongst those studies, 
it is difficult to draw concrete conclusions by reviewing the evidence. 
At this moment, however, previous researchers only verify the different theoretical 
justifications focusing on REIT IPOs performance in one country. This can only be done by 
comparing changes in REIT IPO initial-day returns with changes in REIT structure or 
characteristics over time to draw inferences. In other words, we would only have the time-
series variation in REIT IPO initial-day returns. As we already know, the result of this 
approach is not very fruitful.  A systematic examination of recently established REIT markets 
in different countries might be able to show if the low or negative initial-day returns of REIT 
IPOs are universally true. Since the management style and the level of institutional investor 
participation in REITs vary by country, we might gain some evidence on whether the fund-
like structure or the level of institutional investor holdings is really the factor explaining the 
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cross-sectional variations in REIT initial-day returns.  
We would expect that the IPOs of REITs that are passive or fund-like (such as those 
in Taiwan, Thailand, and the CR-REITs in South Korea) to be fairly priced as the deadweight 
costs of a failed IPO for such type of REITs are quite small.  We would also expect REITs 
that are externally managed (such as those in most Asia-Pacific countries, with the exception 
of stapled REITs in Australia and K-REITs in South Korea) to exhibit lower initial-day 
returns when compared with internally managed REITs (such as stapled REITs in Australia, 
K-REITs in South Korea, Turkey, Belgium, France, U.K., Canada and the U.S.) where the 
deadweight cost of a failed IPO is higher.  
As mentioned in Section 1, the results of U.S. REIT IPO long-run performance differ 
significantly among the U.S. REIT IPO studies.  Furthermore, it is fair to say that most of the 
evidence on REIT IPO aftermarket performance is inconsistent with the -19.9% 3-year 
market adjusted buy-and-hold returns for industrial firm IPOs, as reported by Ritter (2012b).    
As previously noted, a meaningful comparison of the results in prior studies is not feasible 
due to the differing objectives, methodologies, sample selection criteria and sample periods 
used.  As such, there seems to be a need to study the long-run performance of all REIT IPOs 
available worldwide under one model framework and one sample period to find a more 
conclusive evidence. This is another motivation for this study. 
 
3. Global REIT market 
This section provides a brief description of the REIT structure and regulatory 
environment in each county and summarizes the main characteristics of each market.  
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3.1 REIT market for each country 
While the REIT industries in the U.S. and Australia date back to the early 1960s and 
1971, respectively, the development of the REIT markets in Asia, Canada and Europe only 
started in the recent two decades.  Although REITs in the other countries are basically 
following the American (tax) structure that the REITs can obtain a tax-exempt status if they 
satisfy a set of requirements such as distributing 90% of their free cash flows to shareholders, 
most countries regulate their own REIT or REIT-like structure.  
Appendix I provides a summary and comparison of the structure and requirements of 
the REIT regimes around the globe that we gathered for this study. Data sources for 
Appendix I include NAREIT issues (for U.S. REITs), CBRE 2010 research report (for Asian 
REITs), EPRA 2010 report (for Australia, Asia, Europe and North America REITs), Ernst & 
Young Global Real Estate Investment Trust Report (2010), Real Estate Securitization 
Handbook (2005), Real Estate Investment Trusts: A Global Analysis (2006), and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Worldwide REIT Regimes 2007 report covering Australia, North 
America, and several countries in Europe as well as Asia.  Appendix I shows the year in 
which the first REIT IPO takes place in each country and compares the management structure 
(externally versus internally managed), as well as asset, financial and operating requirements 
of the REITs across the globe.  It is noteworthy that many of these regimes are still evolving 
in terms of regulatory requirements, ownership and structure. This means that the information 
provided in this table is time sensitive and should be updated very frequently.  For example, 
the Malaysian government's liberalization of its regulation of foreign ownership and 
shareholdings in M-REITs in 2009 (see CBRE 2009 research report). 
Australian Real Estate Investment Trusts which were known named as Listed 
Property Trusts (LPTs) have a long history. The first Australian LPT was launched on the 
Australian stock exchanges (now the Australian Securities Exchange) in 1971. In 2008, they 
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were renamed Australian Real Estate Investment Trusts (A-REITs) in line with international 
practice.  
The development of REIT industry in Asia market only started from 2001.1 The first 
REIT of Asia emerged in Japan market and listed on Tokyo stock exchange in 2001. After 
that, REITs industry in the Asia-Pacific market experienced tremendous growth. Six 
countries (South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, Malaysia, Hong Kong) have 
introduced REIT structures rules and launched REIT IPOs on their major stock exchange 
markets.  
With regards to REITs in Japan, Seki (2006) describes that although Investment trust 
Act of Japan provided the creation of both investment trusts (contract-type investment trust) 
and investment corporations (company-type investment trust), all of the current listed J-
REITs are structured as investment corporations. J-REITs must apply external management 
for their assets. Therefore, an investment corporation is formed for the purpose of managing 
assets by investing in specified assets. An investment corporation entrusts its asset 
management to an investment trust management company. For example Nippon Fund 
Building management Ltd is the asset management company of Nippon Building Fund, the 
first and largest Japanese REITs. According to Appendix I, we notice that similar to 
Australia, there is no restriction on leverage ratio for J-REITs, therefore the investment 
corporation could expand their assets by raising loans as much as they can. Moreover, in May 
2008, Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) has amended its listing regulation that an inclusion of 
overseas real estate to the portfolio of J-REIT funds is liberated by law. This change means 
Japanese Capital is legally permitted to invest in overseas by real estate securitization 
scheme.   
                                                          
1 See Ooi et al. (2006) for a discussion of the growth of the REIT markets in Asia. 
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REITs in South Korea can be structured as Corporate Restructuring REITs (CR-
REITs) or organized as ordinary REITs (K-REITs) in the market. CR-REITs are corporate 
restructurings involving external management, limited life and favorable tax provisions. 
During the limited life of CR-REITs, they were not allowed to issue secondary units/share to 
the market. In 2002, Korea established its first Corporate Restructuring REITs (CR-REITs) 
on the Korean Stock Exchange. Different from CR-REITs, K-REITs are internally managed 
commercial real estate REITs without tax flow-through provision. Due to no tax benefit, no 
K-REIT was formed at the beginning. The legislation was amended in April 2005. It 
effectively extends the tax transparency status to K-REITs and initial capitalization 
restrictions, which makes it easy to structure K-REITs. However, neither K-REIT or CR-
REIT could borrow to fund new investment which is a serious impediment to growth. In June 
of 2007, the Real Estate Investment Trust Act in South Korea was amended again. The new 
Law raised the borrowing rate from 200% of equity to 1000%.  
The guidelines for the establishment of real estate funds of Singapore were first 
released by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) in May 1999. In June 2005, the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore announced the changes to the REIT framework, which 
involves including raising the current 35% borrowing limit to 60%. The condition for tax 
transparency granted to S-REITs was also changed in December 2002 by reducing the 
income distribution requirement from 100% to not less than 90%. To sustain the growth in 
the S-REIT market, in 2005, the Singapore government further announced the waiver of 
stamp duties for properties acquired by REITs over a period of five years. Similar to Japan, 
Singapore also provided for the creation of both investment trusts and investment 
corporations and S-REIT must be implemented by external management. In addition, most of 
S-REIT are open-end fund that they could offer secondary shares or units for acquisition real 
estate.  
13 
 
 
 
REITs exist as Property Funds for Public Offering (PFPO) in Thailand. They were 
established as a recovery vehicle for the 1997 financial crisis. However the Thai PFPO code 
is more rigid than the other REIT regulations compared to the U.S market. Asian REIT 
Market overview 2007 report published by AME capital says that Thai REITs cannot hold 
debt more than 10% of its asset, which hampers its acquisition for newly developed 
properties. Another important characteristic of Thai REITs is that they are built with close 
mutual fund type and could not issue units in the future for growth purpose. 
Taiwan government approved REIT in 2003 and created its first REIT in March 2005. 
Taiwan REITs are similar to REITs in other countries, involving raising funds first and then 
acquiring real estate objectives. However, Taiwan only allows the operation type of 
investment trust (contract-type investment trust) instead of the investment corporation type 
(company-type investment trust). In addition, Lin (2007) describes that Taiwan REITs 
growth is limited because REITs in Taiwan are usually be structured as closed-ends, which 
means that the number of units is restricted to what was issued at the initial offering and they 
were not allowed to issue new shares in order to raise funds to buy new property at the 
original fund level.  
While Malaysia introduced its first Property Trust on Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
in 1989, the Trusts were not granted tax transparency and lacked focusing on asset 
management. These trusts were not popular within the institutional investors. Most of them 
were eventually taken private. In early 2005, Malaysia government liberalized its REIT 
framework. The revision includes granting tax transparency status to the trust and liberalizing 
the trust’s borrowing limits to 35% of asset value. Under the new guidelines, the property 
fund were also be renamed to M-REITs and the first REIT was listed under the new REIT 
guidelines in August 2005. Most of M-REITs are structured to be open-ended. CBRE 
research report (2009) mentioned that on 30 June 2009, the Malaysian government 
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announced the liberalization of Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) guidelines for property 
purchases by foreigners, removal of the 30% Bumiputra equity condition in public-listed 
companies, and the allowance of 100% foreign ownership in fund management companies. 
The new guidelines are expected to spur interest on the part of foreign and local institutional 
property funds and REITs in coming into the market within the short-term future. 
Hong Kong launched Link REIT, the first HK-REIT and the largest REIT IPO in the 
world in November 2005. All the current listed HK-REITs are open-ended fund that they 
could issue secondary units/shares for acquisition properties that enhance existing rental 
yields for growth purpose. Different from the U.S. REITs and Australia LPT, HK-REITs 
would not receive any tax transparency.   
In Europe, Turkey established its REIT regimes in 1995. But the first public listing on 
the Turkish Stock Exchange was in 1997. REITs in Turkey are corporate type using internal 
management unit to manage their assets.  
The Belgium enacted the REIT regime known as the SICAFI in 1995.  REITs in 
Belgium are corporate type with internal management. Belgian legislation requires that the 
aggregate loans do not exceed 65% of the total assets. Furthermore, the annual interest costs 
may not exceed 80% of the total annuals profits. 
France introduced REITs in 2003 to allow listed real estate firms to elect to convert to 
a REIT in order to benefit from a French corporate tax exemption.  Besides these conversions, 
there are also property firms that launch as newly created REITs via initial public offerings.  
The French SIIC regime does not provide specific leverage restrictions.  
Similarly, when the U.K. established its REIT regime in 2007, a number of property 
firms in the U.K. chose to convert to REITs. Previously, these U.K. firms could be property 
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investment companies (PICs) that hold a similar commercial property portfolio to REITs.  
These PICs have existed long before the U.K. introduced its REIT legislation in 2007.  The 
U.K. REITs could be internal or external managed, but mostly apply internal management.  
To qualify as a U.K. REIT, at least 75% of the net income profit of the firm must be derived 
from the property rental business and at least 75% of the assets must be used in the property 
rental business. 
 
3.2 A comparison of the main characteristics of REIT structure  
With regard to asset management structure, REITs in the Asia-Pacific region (with the 
exception of stapled REITs in Australia, K-REITs in South Korea, and the Link REIT in 
Hong Kong) use an external management unit to manage their assets.  Stapled A-REITs are 
considered as internally managed given that its asset management function is carried out by 
an entity within the group structure.  In South Korea, all the early REITs are structured as 
Corporate Restructuring REITs (CR-REITs), which are externally managed while the more 
recent REITs are organized as ordinary REITs (K-REITs), which are internally managed. It is 
noteworthy that the CR-REITs in South Korea have finite-lives. REITs in Taiwan and 
Thailand are passive and fund-like in nature and have very limited growth opportunities.  
Link REIT (the first H-REIT comprising of properties formerly owned by the Hong Kong 
Housing Authority, a government agency) is the only REIT in Hong Kong that has an internal 
management structure.   
REITs in Europe, Canada and the U.S. are mostly internally managed even though 
some of the countries (U.S., Canada, Belgium, and the U.K.) permit both forms of 
management structure.   According to various sources (Real Estate Securitization Handbook, 
2005, Real Estate Investment Trusts: A Global Analysis, 2006, and Londerville, 2002) all the 
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existing REITs in France, Turkey, Belgium, and Canada have an internal management 
structure.  It is also noteworthy that, after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the U.S. that 
permits either internal or external management, a significant portion of U.S REITs in the 
post-1990 period are managed internally (see Chan, Erickson and Wang, 2003). 
In order to qualify as a REIT, the legal system for each country specifies certain 
investment requirements on real estate.  Most countries (except Australia, Japan, Turkey, 
Canada, and the US) place restrictions on the use of leverage and all countries (except 
Malaysia where it is not specified) have dividend payout requirements.  All countries, except 
Thailand, allow REITs to invest in foreign markets but so far, in the Asia-Pacific, only A-
REITs and S-REITs have invested in foreign markets.  According to a 2006 report by Yuta 
Seki of the Nomura Institute of Capital Market Research, J-REITs are considered to be 
passive property investment schemes and none has invested in development projects.  The 
REITs in all countries receive favorable tax provisions although in South Korea, these tax 
provisions were not extended to K-REITs until 2005. 
 
4. Sample selection and description 
This Section firstly provides a detail of the sample selection criteria and procedure.  
We will also report some of the difficulties we encountered in filtering the data. Section 4.2 
will report the summary statistics of our final sample of 370 REITs that we gathered from 14 
countries during the 1996-2010 period.  
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4.1. Sample selection and data sources 
We first identified and collected our sample of U.S. REIT and non-U.S. REIT IPOs 
during the 1971 to 2010 period from several data sources.  However, we decided to limit our 
sample to the period beginning from 1996.  This is because the Asian REIT market started in 
2001 and we are not able to obtain IPO data on our European REIT sample prior to 1996.  In 
addition, to facilitate comparison across countries, we think it is best to apply the same 
sampling period to all the countries that we include in this study.  Only three countries 
(Australia, Canada and the U.S.) have IPO data prior to 1996. 
We identify the initial sample of U.S. REIT IPOs that starts trading between January 
1996 to December 2010 from the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trust 
(NAREIT) database, Securities Database Corporation (SDC) Platinum New Issues database, 
and Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Appendix II shows our data 
collection procedure for U.S. REIT IPOs during the 1996-2010 period.  Both SDC Platinum 
and CRSP provide the industry classification of firms in the database.  We use SIC 6798 to 
identify the firms that are classified as REITs in both of these databases. The NAREIT 
database and the SDC database provide the REIT name, offering date, offering price and 
offering amount, and the CRSP database provides the REIT name and the first trading date.  
Using at least two data sources, we verified a sample of 132 U.S. REIT IPOs spanning the 
period 1996-2010. (Of these, only one IPO in the sample is a best efforts offer.) Among them, 
129 REIT IPOs are verified using NAREIT and SDC, two are verified using either SDC or 
NAREIT together with Lexis-Nexis news, and one is verified using CRSP and the REIT’s 
IPO prospectus (available from EDGAR online).  
For each of the verified U.S. REIT IPO, we use CRSP to obtain aftermarket price data 
for the first trading day, the daily returns data for the subsequent 190 trading days and the 
returns on the market (the CRSP equally-weighted market index including dividends).  CRSP 
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provides daily return data that includes dividend and stock split adjustments.  CRSP uses the 
last sale price or the closing bid/ask average at the time of the last available price for the 
return computation (see CRSP documentation).  We checked the CRSP return series for 
missing return codes (-66.0, -77.0, -88.0, and -99.0) but did not find these codes during the 
time periods we examine in this study. We also checked the first-day trading price for each 
REIT using the Standard and Poor’s Daily Stock Price Record.  From this screen, we 
eliminate three IPOs. The first is a unit (common share plus warrant) offering in which the 
first-trading day (given in CRSP) and the offering date (as stated in NAREIT and SDC) of 
this REIT are about six months apart.   In this particular case, the warrants detach six months 
after the offering date (PR Newswire, 11/14/1997.)  The second involves a publicly-listed 
specialty finance company converting to a REIT and filing to list on the NYSE under a new 
stock symbol.  The third is an existing NASDAQ traded REIT that made a public offering of 
common stocks and began trading on the NYSE.  With these three deletions, our final U.S. 
sample comprises of 129 REITs with initial trading dates spanning the period 1996-2010. 
To identify the non-US REITs (from 13 countries, namely, Australia, Japan, South 
Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Turkey, Belgium, France, U.K., 
and Canada) and their IPO information during the 1996-2010 period, we gather all firms 
listed in the REIT sector from the Securities Database Corporation (SDC) Platinum New 
Issues database, Bloomberg database, and the Thomson Datastream Advance database. 
Appendix III uses flow chart showing how we arrived at our sample of 241 non-U.S. REIT 
IPOs. The Bloomberg database classifies firms according to Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB), Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) and Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes. To get the largest initial sample from Bloomberg, we use ICB, 
Bloomberg’s default code to filter firms. DataStream classifies firms into REIT industry 
based on Thomson Reuters Business Classification (TRBC). It covers over 40 years of data 
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from more than 140 countries and 60 markets.  It also covers the historical data for both 
active (listed) and dead (delisted) firms. When we set the selection criterion, we restrict our 
samples to the “Primary quotes” and “Major Security” so that the firms selected are only the 
primary quotes on the main markets. For firms with cross-listings, only those on the main 
markets will be counted in our sample. SDC and Bloomberg provide the issuer name, the 
issue date, offer price, the primary exchange where issuer’s stock trades, the issuer’s industry, 
REIT type and the primary shares offered in the market while DataStream provides the firm 
name, industry sector, market, and base (first available trade) date.  Both Bloomberg and 
DataStream provide the first-day trading price and time-series price data.  For the first-day 
closing price, we use the unadjusted price, which is the closing price as it was historically 
determined on the stock exchange.  For our long-run performance analysis, we use time-
series price data from DataStream as in prior studies of global equity offerings (e.g., Foerster 
and Karolyi (2000) and Brounen and Eichholtz (2002)). 
We cross-reference the firms from the above three databases (those with SIC 6798 in 
SDC, those in the ICB REIT sector in Bloomberg, and those in the REIT sector in 
DataStream) and retain only the firms that are not duplicates.  A firm is verified to be a REIT 
if it is in the REIT sector in all three databases.  If not, we verify the firm to be a REIT using 
one of the following additional sources: the website of the stock exchange on which the firm 
is listed, the firm’s website, CBRE report, EPRA report, and Thomson Extel Cards Records, 
Hoover's Company Records, Nelson's Public Company Profiles or Major Companies Report 
from the LexisNexis Academic Database.  
After deleting those firms that we cannot verify to be a REIT in at least two sources, 
we have an initial sample of 312 non-U.S. REITs that have an initial trading date in the 1996-
2010 period.  Note that in our U.K. sample, we include property investment companies that 
went public prior to the establishment of the U.K. REIT regime in 2007 only if they are 
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classified as a REIT in the data sources (SDC, Bloomberg or DataStream) that we use to 
identify our initial REIT sample.  We next check for offering price and first-day closing price 
information for these 312 REITs using one of several sources: Bloomberg, DataStream, 
Google Finance, Yahoo Finance, CBRE report, and market releases or IPO prospectuses (if 
they are available from Bloomberg or Lexis-Nexis Academic).  Of these 312 REITs, we are 
able to find non-missing offer price and first-day close price information for 266 of them (54 
from Australia, 138 from Asia, 41 from Europe, and 33 from Canada).  Given that we find 
instances of discrepancies in the recorded offer price or first-day day close price among the 
different data sources, we will include a REIT in the final sample only if its offer price and 
first-day closing price information can be verified in at least two sources, except in cases 
where the IPO price is taken from a prospectus or is the same for all the REITs in a country 
(as in the case of CR-REITs in South Korea, T-REITs in Taiwan and Thai REITs).  
A situation that requires special treatment is when an IPO is being offered on a partly 
paid or installment basis, as is the case with several A-REITs in our sample.  To illustrate, an 
excerpt from the offering prospectus of Reckson New York Property Trust dated Aug 15, 
2005 states:  “The Offer is for 263 million Units in the Trust at a fully paid Issue Price of 
$1.00 per Unit. The Issue Price will be payable in two installments – an Initial Installment of 
$0.65 per Unit which will be payable at the time of Application and a Final Installment of 
$0.35 per Unit which will be payable on 1 October 2006”.  A press release statement on the 
day after the REIT started to trade reads as follows: “The $263.4 million Reckson New York 
Property Trust has made its debut on the Australian Stock Exchange, closing at the issue 
price of 65c a unit, having gone as high as 66c.  With 35c payable in October next year, 
Reckson offers a slice of the New York tri-state office property market (Sydney Morning 
Herald (Australia), Business Section, p. 18, September 27, 2005).   Therefore, for this and 
other A-REIT IPOs involving partial payments, we treat the first installment price as the offer 
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price and the first-day closing price as the price given in the press release following the day 
of trade and confirmed with the price in Bloomberg and DataStream.   
Another situation that requires attention is when the SDC reports two different 
offering prices for the same IPO (in a few cases in Malaysia and Singapore).  In such cases, 
we check with the firm’s prospectus and use the retail price offered to the public as the IPO 
price. 
After this verification, 25 IPOs are eliminated for the following reasons: 
(a) The offer price or the close price can be found in only one source (7 A-REITs, two K-
REITs, and 7 Canadian REITs eliminated). 
(b) The offer has either conflicting offer price or closing price information from two or 
more sources (two A-REITs, one Turkish REIT, one Canadian REIT, and one U.K. 
REIT eliminated). 
(c) The offer is a relisting under the same name after a merger with another firm (one J-
REIT eliminated). 
(d) The offer is a spin-off offering in which shares are distributed to parent firm’s 
shareholders or offered to these shareholders at a preferential rate (three S-REITs 
eliminated). 
The final sample consists of 129 U.S. REIT IPOs and 241 non-U.S. REIT IPOs (45 from 
Australia, 132 from Asia, 39 from Europe, and 25 from Canada) with offering dates spanning 
the 1996-2010 period.  Totally, we have a final sample of 370 REIT IPOs from four 
continents.   
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4.2. Sample statistics 
 Table 1.2 compares the mean percentage of institutional holdings of REIT stocks 
across the globe.  Given data limitations, our computation of the mean percentage of 
institutional holdings of REIT stocks in each country in our sample (except the U.S.) is based 
on the institutional holdings data that Bloomberg reports for each REIT on December 31, 
2010.2 The mean percentage holding is computed using only those REITs with available 
institutional holdings data.  Note that we report the institutional holdings figures for Taiwan 
to be not available because the figures given by Bloomberg for the Taiwan REITs are 
extremely low (average of 0.05%), which are inconsistent with information in new articles 
that mentioned about high institutional holdings of Taiwan REITs.  For example, according 
to a November 2010 Taiwan economic news article in news.cens.com, REITs in Taiwan are 
held mostly by institutional investors.  The article cited two REITs (San Tin Fund and Kee 
Tai Fund) with institutional holdings of around 75% and 59%. Given the contradictory 
information (at two extreme opposite ends) reported in Bloomberg and news articles for 
Taiwan REITs, we treat the institutional information for Taiwan as being “not available”. For 
the U.S. REIT sample, the percent of institutional holdings is the equity holdings of 
institutional investors in REIT stocks in the first quarter following their IPOs. This 
information is obtained from the Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings 13F database 
through WRDS. 
As Table 1.2 shows, the percentage of institutional holdings in REIT stocks in several 
countries (Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, the U.K. and post-1995 US) is relatively high 
(ranging from about 39% to 90%) when compared to the institutional holdings of about 13% 
                                                          
2 Bloomberg provides firm-level data on the percentage of institutional holdings starting only in March 2010.  
We asked someone working in the Bloomberg data department about the availability of data for earlier 
periods but were told that Bloomberg does not provide historical institutional holdings information for non-
U.S. firms. 
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and 23% in U.S. REITs during the 1981-1989 and 1981-1999 periods, respectively (see Chan, 
Erickson and Wang, 2003).  However, institutional interest in REITs is still rather low (below 
10%) in Turkey during the period of the study.  It should be noted that this observation is 
based only on a sample of four REITs in Turkey that have institutional holdings information 
available 
Table 1.3 presents a detailed breakdown of the number and issue size of these IPOs in 
each year during the 1996-2010 period by country and by continent.  SDC provides the 
offering size or proceeds amount in the market (at which the REIT trades) denominated in US 
dollars.  When the data is missing from SDC for a particular REIT, we compute the offering 
size by first multiplying the offer price, which is denoted in local currency, by the number of 
IPO shares offered taken from Bloomberg.  We then convert the amount to US dollars using 
the exchange rate prevailing at the IPO date.  The foreign currency exchange rate is obtained 
online from http://www.x-rates.com/. 
As Table 1.3 shows, only the U.S., Australia, Canada, and Belgium have REITs 
trading before 2001.  REIT IPO activity in Asia did not begin until September 2001.  
Although Turkey has the first public listing of REIT on the Turkish Stock Exchange in 1997 
(see EuroProperty Magazine, Nov. 17, 2008), 2005 is the earliest year we are able to find 
REIT IPO information for Turkey from our data sources.  France established a REIT regime 
in 2003 followed by the U.K. in 2007.  Therefore, for France, REIT IPO activity starts only in 
2005.  For the U.K., however, only two REITs (one in 2007 and one in 2010) were launched 
as newly-created REITs.  The rest of the IPOs are by REIT-like firms (or property investment 
companies) that are classified as REITs in SDC, Bloomberg or DataStream.  Most of these 
firms converted to REITs at a later date after their IPOs.   
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Comparing offering sizes across countries, Table 1.3 shows a similarity in the mean 
amount issued between Asia ($239 million) and the U.S. ($243 million).  The average 
offering sizes in Europe ($89 million) and in Canada ($87 million) are less than half that of 
the REITs in Asia or in the U.S., while the average offering size in Australia ($153 million) is 
slightly below the global (excluding the U.S.) average.  At the country level, Hong Kong has 
the largest mean offer size (US$684 million) followed by Japan (US$370 million).  It is 
noteworthy, however, that the large mean offer size in Hong Kong is driven by an extremely 
large offer (US$2,560 million) by Link REIT, the first listed REIT in Hong Kong.  Excluding 
this outlier, the mean offer size in Hong Kong is $371 million, which is close to that in Japan. 
While recognizing that the REIT regimes in different countries are at various stages of 
maturity, we are able to observe periods of heightened REIT IPO activity (or wave) in each 
region during the period from 1996 to 2010.  Defining a REIT IPO wave to be ten or more 
IPOs in any given year or consecutive years as in Buttimer, Hyland, and Sanders (2005), we 
observe the following waves: 2003, 2005-2007, and 2010 in Asia; 2006 in the Europe; and 
1997-1998, 2003-2005, and 2010 in North America.3  Under this definition, there are no 
REIT IPO waves in Australia.  For all the countries in our sample, with the exception of 
Thailand and the U.S., there are no REIT IPOs completed in 2009.  In addition, there are no 
REIT IPOs from 2008 to 2010 in the Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong samples.  In the next 
section we will report that this is probably tied to the poor performance of the REITs 
(especially in Taiwan and Hong Kong) that went public in the earlier years. 
 
 
                                                          
3 The 1997-1998 period is the last of three REIT IPO waves examined in the long-run performance study by 
Buttimer, Hyland and Sanders (2005). 
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5. Methodologies 
This section describes the methodologies we use to compute the initial-day returns, 
the subsequent aftermarket returns over selected intervals in the 190 days after the IPO and 
the long-run returns in the first 3 years and 5 years after the IPO.   
 
5.1. Measuring initial-day returns  
The initial-day raw return is measured from the offer price to the close price at the end 
of the first trading day, without adjusting for market movements.  We also compute market-
adjusted initial-day returns, in which the raw return is adjusted for the contemporaneous 
return on the local market index. The local market indexes used for each non-U.S. country are 
as follows: the ASX All Ordinaries Index (Australia), Nikkei 225 (Japan), Seoul Composite 
Index (South Korea), Straits Times Index (Singapore), SET Index (Thailand), Taiwan 
Weighted Index (Taiwan), KLSE Composite Index (Malaysia), Hang Seng Index (Hong 
Kong), Istanbul National 100 Index (Turkey), Euronext BEL-20 Index (Belgium), CAC 40 
Index (France), FTSE 100 (U.K.), and S&P/TSX Composite Index (Canada).  For the U.S. 
market benchmark, we use the CRSP Equally-Weighted market index with dividends.  The 
reason why we use local market indexes, instead of a matching REIT sample, is because the 
REIT markets in most of the countries we are studying are relatively new and we will not 
have an adequate sample of seasoned REITs to match REIT IPO samples. We want to apply 
one methodology to all countries involved. 
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5.2. Measuring cumulative abnormal returns over 190 days 
To analyze the performance of the REIT IPOs over a longer interval, following the 
methodology in Wang, Chan and Gau (1992), we compute their average daily returns for the 
189 days after the first trading day.  CRSP provides the daily returns for the U.S. REITs 
while DataStream provides the individual stock total return index (inclusive of dividends) 
that we can use to calculate the daily returns for each non-U.S. REITs.  However, for 11 
REITs in our sample (one in Australia, five in Taiwan, four in Canada, and one in France) in 
which time-series data is not available for the beginning part of the series from DataStream, 
we filled in the missing portion using time-series data from Bloomberg.  
For computing the benchmark returns during our period of analysis, DataStream 
provides time-series data on the daily total return index (inclusive of dividends) for some 
countries, namely, Australia, Canada, France, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and 
the U.K. but provides only the price index (exclusive of dividends but adjusted for capital 
operations) for Belgium, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, and Turkey. For those countries with 
an available total return index we compute the daily market stock return using the total return 
index.  For those countries with only the price index data (but no return index data), we 
compute the daily market stock return using the price index provided.4 For Malaysia, the 
daily total return index series starts only from November 2009.  Consequently, we have to 
use the daily price index data to compute the return series.  CRSP provides the time-series 
return on an equally-weighted market index (including dividends) for the U.S. REITs.   
We compute the cross-sectional average daily market-adjusted returns and cumulate 
them over selected intervals after the IPO day.  We then compute the significance of the 
                                                          
4 DataStream also provides dividend information on the market in a separate file.  However, we find that most of 
the dividends reported in the file are either errors or blanks. Given this, we believe that the dividend files for 
the stock market index are not reliable.  Since the stock market returns calculated using the stock market price 
indexes do not include the market dividends, the results of the five countries derived using price indexes 
should be interpreted with caution. 
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market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) using a methodology similar to Ritter 
(1991) and Wang, Chan and Gau (1992).  
 
5.3. Measuring long-run performance over 3-year and 5-year periods 
To test the long-run performance of REIT IPOs in each country (each continent as 
well as the global market) over the longer run (three years and five years), we employ a Fama 
and French factor model similar to that used by Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Buttimer, 
Hyland and Sanders (2005).  The number of factors that we include in the model for each 
country will depend on data availability.  As in Loughran and Ritter (1995), each month we 
form a portfolio of REIT IPOs that went public during the prior 36 months (or 60 months).  
In month t, REIT IPOs from month t-1 are added to the portfolio while those REITs that went 
public in month t-37 (or t-61) are dropped from the portfolio. The portfolios are formed for 
each country, each continent (Australia, Asia, Europe and North America), and the global 
market (including and excluding the U.S.).  The portfolio monthly return is the average of the 
monthly return (including dividend) of each REIT included in the portfolio.  
For each country, we regress the REIT IPO portfolio return in excess of the risk-free 
rate against one or more Fama and French (1993) factors. The regression model with the 
Fama-French factors as well as Carhart's (1997) momentum factor included is as follows: 
Rpt – Rft =  + b [RMCt - Rft]+ c HMLCt + d SMBCt + e WMLCt + εpt, 
where Rft is the risk-free rate in month t, and Rpt – Rft is the return on the country’s portfolio 
minus the risk-free rate (or excess return) in month t.  RM
C
t - Rft  is the excess monthly return 
on the value-weighted local market portfolio, HMLCt is the return on a country portfolio of 
high book-to-market stocks minus the return on a country portfolio of low book-to-market 
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stocks in month t,  SMBCt  is the return on a country portfolio of small firms minus the return 
on country portfolio of large firms in month t, and WMLCt is Carhart's (1997) momentum 
factor.  A statistically significant intercept  of the regression will indicate long-run abnormal 
performance.   
Kenneth French’s website provides Rft (the one-month U.S. treasury bill rate).5  The 
website also provides RM
C
t , the country’s market return (value weighted local return) for the 
following countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, 
U.K., and the U.S.  For the rest of the countries (Taiwan, Thailand, South Korea, Turkey and 
Malaysia) we calculate the local market monthly return using the local stock market price 
index from DataStream.  The market monthly market returns include dividend returns for 
Taiwan and Thailand but exclude dividend returns for South Korea, Turkey and Malaysia.  
Kenneth French's website provides all the monthly country-specific factors, HMLCt , SMB
C
t 
and WMLCt  for the U.S. and Japan, but only provides the HML
C
t factor for the other 
countries. 
Additionally, we run a similar four-factor regression model for each continent (and 
global) portfolio where we define Rpt – Rft as the continent (or global) market portfolio return 
in excess of the risk-free rate in month t, RMt - Rft  is the excess monthly return on the value-
weighted regional (or global) market portfolio, and HMLt
 , SMBt
 and WMLt as the regional (or 
global) value, size and momentum factors, respectively.  Kenneth French’s website provides 
the global factors, European factors, Asia-Pacific ex-Japan factors and the North American 
factors. 
 
                                                          
5  Kenneth French’s website is http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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6.  Empirical results 
This section reports the empirical results for the initial-day returns, the subsequent 
aftermarket returns over selected intervals in the 190 days after the IPO and the long-run 
returns in the first 3 years and 5 years after the IPO.   
 
6.1. Initial-day returns 
Table 1.4 displays the summary statistics of the raw and market-adjusted (or 
abnormal) initial-day returns by country, by continent, and globally.  The mean market-
adjusted initial-day return for the 370 REIT IPOs issued in 14 countries during the 1996-2010 
period is a significant 3.31%.  The mean market-adjusted initial-day return for the 241 (129) 
non-U.S. (U.S.) REIT IPOs is a significant 3.59% (2.79%).  The mean market-adjusted 
initial-day returns are significantly positive for four countries: Australia (3.24%), France 
(8.55%), the U.K. (7.65%), and the U.S. (2.79%). The other ten countries have positive (but 
insignificant) initial-day returns.  
The initial-day returns of the four continents are all significant and positive. The 39 
European REIT IPOs have the highest mean market-adjusted initial-day return (6.60%) 
comparing with the 45 REIT IPOs in Australia (3.24%), the 132 REIT IPOs in Asia (3.19%), 
and the 154 REIT IPOs in North American (2.61%) during the same period.  We also 
compute median raw initial-day returns and find the results to be generally consistent with 
that using the mean return measure. We use the signed test and Wilcoxon signed rank test to 
see whether the median initial-day return is significantly different from zero. Based on the 
median raw return, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand also exhibit significant underpricing.   
At the bottom of Table 1.4, we also present our findings for the U.S. over a longer period, 
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from 1971 to 2010.  Over this period, the mean raw and the mean market-adjusted initial-day 
returns are a positive and significant 0.97% and 0.89%, respectively.   
We now compare some of our findings with that reported by prior studies (see Table 
1.1).  Our findings, in general, are consistent with the initial-day returns documented by 
studies that examined the pricing of REIT IPOs in Canada, Australia, Japan, Singapore, 
Malaysia, and Hong Kong (see Londerville (2002), Dimovski and Brooks (2006a and 2006b), 
Dimovski (2010) and Wong, Ong and Ooi (2013)).  Our initial-day IPO return for the U.K. 
(given that our U.K. sample contains both REIT and property investment firms) is consistent 
that reported in the literature for U.K. property firms.  Our results for France, however, is not 
comparable to that reported by Brounen and Eichholtz (2002) because our sample comprises 
of French REITs that are formed after France established its REIT regime in 2003 while their 
sample comprises only of property firms in France from 1994-1999.  
However, although we find positive and significant underpricing at the continent and 
global levels during the period of our study, the magnitude of the underpricing seems to be 
small and far below that documented for industrial firms. Table 1.5 compares average raw 
initial-day returns of REIT IPOs with that of industrial firms in each country.  The data on 
non-REIT IPOs in each country is obtained from Jay Ritter’s IPO Data website 
(http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm).  The last column in Table 1.5 shows the 
relative underpricing of non-REITs versus REITs. The numbers are calculated using the 
average initial-day return of non-REITs divided by the average initial-day return of REITs.   
Although the sample periods of the industrial firm IPOs in same countries might differ 
significantly from the sample period we use for the REIT IPOs, the difference in the 
magnitudes of the initial-day returns between these two groups of studies is too large to 
ignore.  
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In general, as the Table 1.5 shows, the relative underpricing (industrial firms versus 
REITs) is much larger for Asian REIT IPOs than that observed for REITs in Europe, 
Australia or North America. The initial-day returns of industrial firm IPOs in Thailand and 
Taiwan are 43.57 and 30.24 times that of the REIT IPOs.  Lower relative underpricing is 
observed for European REITs. The initial-day returns of industrial firm IPOs in the U.K. and 
France are 1.24 and 2.11 times that of the REIT IPOs.  As mentioned in Section 3, some of 
the U.K. REITs were still operating companies (property investment companies) at the IPO 
stage (that later convert to REITs after the IPOs). This might partially explain the difference 
between the European REITs and the Asian REITs.  The ratios of the relative underpricing 
for 11 out of the 14 countries are above 4 (6.04 for the U.S.).  This indicates that industrial 
firm IPOs, on average, earn a significantly higher initial-day return than REIT IPOs given the 
global evidence.  
Table 1.6 provides the average initial-day returns of REIT IPOs by continent and by 
year of listing. The last two columns report the information on the average initial-day return 
of the global 370 REIT IPOs by year.  The mean initial-day return of 14 (one) out the 15 
years examined are positive (negative). Among the 14 years with positive returns, six are 
significantly positive. We observe significant underpricing in 1997 (only when the U.S. is 
included), during the period from 2003-2006 and in 2010.  At the continent level, we also 
observe similar clusters of significant underpricing during the 2003-2006 period. Significant 
underpricing in 2007 and 2010 is observed only for Europe and Asia, respectively. It appears 
that 2003 to 2006 are the hot REIT markets globally. The average initial-day returns of these 
four years are all significantly positive in the global sample. It should be noted that 190 (out 
of a total of 370) REIT IPOs were issued during this 4-year period.  In other words, 51.35% 
of global REITS IPOs are concentrated in a 4-year window period during a 15-year period.  
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So far, our analyses of global REIT IPOs confirm the phenomenon we have observed 
from the U.S. REIT market. First, the average initial-day return of REIT IPOs is low. Second, 
industrial firm IPOs have much higher initial-day returns than REIT IPOs.  Third, REIT IPOs 
come in waves.  The initial-day returns in a hot market (with more IPOs in the market) are 
higher than that in a cold market (with fewer IPOs in the market).  Fourth, there are negative 
initial-day returns in certain years or certain regions for REIT IPOs.  We will now see if we 
can gather some evidence from the country-level results to answer questions on why REIT 
initial-day returns are so low and why they can sometimes be negative. 
To do this, we analyze if there are differences in the underpricing levels between the 
REIT type, property management structure, trust structure, institutional holdings, and issue 
size.  Table 1.7 reports the results of the various univariate tests.  As Panel A of Table 1.7 
shows, REITs in Europe are significantly more underpriced than those in Asia-Pacific.  As 
discussed in Section 3, European REITs are internally managed and more operational in 
nature while Asia-Pacific REITs are mostly externally managed and more fund-like in nature.  
Panel B and Panel C of Table 1.7 report that there is no significant difference in underpricing 
between unit trusts and stapled REITs in the Australian sample, but there is a significant 
difference in underpricing between K-REITs and CR-REITs in the South Korean sample.   K-
REITs are self-managed and more operational in nature when compared with CR-REITs that 
are fund-like with finite life. Panel D of Table 1.7 shows that internally managed REITs 
(based on firm level data) are significantly more underpriced than those that are externally 
managed. Panel E of Table 1.7 shows that REITs that are more operational-like are 
significantly more underpriced than those that are fund-like and/or with finite life.  However, 
we do not find any significant differences in underpricing level between high and low 
institutional holdings in the REIT IPO samples for both the U.S. and non-U.S. countries (see 
Panels F and G) and also between high and low offer sizes (see Panel H). 
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Recall that there are two types of explanations for the observed low initial–day 
returns. The first explanation is based on the asymmetric information between informed 
investors (institutional investors) and uninformed investors (individual investors). If informed 
investors know much more about the true value of the IPOs, then the issuers will underprice 
IPOs to attract the uninformed investors and compensate for the expected loss of the 
uninformed investors.  The second explanation is based on a deadweight cost argument. As 
long as the cost of a failed IPO is low, an issuer is not necessary to underprice an IPO and 
sometimes will overprice an IPO if uncertainty on the value of the REIT IPO is high.  We 
now try to see which explanation can better fit the evidence we provide in Tables 1.7. 
Tables 1.7 indicates that REIT IPOs are more underpriced when they are more 
operational in nature (Panels A and E) and internally managed (Panels C and D). It is 
reasonable to argue that the deadweight cost (the cost of a failed IPO) should be higher for a 
REIT with an operational component and lower for a REIT with external management (or 
fund-like structure).  It is fair to say that the deadweight cost argument is relatively more 
straightforward than the asymmetric information argument.  This is especially true given that 
the magnitude of the initial-day return seems to be invariant to the level of institutional 
investor participation in the IPO market (Panels F and G) or the issue size of the IPO (Panel 
H).  If the underpricing is to compensate individual investors who have less information 
about the value of the REIT, we would expect that the underpricing level should be higher for 
the IPOs with more institutional investor participation so that the issuers need to compensate 
for the expected loss of the individual investors. 
Table 1.6 also indicates that issuers underprice REIT IPOs more in a hot market 
(2003-2006). An asymmetric information type of explanation would predict less underpricing 
in a hot market as competition among issuers should reduce the level of information 
asymmetry among investors. However, the empirical evidence seems to be in a direction 
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opposite to that predicted by an asymmetric information explanation.  On the other hand, the 
likelihood of having a failed IPO is higher (and, therefore, the expected cost of a failed IPO is 
higher) when there are more competitors in the market.  The deadweight cost type of model 
would predict a higher degree of underpricing in a hot market, which is supported by the 
empirical evidence reported in Table 1.6. 
We are also interested in finding out if a behavioral type of explanation can explain 
the variations in the initial-day return.  An investor sentiment type of argument would predict 
that a high return in the IPO market could be due to “excessive demand” in the market. To 
analyze this, we ran additional tests to see if the mean initial-day return is impacted if a) we 
exclude the first REIT IPO in each country from the sample or b) if we exclude REITs that 
are “special” in the sense that they are the first of its kind in the country which might receive  
a lot media attention.  We hypothesize that the introduction of the first REIT or a special type 
of REIT into a particular market would attract the attention of investors that might increase 
the investors’ demand for a new product. 
We perform this test for the Asian market only since the REITs in Asia are relatively 
new and we can identify the first REITs in all the countries in our Asian sample. The 
identification of the “special” REITs is from our own reading and understanding of news 
articles downloaded from Lexis-Nexis. We are able to identify a “special” REIT only for 
South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong.  Dasan REIT (a K-REIT) is the first self-
managed REIT to go public after the South Korean government amended the REIT 
regulations to stimulate investor interests in REITs.  CapitalRetail China Trust (an S-REIT) is 
the first REIT with China properties to list in Singapore. Al-‘Aqar KPJ REIT (an M-REIT) is 
the first publicly traded Islamic REIT in Asia. Prosperity REIT (a H-REIT) is the first private 
sector REIT in Hong Kong or the second REIT in Hong Kong. The properties of the first 
REIT in Hong Kong are related to the Hong Kong government. 
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Table 1.8 reports the mean initial-day returns of the Asia samples with and without 
the first REIT (and with and without the “special” REIT).  The removal of the first REIT 
from the sample does not change the mean initial-day return much for Japan, South Korea, 
Singapore, and Thailand.  While we observe a drop in the underpricing level for Taiwan, 
Malaysia, and Hong Kong, the change in the level of underpricing between the sample with 
and the sample without the first REIT is not statistically significant. 
When we compare the mean initial-day return of the sample with and without the 
“special” REIT, we find a large drop in the underpricing levels in South Korea, Singapore 
and Hong Kong.  There is no change observed in Malaysia.  The mean underpricing for the 
Asian market as a whole, after removing these four REITs, drops from 2.97% to 1.87%. The 
difference is not statistically significant.  The result shows that in general the significant 
underpricing of REIT IPOs in Asia is not due to the first or the special REIT effect.  
 
6.2. Cumulative abnormal returns over 190 days 
Wang, Chan and Gau (1992) report that the 87 REITs issued in the 1971-1988 period  
underperform (-7.48%) seasoned REITs in the 189 trading days after their IPOs. However, 
Ling and Ryngaert (1997) subsequently find that 85 equity REITs issued in the 1991-1994 
period moderately outperform (2.2%) a REIT Index in the 100 trading days after the first 
trading day. Wang, Chan and Gau (1992) could not explain the -7.48% 2-190 days 
cumulative average abnormal return (CAR) in their sample. There is no need for Ling and 
Ryngaert (1997) to explain the 2.2% return since the magnitude is small. Given this, the 
evidence on the short-run aftermarket performance (up to 190 days) is still inconclusive. We 
now examine if REITs globally exhibit any special patterns in the 189 days after the initial-
day trading.  The intervals (1-30, 1-90, and 1-190) include the initial-day return and the 
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intervals (2-30, 2-90, and 2-190) exclude the initial-day return.  To distinguish this analysis 
from the 3-year and 5-year long-run performance in the next sub-section, we term this 
performance analysis (up to 190 days) the short-run performance of REIT IPOs. 
Table 1.9 reports the 1-90 days CAR and 1-190 days CAR for non-US REITs to be an 
insignificant 0.65% and an insignificant -1.03%. If we exclude the first day return, the 2-90 
days CAR and the 2-190 days CAR for non-US REITs are a significant -2.94% and a 
significant -4.62%, respectively.  This means that non-U.S. REITs underperform their general 
stock market indexes in the 189 days after their IPOs.  Therefore, the total return of the non-
U.S. REIT IPOs during the 190 days after issuance (inclusive of first-day return) is 
insignificantly different from zero.  In this regard, if we take the 190 days (instead of the 
first-trading day) as the window to observe the IPO performance, the deadweight cost type of 
model seems to be more suitable to explain this return pattern than a winner’s curse type of 
model. 
However, the global REIT IPO short-run performance (inclusive of U.S. REITs) is 
different from that of non-US REIT IPOs.   Table 1.9 reports that the 1-90 days CAR and the 
1-190 days CAR for the global REIT sample are an insignificant -0.76% and a significant      
-4.05%, respectively.  The 2-90 days CAR and the 2-190 days CAR for the global REIT 
sample are a significant -4.07% and a significant -7.36% respectively.  Clearly, this 
significant underperformance is caused by the U.S. REITs.  However, a significant -4.05% 
during the first 190 days of trading is not difficult to explain.  Risk might explain the 
difference because the CAR does not adjust for risk.  For example, if the average beta of the 
global REIT sample is around 0.6, and the annual market return is around 15%, we can easily 
explain why there should be a -4.05% return (compensating for risk) during a 190-day trading 
period. This also points out a need to analyze the long-run performance of REIT IPOs using 
asset-pricing models that explicitly adjust for risks.  
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There are also significant variations in the performance of the short-run CARs among 
countries and continents.  Asian and European REITs have insignificant 1-190 days CARs.  
On the other hand, Australian and North American REITs behave similarly to the U.S. 
REITs.  At the country level, the CARs over the 2-30 day interval for South Korea and the 
U.S. are negative and significant, while the CARs for the rest of the countries are 
insignificant. In Table 1.9, we notice that the 2-30 days CAR for South Korea is a significant 
-8.77%. The large negative CAR is mostly driven by the poor performance of one REIT 
(Dasan REIT).  Interestingly, this REIT has a large run-up in price (70% initial-day return) on 
the first-day of trading but subsequently its price continues to drop precipitously over the 
interval of observation.  By day 30 after its IPO, its price has dropped about 53% from 1700 
won (close price on first-trading day) to 804 won.  For the rest of countries we examined, ten 
out of the fourteen countries have a negative 2-190 days CAR.  Of the ten negative 2-190 
days CARs, four are significant.  Australia, Taiwan, U.S. and Hong Kong are the four 
countries with the lowest 1-190 days CAR and 2-190 days CAR.   
As a comparison, we also check the performance of the short-run CARs of U.S. 
REITs issued during the 1971-2010 (instead of 1996-2010). The result is similar, with a 
significantly negative -11.13% 2-190 days CAR. We are also able to duplicate the positive 
short-run result reported by Ling and Ryngaert (1997) for REITs issued during the 1991-1994 
period. This might indicate that there are significant sub-period variations in the performance 
of the CARs. 
In order to check whether REIT management structure (internal versus external) 
matters in the short-run aftermarket performance, we conduct a univariate test (similar to 
Panel D in Table 7) on two sub-samples of the 1-190 days and 2-190 days market-adjusted 
CARs partitioned by management structure.  The results are reported in Table 1.10. Panel A 
of Table 1.10 reports the differences of the 1-190 days CARs between the REIT internal and 
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external management structure while Panel B reports the differences of the 2-190 days CARs. 
We find that the internally managed sub-sample performs significantly better (exhibiting less 
negative market-adjusted CAR) than the externally managed sub-sample when we look at the 
global REIT samples. This result also holds true if we examine only U.S. REITs.  The result 
is qualitatively similar if we examine the 2-190 days return as well for the U.S. REITs 
sample. 
It is difficult to explain why there are so much variations in the short-run aftermarket 
(within 190 days of the initial-trading day) performance of REIT IPOs in the 14 countries 
examined.  It is also difficult to explain the large negative 2-190 day CAR observed in, for 
example, Hong Kong (-29.41%).  Given our result and the fact that Joel-Carbonell and Rottke 
(2009) document large negative market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns over one, three and 
five years for U.S. REIT IPOs during the 1991-2008 period, there is a need to examine the 
long-run performance of REIT IPOs using asset pricing models.  
 
6.3. Long-run performance over 3-year and 5-year periods 
Tables 1.11 and 1.12 report the results of the time-series regressions of monthly 
portfolio returns using one factor (CAPM), two factors and four factors (depending on data 
availability) for the first 3 or 5 years after going public.  However, before we report our 
results, we would like to point out that our analyses have two weaknesses. First, the numbers 
of observations are low for many countries in the sample and the sample period is quite long.  
Given this, some of the time-series portfolios might contain only a few REITs at some 
periods. This means that our result will be data sensitive and the results might change when 
countries establish more REITs in the future.  Second, as it is also true in the finance 
literature, the long-run results are model sensitive as the results could change significantly 
39 
 
 
 
with the inclusion or deletion of one or more factors.  Therefore, the results reported here 
should be interpreted with these two caveats in mind. 
Table 1.11 reports the 3-year long-run performance results, and Table 1.12 reports the 
5-year long-run performance results. The 3-year long-run results do not show any abnormal 
performance at the global level and for all continents, except Australia. The 5-year long-run 
results do not show any abnormal performance at the global level and for all the continents. 
The global market beta (systematic risk) for the REIT IPO firm for the first 3-year and 5-year 
periods are 0.51 and 0.59, respectively.  This conforms to the general finding in the literature 
that REITs have low beta (systematic risk) and the empirical results shown in Appendix V.   
The results that the global and regional REIT IPO firms have low betas and do not 
perform better than the general stock markets mean that REIT IPO stocks earn their normal 
risk-adjusted returns.  This also means that when we look at a longer time horizon, the poor 
2-190 days performance of the global REITs disappears.  However, our results show that 
there are some variations at the country level. REITs in Australia exhibit significant negative 
abnormal performance of 1.41% per month and 0.93% per month, respectively, in the 3 years 
and 5 years after going public.  Their long-run results conform to the short-run CAR results 
we reported in Table 1.9.   South Korean REITs show a slightly significant positive abnormal 
performance of 0.5% per month in the 3 years and 0.52% per month in the 5 years after going 
public, while Canadian REITs exhibit a significant positive abnormal performance of 0.91% 
per month in the 3 years and a significant positive of 0.75% per month in the 5 years 
following their IPOs. 
While Australia underperforms the market and Canada and South Korea outperform 
the market 5 years after the initial trading date, the differences could be attributed to the 
unique characteristics of the country. Consequently, the important conclusion from this 
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analysis is that the long-run performance of REIT IPO stocks seems to be comparable with 
that of the general stock market.  However, as we have mentioned in the literature review 
section, this evidence might not be consistent with some of the evidence reported in the 
literature on the long-run performance of industrial firm IPOs. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This study is the first to examine the international REIT market in a systematic way by 
analyzing the 370 IPOs issued in 14 countries during the 1996-2010 period. Using 129 U.S. 
REIT IPOs ad 241 non-U.S. REIT IPOs, we find the following. First, the initial-day return of 
non-U.S. REIT IPOs is, on average, significantly positive and its magnitude is low when 
compared with that of industrial firm IPOs in the same country.  This pattern is the same as 
that observed for U.S. REITs.  Given this, we can confirm that the low initial-day return 
pattern is universally true for REIT IPOs.  Second, REITs perform poorly during the 189 
days after their initial offerings and the mildly positive initial-day return is offset by the 
negative 189-day aftermarket return. The pattern is unique, but explainable (as it implies a 
fair pricing in the 190-day period).  Finally, except for three countries (Australia, Canada and 
South Korea), we fail to see a clear pattern on either the under-performance or over-
performance of REIT stocks in the 3 or 5 years after their initial offerings. These results, 
collectively, seem to provide some support to the model predictions derived from Chan, 
Wang and Yang (2009). 
The most shocking result, however, is that related to the structure adopted by the newly 
created non-U.S. REITs.  Unlike the internally managed REITs in the U.S. during the modern 
REIT Era, a significant fraction of the recently established REITs in Asia are still externally 
managed in which the management firm is owned by the same company that sponsored the 
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REIT. The internally managed REITs are significantly more underpriced than those are 
externally managed. The management structure (internal versus external) also affects the 
REIT IPOs short-run aftermarket performance.  The internally managed REITs perform 
significantly better than the externally managed REITs in the 1-190 days period after the 
initial public offerings. It will be interesting to see, in the long run, whether this external-
management structure will lead to the same problems that we have observed in the U.S. 
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Table 1.1: Summary of first-day returns and long-run returns of reits or property firms from selected studies 
Country Type Authors of Study Sample Period Sample 
Size 
Mean First-day 
Return % 
Long-Run Returns %a 
Panel A: North America      
US REIT Wang et al. (1992) 1971-1988 87 -2.82*** Matching REIT-adjusted CAR= -10.11** (Days 1-190)  
or  -7.48* (Days 2-190) 
US REIT Ling and Ryngaert (1997) 1991-1994 85 3.60*** Market-adjusted BHAR (Days 1-100) =2.20* 
US REIT Ghosh et al. (2000) 1992-1996 61 3.47 (NA)  
US REIT Chan et al. (2003) 1970-1979 24 -3.10 (NA)  
   1980-1989 78 -3.14 (NA)  
   1990-2000 159 2.36 (NA)  
US REIT Buttimer et al. (2005) 1980-2001 163 2.47 *** No abnormal returns or mildly positive abnormal returns 
within first 3 or 5 years of IPO. 
US REIT Hartzell et al. (2005) 1980-1998 189 0.27  
US REIT Chen and Lu (2006) 1980-1989 49 -1.30 (NA)  
   1990-1999 148 4.30 (NA)  
US REIT Dolvin and Pyles (2009) 1986-2004 209 3.72 (NA)  
US REIT Joel-Carbonell and Rottke (2009) 1991-2008 90 4.3*** Market-adjusted BHAR = -4.1 (1 year); or -8.3 (3 years); or   
-24.7** (5 years) 
US REIT Bairagi and Dimovski (2011) 1996-Jun 2010 123 3.18***  
   1996-1999 48 4.72***  
   2002-2006 55 3.43***  
   2007-2010 20 -1.19  
Canada CREIT Londerville (2002) 1993-1998 13 1.71 Market-adjusted CAR (Days 1-20) = 8.34** 
Panel B: Asia-Pacific      
Australia LPT Dimovski and Brooks (2006a) 1994-1999 37 1.2  
Australia LPT Dimovski and Brooks (2006b) 1994-2004 58 2.6 (significant)  
Australia LPT Dimovski (2010) 2002-2008 45 3.37 (significant)  
Japan JREIT Kutsuna et al. (2008) 2001-2006 40 0.5  
Singapore SREIT Ooi (2009) 2002-2007 20 11.82***  
Singapore SREIT Wong et al. (2013) 2001-2008 18 5.4  
Japan JREIT Wong et al. (2013) 2001-2008 42 1.5  
Malaysia MREIT Wong et al. (2013) 2001-2008 11 6.1*  
Hong Kong HREIT Wong et al. (2013) 2001-2008 7 2.7  
Hong Kong Property Chan et al. (2001) 1986-1997 56 16.21** Market-adjusted CAR (Days 2-60) = -9.62* 
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Table 1.1: Continued. 
Country Type Authors of Study Sample Period Sample 
Size 
Mean First-day 
Return % 
Long-Run Returns % 
Panel C: Europe      
U.K. Property Gerbich et al. (1995) 1981-1994 51 11.11***  
U.K. Property 
Trading 
Sahi and Lee (2001) 1986-1996 22 12.14***  
U.K. Property 
Investment 
Sahi and Lee (2001) 1986-1995 26 4.11  
U.K. Property Brounen and Eichholtz (2001) 1990-2000 83 3.43 (significant) Market-adjusted BHAR (1 year) = -0.96. 
U.K. Property Brounen and Eichholtz (2002) 1984-1999 17 4.07** Market-adjusted CAR(12 mos) = -4.53; Market-adjusted 
BHAR =-5.83% 
France Property Brounen and Eichholtz (2002) 1984-1999 13 0.77 Market-adjusted CAR(12 mos) = -12.62**;  
Market-adjusted BHAR = -10.76%** 
Sweden Property Brounen and Eichholtz (2002) 1984-1999 24 1.75 Market-adjusted CAR (12 mos) = 18.89; Market-adjusted 
BHAR =22.16* 
U.K., W. & E. 
Europe 
Property Freybote et al. (2008) 1994-2006 105 7.26***  
U.K. Property Freybote et al. (2008) 1994-2006 27 5.9***  
       
 
a CAR = cumulative average return;  BHAR = buy-and-hold average return. 
***, **, *Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  (NA) = significance not given. 
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Table 1.2: Mean institutional holdings of REIT stocks a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a
Data on the institutional holdings of individual REITs in each of the non-U.S. countries are sourced from 
Bloomberg. The mean institutional holding (%) reported is for Dec 31, 2010.  Institutional data on individual 
U.S. REITs are collected from Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database through WRDS. The 
figure reported in the table for U.S. REITs is the average percentage holdings of institutional investors in the first 
quarter after the IPO.     
bThe number of observations is the number of REITs in the sample with available institutional 
holdings information from Bloomberg.  This number may not correspond to the number of REITs in 
the full sample in each country. 
c
The institutional holdings figures reported in Bloomberg for Taiwan REITs are extremely low (average of 
0.05%), which are inconsistent with new articles that report much higher institutional holdings percentages for 
Taiwan REITs.  We, therefore, report this figure as n.a. (not available).   
 
 
Country Mean Institutional Holding Number of Observationsb 
Australia 25.4% 27 
   
Asia   
Japan 63.8% 40 
South Korea 29.1% 9 
Singapore 39.4% 20 
Thailand 24.8% 21 
Taiwanc n.a. n.a. 
Malaysia 14.7% 13 
Hong Kong 40.7% 7 
 
Europe   
Turkey 2.6% 4 
Belgium 14.3% 6 
France 19.3% 12 
United Kingdom 90.4% 7 
   
North America 
Canada 26.6% 18 
U.S. 45.8% 114 
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Table 1.3: Number and issue size of REIT IPOs by country and region (1996-2010)a 
a Data is obtained from Thomson DataStream, Bloomberg, and Securities Data Corporation (SDC) and verified with information from the local stock exchange websites and CBRE Reports. The number of observations is based on our 
final sample of REIT IPOs in each country.  The IPO proceeds (or amount issued) in US $ is obtained from SDC database.  If the proceed amount is missing from SDC, we calculate the total amount issued using the IPO offering price in 
local currency multiplied by the total number of shares offered (given in Bloomberg). We then convert the total amount into US dollars using the foreign currency exchange rate at the IPO offering date. The foreign currency exchange rate 
is obtained from http://www.x-rates.com/cgi-bin/hlookup.cgi.    b The U.K. REIT sample includes both REITs and property investment companies (PICs), which are close equivalents to REITs.  The firms before 2007 are all PICs. 
 
Region  Amount Issued in US$ Million 
Mean Amount 
Issued   
(Number of Observations) 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
Australia 315 165 124 359 - - 429 670 613 1,640 771 761 131 - 892 6,874 153 
  (1) (3) (2) (1) - - (4) (7) (6) (8) (6) (5) (1) - (1) (45)   
Asia                 
       
  
 
Japan - - - - - 1,122 1,128 1,701 1,902 3,564 5,555 563 - - - 15,537 370 
  - - - - - (2) (4) (4) (5) (13) (12) (2) - - - (42) 
 
South Korea - - - - - - 53 63 30 21 22 463 5 - 37 695 58 
  - - - - - - (2) (3) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) - (2) (12) 
 
Singapore - - - - - - 254 594 438 466 886 1,330 191 - 1,466 5,625 268 
  - - - - - - (2) (1) (1) (2) (6) (5) (1) - (3) (21) 
 
Thailand - - - - - - - 47 - 472 648 162 262 137 202 1,930 67 
  - - - - - - - (2) - (6) (4) (3) (5) (5) (4) (29) 
 
Taiwan - - - - - - - - - 950 636 129 - - - 1,715 214 
  - - - - - - - - - (3) (4) (1) - - - (8) 
 
Malaysia - - - - - - - - - 186 273 158 - - 706 1,323 102 
  - - - - - - - - - (3) (4) (4) - - (2) (13) 
 
Hong Kong - - - - - - - - - 3,041 1,162 585 - - - 4,788 684 
  - - - - - - - - - (3) (2) (2) - - - (7) 
 
Asia Market - - - - - 1,122 1,435 2,405 2,370 8,700 9,182 3,390 458 137 2,411 31,610 239 
  - - - - - (2) (8) (10) (7) (31) (33) (18) (7) (5) (11) (132)   
Europe 
 
              
       
  
 
Turkey - - - - - - - - - 197 - - - - 407 604 101 
  - - - - - - - - - (1) - - - - (5) (6) 
 
Belgium - - - 104 - - - - - - 149 58 15 - - 326 47 
  - - - (2) - - - - - - (2) (1) (2) - - (7)   
France - - - - - - - - - 329 1,087 142 32 - - 1,590 99 
  - - - - - - - - - (3) (9) (2) (2) - - (16) 
 
U.K.b 10 - - - 28 - - - - 449 - 310 - - 169 966 97 
 
(1) - - - (1) - - - - (3) - (3) - - (2) (10) 
 
Europe Market 10 - - 104 28 - - - - 975 1,236 510 47 - 576 3,486 89 
  (1) - - (2) (1) - - - - (7) (11) (6) (4) - (7) (39)   
North America                 
       
  
 
Canada - 157 55 - - 99 412 321 280 63 255 19 - - 517 2,178 87 
  - (2) (1) - - (1) (5) (3) (3) (2) (3) (1) - - (4) (25) 
 
U.S. 1,108 6,219 2,163 292 - - 588 2,369 6,244 4,025 1,962 1,616 440 2,574 1,729 31,326 243 
  (6) (25) (16) (2) - - (3) (8) (28) (12) (5) (4) (2) (9) (9) (129) 
 
North America 1,108 6,376 2,218 292 - 99 1,000 2,690 6,524 4,088 2,217 1,635 440 2,574 2,246 33,504 218 
  (6) (27) (17) (2) - (1) (8) (11) (31) (14) (8) (5) (2) (9) (13) (154)   
Global 1,433 6,541 2,342 755 28 1,221 2,864 5,765 9,507 15,403 13,406 6,296 1,076 2,711 6,125 75,474 204 
  (8) (30) (19) (5) (1) (3) (20) (28) (44) (60) (58) (34) (14) (14) (32) (370)   
Global (ex-US) 325 322 179 463 28 1,221 2,276 3,396 3,263 11,378 11,444 4,680 636 137 4,396 44,145 183 
  (2) (5) (3) (3) (1) (3) (17) (20) (16) (48) (53) (30) (12) (5) (23) (241)   
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Table 1.4: Summary statistics of the raw and market-adjusted initial-day returns of REIT IPOs by country (1996-2010) 
aThe initial-day raw return is measured from the offer price to the close price at the end of the first trading day, without adjusting for market movements.   
bThe market-adjusted or abnormal return (AR) is calculated as the difference between the local initial-day raw return and the total return on the contemporaneous local market index obtained from 
DataStream for the non-U.S. REITs and the equally-weighted CRSP index with dividends for the U.S. REITs.  
cThe REIT IPO data in the pre-1996 period are collected following the procedure as described in Chan, Erickson and Wang (2003).  
**, *Significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively, for a two-tailed t-test.   
Region / Country 
Mean  
return  
 
Mean  
AR 
Sample 
 size 
# # # 
Median  
return 
Minimum 
return 
Maximum 
return 
Std.  
Dev. 
  (%)a  (%)b   <0 =0 >0  (%)  (%)  (%) (%) 
Australia 3.21**  3.24** 45 12 5 28 2.20** -20.00 27.50 7.27 
                      
Asia                     
Japan 1.45  1.77 42 18 2 22 0.31 -11.07 41.59 9.57 
South Korea 7.07  7.37 12 1 2 9 1.20** -2.00 70.00 19.90 
Singapore 6.17  6.57 21 8 1 12 2.11 -15.00 59.29 17.40 
Thailand 0.84  1.03 29 7 6 16 1.00* -30.00 20.00 7.66 
Taiwan 1.23*  1.06 8 1 0 7 0.75*  -0.20 4.50 1.51 
Malaysia 4.93  4.91 13 3 2 8 2.61 -11.00 34.40 12.00 
Hong Kong 2.65  2.67 7 3 0 4 0.37 -15.69 20.37 13.66 
Asia Market 2.97**  3.19** 132 41 13 78 0.90** -30.00 70.00 12.17 
 
                    
Europe                     
Turkey 4.67  4.61 6 2 1 3 1.43 -2.82 21.26 9.15 
Belgium 3.26  2.34 7 1 2 4 1.37 -3.03 11.50 5.05 
France 8.46**  8.55** 16 2 0 14 5.37** -3.50 29.51 9.49 
U.K. 7.66**  7.65** 10 0 0 10 3.00**  0.25 27.50 9.34 
Europe Market 6.74**  6.60** 39 5 3 31 3.00** -3.50 29.51 8.69 
                      
North America                     
Canada 1.56  1.62 25 13 3 9 -0.20   -9.30 17.00 5.86 
U.S. 2.78**  2.79** 129 33 31 65 0.00** -13.75 37.50 7.79 
North America 2.59**  2.61** 154 46 34 74 0.00** -13.75 37.50 7.45 
  
 
        
 
Global 3.24**  3.31** 370 104 55 211 1.00** -30.00 70.00 9.55 
Global (ex-US) 3.48**  3.59** 241 71 24 146 1.37** -30.00 70.00 10.40 
            
U.S. (1971-2010) c 0.97**  0.89* 323 104 88  131  0.00** -45.00 37.50 8.09 
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Table 1.5: Comparison of the average initial-day returns of REIT IPOs vs. non-REIT firm IPOs by country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe information on non-REIT IPOs is obtained from Jay Ritter’s IPO data website: http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. 
** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test.  
  REIT IPOs   Non-REIT IPOsa 
Non-REITs Vs. 
REITs 
Country Sample Size Time Period 
Average Initial-
Day Return (%) 
  Sample Size Time Period 
Average Initial-
Day Return (%) 
Relative 
Underpricing 
Australia   45 1996-2010     3.21**      1,462 1976-2010 22.8 7.10 
                  
Asia                 
Japan   42 2001-2010 1.45      3,100 1970-2010 40.4 27.86 
South Korea   12 2001-2010 7.07      1,593 1980-2010 61.6 8.71 
Singapore   21 2002-2010 6.17   519 1973-2008 27.4 4.44 
Thailand   29 2003-2010 0.84   459 1987-2007 36.6 43.57 
Taiwan 8 2005-2010   1.23*      1,312 1980-2006 37.2 30.24 
Malaysia  13 2005-2010 4.93   350 1980-2006 69.6 14.12 
Hong Kong 7 2005-2010 2.65      1,259 1980-2010 15.4 5.81 
Asia Market    132 2001-2010     2.97**           
  
                
Europe 
Turkey 6 2005-2010 4.67 
 
315 1990-2008 10.6 2.27 
Belgium 7 1999-2010 3.26   114 1984-2006 13.5 4.14 
France   16 2005-2010     8.46**   697 1983-2010 10.5 1.24 
U.K.   10 1996-2010     7.66** 
 
   4,267 1959-2010 16.2 2.11 
Europe Market   39 1996-2010     6.74** 
 
        
                  
North America                 
Canada  25 1997-2010 1.56   696 1971-2010 6.7 4.29 
U.S.   129 1996-2010      2.78**       12,165 1960-2010 16.8 6.04 
North America   154 1996-2010     2.59**           
                  
Global   370 1996-2010     3.24**           
Global (ex-U.S.)   241 1996-2010     3.48**           
         
U.S. (1971-2010)   323 1971-2010     0.97**      12,165 1960-2010 16.8 17.32 
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Table 1.6: Average initial-day returns of REIT IPOs by region and by year (1996-2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a The initial-day raw return is measured from the offer price to the close price at the end of the first trading day, without adjusting for market movements.  
 b Nob denotes the number of observations. 
**, *Significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively, for a two-tailed t-test. 
  Mean Initial-Day Return (%)a     
Year Australia   Nobb Asia   Nobb Europe   Nobb 
North 
America   Nobb 
Global 
 (ex-US)   Nobb Global    Nobb 
1996 -2.00 
 
1 - 
 
- 3.00 
 
1 1.06 
 
6 0.50 
 
2 0.92 
 
8 
1997 12.50 
 
3 - 
 
- - 
 
- 7.64 ** 27 9.20 
 
5 8.12 ** 30 
1998 -7.00 
 
2 - 
 
- - 
 
- 0.84 
 
17 -4.67 
 
3 0.02 
 
19 
1999 0.72 
 
1 - 
 
- -0.83 
 
2 1.26 
 
2 -0.31 
 
3 0.32 
 
5 
2000 - 
  
- 
 
- 27.50 
 
1 - 
 
- 27.50 
 
1 27.50 
 
1 
2001 - 
  
1.19 
 
2 - 
 
- -0.50 
 
1 0.62 
 
3 0.62 
 
3 
2002 1.74 
 
4 0.72 
 
8 - 
 
- -0.39 
 
8 0.78 
 
17 0.48 
 
20 
2003 6.19 * 7 -0.26 
 
10 - 
 
- 4.67 ** 11 2.97 * 20 3.29 ** 28 
2004 3.17 
 
6 3.92 ** 7 - 
 
- 4.78 ** 31 4.65 ** 16 4.43 ** 44 
2005 3.48 ** 8 5.32 ** 31 8.14 * 7 -0.06 
 
14 5.03 ** 48 4.15 ** 60 
2006 6.00 ** 6 1.21 
 
33 10.26 ** 11 0.43 
 
8 3.48 ** 53 3.31 ** 58 
2007 -2.51 
 
5 2.96 
 
18 3.75 * 6 -0.29 
 
5 2.11 
 
30 1.82 
 
34 
2008 5.00 
 
1 -2.00 
 
7 3.88 
 
4 -0.21 
 
2 0.54 
 
12 0.44 
 
14 
2009 - 
  
-3.80 
 
5 - 
 
- -1.70 
 
9 -3.80 
 
5 -2.45 
 
14 
2010 -3.27 
 
1 12.18 * 11 3.71 
 
7 -0.93 
 
13 6.65 * 23 4.52 * 32 
Total 3.21 ** 45 2.97 ** 132 6.74 ** 39 2.59 ** 154 3.48 ** 241 3.24 ** 370 
49 
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Table 1.7:  Univariate tests on the initial-day returns in the 1996–2010 period 
aStapled REITs of Australia,  K-REITs of South Korea, Link REIT from Hong Kong, REITs from Europe and Canada, and the 
U.S. REITs with properties managed internally are grouped as "Internal" while Unit REITs of Australia, all Asian REITs 
(except K-REITs and Link REIT from Hong Kong) and U.S. REITs with properties managed by an affiliated or independent 
third party are grouped as "External". 
bThailand REITs, Taiwan REITs, CR-REITs of South Korea and two finite-life U.S. REITs are classified as "Fund-like and 
Finite-life", while the remaining REITs in the sample are classified as "Operating". 
cThe institutional holdings for U.S. REIT IPOs are the holdings of institutional investors in the first quarter after IPOs. 
dThe institutional holdings for non-U.S. REIT IPOs are the institutional holding levels of the REITs reported in Bloomberg on 
Dec 31, 2010. 
eThe offering size is the product of the offer price and the number of shares offered at the IPO. The firms are grouped into the 
"High Offer Size" if the offering size of the REIT is above or equal to the country’s median offering size. The firms are grouped 
into the "Low Offer Size" if the offering size is below the country’s median offering size. 
**, *Significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test. 
Subsample of REIT IPOs Mean Initial-Day Return (%) Sample Size 
Panel A: Partitioned by Region (Asia-Pacific vs. Europe) 
(a) Europe   6.74** 39 
(b) Asia-Pacific   3.03** 177 
Difference (a)-(b)  3.70* 
 Panel B: Partitioned by Australia REIT Type (Stapled vs. Unit) 
(a) Unit (external)    3.66** 32 
(b) Stapled (internal) 2.11 13 
Difference (a)-(b)  1.55 
 Panel C: Partitioned by South Korea REIT Type (K-REIT vs. CR-REIT) 
(a) K-REIT (internal) 24.27 3 
(b) CR-REIT (external)      1.33* 9 
Difference (a)-(b)    22.94* 
 Panel D: Partitioned by Property Management Structure (Internal vs. External)a 
(a) Internal managed     4.55** 145 
(b) External managed     2.14** 203 
Difference (a)-(b)      2.41** 
 Panel E: Partitioned by Trust Structure (Fund-like vs. Operating)b 
(a) Operating     3.57** 323 
(b) Fund-like and Finite-life 0.99 47 
Difference (a)-(b)    2.58* 
 Panel F: Partitioned by Institutional Holding of U.S. REIT IPOsc 
(a) High institutional holding (>40%)     3.05** 64 
(b) Medium institutional holding     3.70** 35 
(c) Low institutional holding (<10%) 0.39 15 
Difference (a)-(c)  2.66 
 Panel G: Partitioned by Institutional Holding of Non U.S. REIT IPOsd 
(a) High institutional holding (>40%)     3.85** 73 
(b) Medium institutional holding     2.14** 76 
(c) Low institutional holding (<10%)     4.18** 40 
Difference (a)-(c)  -0.33  
Panel H: Partitioned by Issue Size (High vs. Low)e 
(a) High offer size       3.15** 191 
(b) Low offer size       3.34** 179 
Difference (a)-(b)  -0.19 
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Table 1.8:  Mean initial-day return excluding the first REIT or a “Special” REITa 
Country Year of 
First 
IPO 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Return 
(%) 
Mean Return 
with Deletion of the First 
REIT only  (%) 
Mean Return 
with Deletion of a 
"Special" Type of REIT 
only (%) 
Japan 2001 42 1.45 1.47  
South Korea 2002 12 7.07 7.66 1.35**b 
Singapore 2002 21 6.17 6.32 3.51c 
Thailand 2003 29 0.84 0.66  
Taiwan 2005 8 1.23* 0.76*  
Malaysia 2005 13 4.93 2.47 5.03d 
Hong Kong 2005 7 2.65 0.67 -0.30e 
Asia Market 132 2.97** 2.63** 1.87** 
 
aThe first REIT refers to the first ever REIT to be listed in each country.  “Special” refers to the first of its 
kind in a country or a REIT that received special attention in the media. 
bIn South Korea, we delete Dasan REIT, a self-managed REIT, that went public after the Korean government 
tightened loan risk standards and amended the REIT regulations to stimulate investor interest in REITs. 
cIn Singapore, we delete CapitalRetail China Trust, the First China Retail REIT to list in Singapore. 
dIn Malaysia, we delete Al-‘Aqar KPJ REIT, the first publicly traded Islamic property trust in Asia. 
eIn HK, we delete Prosperity Real Estate Investment Trust, the first private sector REIT in Hong Kong. 
**,*Significant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively, for a two-tailed test. 
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Table 1.9: Cumulative average abnormal daily returns (CARs) for selected intervals during the first 190 
trading days after the initial public offerings of REITs around the globe in the 1996-2010 period  
aThe cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) from day t1 to t2 is computed as the sum of the cross-sectional average daily abnormal returns (ARt) from 
day t1 through t2. The abnormal return (AR) is calculated as the difference between the local daily raw return and the total return on the contemporaneous 
local market index obtained from DataStream (for non-U.S. REITs) and from CRSP (for U.S. REITs).  The t-statistics for CAR in the interval (t1 , t2) is 
computed as  𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒕𝟏,𝒕𝟐 ∙ √𝑵𝒕/𝑪𝑺𝑫𝒕  where 𝑵𝒕  is the number of REITs trading in each day, and 𝑪𝑺𝑫𝒕  is computed as 𝑪𝑺𝑫𝒕 =
√(𝒕𝟐 − 𝒕𝟏 + 𝟏) ∙ 𝒗𝒂𝒓 + 𝟐(𝒕𝟐 − 𝒕𝟏) ∙ 𝒄𝒐𝒗 . The variance (var) is the average cross-sectional variance (from day 2 to 190) and the covariances (cov) is the 
first-order autocovariance of the 𝑨𝑹𝒕 series.  
b
The sample size varies because some REITs do not have price data for all 190 days after the initial offerings. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. *** , **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test. 
  
CAR (%) 
(Local market index 
adjusted) 
Sample 
Size 
b
 
CAR (%) 
(Local market index 
adjusted) 
Sample 
Size 
b
 
CAR (%) 
(Local market index 
adjusted) 
Sample 
Size 
b
 
Days 1 – 30   2 – 30     1 – 90   2 – 90     1 – 190   2-190     
Australia 0.75   -2.49 
 
45 -2.94 
 
-6.18 ** 45 -10.82 *** -14.06 *** 45 
  (0.49)   (-1.65)     (-1.11)   (-2.34)     (-2.81)   (-3.66)     
Asia                
Japan 1.55  -0.23  42 1.25  -0.52  42 5.52  3.75  42 
  (1.11)   (-0.16)     (0.52)   (-0.22)     (1.57)   (1.07)     
South Korea -1.40   -8.77 * 12 -1.67   -9.05   12 0.73   -6.64   12 
  (-0.34)   (-2.14)     (-0.23)   (-1.26)     (0.07)   (-0.64)     
Singapore 5.66 ** -0.91   21 5.46   -1.11   21 5.34   -1.22   21 
  (2.25)   (-0.37)     (1.25)   (-0.26)     (0.84)   (-0.19)     
Thailand -1.89   -2.92   29 -4.21   -5.24   29 -5.93   -6.97   29 
  (-1.02)   (-1.61)     (-1.31)   (-1.65)     (-1.27)   (-1.50)     
Taiwan -1.05   -2.11   8 -7.64 * -8.70 * 8 -12.42 * -13.48 ** 8 
  (-0.48)   (-0.98)     (-2.02)   (-2.31)     (-2.26)   (-2.46)     
Malaysia 3.04   -1.86   13 2.08   -2.83   13 0.24   -4.66   13 
  (1.34)   (-0.83)     (0.53)   (-0.72)     (0.04)   (-0.82)     
Hong Kong -1.65   -4.31   7 -17.63 ** -20.30 ** 7 -26.74 ** -29.41 ** 7 
  (-0.42)   (-1.12)     (-2.59)   (-3.00)     (-2.70)   (-2.98)     
Asia Market 1.00   -2.19 ** 132 -1.00   -4.20 *** 132 -0.78   -3.97 * 132 
  (1.13)   (-2.53)     (-0.66)   (-2.77)     (-0.35)   (-1.80)     
Europe                
Turkey -0.50   -5.11   6 -2.35   -6.96   6 -0.49   -5.10   6 
  (-0.09)   (-0.91)     (-0.24)   (-0.71)     (-0.03)   (-0.36)     
Belgium 7.72   5.37   7 13.97   11.63   7 3.37 
 
1.02   7 
  (1.19)   (0.84)     (1.24)   (1.04)     (0.21)   (0.06)     
France 7.52 ** -1.03   16 6.87   -1.67   16 9.33   0.78   16 
  (2.83)   (-0.39)     (1.50)   (-0.37)     (1.40)   (0.12)     
U.K. 7.88 ** 0.23   10 5.23   -2.42   10 -3.34   -10.99   10 
  (3.22)   (0.10)     (1.23)   (-0.58)     (-0.54)   (-1.79)     
Europe Market 6.41 *** -0.18   39 6.31 * -0.29   39 3.50   -3.10   39 
  (3.34)   (-0.10)     (1.90)   (-0.09)     (0.72)   (-0.64)     
North America                
Canada 3.03 
 
1.41   25 7.04 ** 5.42   25 8.21 
 
6.60   25 
  (1.55)   (0.74)     (2.08)   (1.61)     (1.67)   (1.35)     
US -0.03   -2.82 *** 129 -3.40 ** -6.19 *** 129 -9.70 *** -12.49 *** 129 
  (-0.03)   (-2.99)     (-2.04)   (-3.74)     (-4.01)   (-5.18)     
North America 0.46  -2.14 ** 154 -1.70  -4.30 *** 154 -6.79 *** -9.39 *** 154 
 (0.54)   (-2.51)     (-1.14)   (-2.89)    (-3.12)  (-4.33)   
                
Global 1.32 ** -1.99 *** 370 -0.76   -4.07 *** 370 -4.05 *** -7.36 *** 370  
  (2.39)   (-3.68)     (-0.80)   (-4.29)     (-2.92)   (-5.32)     
Global (ex-US) 2.04 *** -1.55 ** 241 0.65   -2.94 ** 241 -1.03 
 
-4.62 *** 241 
  (2.99)   (-2.31)     (0.55)   (-2.50)     (-0.60)   (-2.70)     
                
U.S.(1971-2010) -2.01 *** -2.90 *** 323 -4.36 ***  -5.25 *** 322 -10.24 *** -11.13 *** 321 
  (-2.89)   (-4.25)     (-3.62)   (-4.38)     (-5.84)   (-6.36)     
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Table 1.10:  Univariate tests on the 1-190 (2-190) days cumulative average abnormal daily returns 
(CARs) in the 1996–2010 period a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) from day t1 to t2 is computed as the sum of the cross-sectional 
average daily abnormal returns (ARt) from day t1 through t2. The abnormal return (AR) is calculated as the difference 
between the local daily raw return and the total return on the contemporaneous local market index obtained from 
DataStream (for non-U.S. REITs) and from CRSP (for U.S. REITs).  
b Stapled REITs of Australia,  K-REITs of South Korea, Link REIT from Hong Kong, REITs from Europe and 
Canada, and the U.S. REITs with properties managed internally are grouped as "Internal" while Unit REITs of 
Australia, all Asian REITs (except K-REITs and Link REIT from Hong Kong) and U.S. REITs with properties 
managed by an affiliated or independent third party are grouped as "External". 
**, *Significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test. 
 
 
Subsample of REIT CARs 1-190 CARs (%) Sample Size 
Panel A: Partitioned by U.S Property Management Structure (Internal vs. External)b 
(a) Internal managed   -3.47 64 
(b) External managed -16.33 43 
Difference (a)-(b)        12.86** 
 Panel B: Partitioned by Global Property Management Structure (Internal vs. External) 
(a) Internal managed -0.01 145 
(b) External managed -5.77 203 
Difference (a)-(b)     5.76** 
 Panel C: Partitioned by Global (ex US) Property Management Structure (Internal vs. External)  b 
(a) Internal managed  2.73  81 
(b) External managed -2.93 160 
Difference (a)-(b)   5.66 
 
Subsample of REIT CARs 2-190 CARs (%) Sample Size 
Panel D: Partitioned by U.S Property Management Structure (Internal vs. External) b 
(a) Internal managed    -7.46 64 
(b) External managed    -16.51 43 
Difference (a)-(b)         9.05* 
 Panel E: Partitioned by Global Property Management Structure (Internal vs. External) 
(a) Internal managed  -4.59 145 
(b) External managed -8.05 203 
Difference (a)-(b)    3.45 
 Panel F: Partitioned by Global (ex US) Property Management Structure (Internal vs. External) b 
(a) Internal managed   -2.33  81 
(b) External managed   -5.77 160 
Difference (a)-(b)     3.44 
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Table 1.11: Factor regressions for REIT IPOs in their 3 years after going publica  
 
Panel A:  Using Local Market Portfoliob 
 
Rp - Rf = a + b [Rm - Rf] +c [HML]+d [SMB] + e [WML]+ ε(t)   
Rp-Rf a 
 
b 
 
c 
 
d 
 
e 
 
Adj. R2 Nobd 
Australia -1.41 *** 1.05 
       
0.36 171 
 
(-3.39) 
 
(0.51) 
         
 
-1.52 *** 1.10 
 
0.37 *** 
   
0.41 171 
 
(-3.77) 
 
(0.95) 
 
(3.57) 
       Asia 
            Japan 0.60
 
0.80
       
0.22 109 
 
(0.86) 
 
(-1.40) 
         
 
0.15 
 
0.89 
 
0.79 *** 
   
0.26 109 
 
(0.21) 
 
(-0.78) 
 
(2.73) 
       
 
0.01 
 
0.87 
 
0.93 *** 0.19
 
-0.28 
 
0.26 109 
 
(0.01) 
 
(-0.93) 
 
(3.04) 
 
(0.76) 
 
(-1.48) 
   South Korea 0.50 * 0.16 *** 
      
0.11 107 
 
(1.76) 
 
(-20.14) 
         Singapore 0.28 
 
1.03 
       
0.71 101 
 
(0.69) 
 
(0.51) 
         
 
0.00 
 
0.99 
 
0.26 *** 
   
0.73 101 
 
(0.01) 
 
(-0.19) 
 
(2.87) 
       Thailand -0.10 
 
0.20 *** 
      
0.33 86 
 
(-0.47) 
 
(-26.23) 
         Taiwan 0.09 
 
0.35 *** 
      
0.27 47 
 
(0.14) 
 
(-8.09) 
         Malaysia 0.39 
 
0.49 *** 
      
0.26 61 
 
(0.89) 
 
(-4.84) 
         Hong Kong 0.44 
 
0.80 
       
0.45 53 
 
(0.49) 
 
(-1.61) 
         
 
0.16 
 
0.73 ** 0.32
     
0.46 53 
 
(0.18) 
 
(-2.03) 
 
(1.32) 
       Europe 
            Turkey -0.04
 
0.35 *** 
      
0.05 44 
 
(-0.03) 
 
(-3.41) 
         Belgium 0.21 
 
0.27 *** 
      
0.13 87 
 
( 0.53) 
 
(-10.37) 
         
 
0.17 
 
0.24 *** 0.10
     
0.15 87 
 
(0.44) 
 
(-10.55) 
 
(1.55) 
       France -0.06 
 
0.51 *** 
      
0.39 62 
 
(-0.15) 
 
(-5.95) 
         
 
-0.04 
 
0.51 *** -0.05
     
0.38 62 
 
(-0.10) 
 
(-5.91) 
 
(-0.38) 
       U.K. -0.42 
 
0.57 *** 
      
0.17 138 
 
(-0.85) 
 
(-3.99) 
         
 
-0.41 
 
0.54 *** 0.10
     
0.17 138 
 
(-0.84) 
 
(-4.09) 
 
(0.93) 
       North America 
            Canada 0.91 * 0.66 *** 
      
0.18 156 
 
(1.73) 
 
(-3.04) 
         
 
0.82 
 
0.74 ** 0.19 ** 
    
0.20 156 
 
(1.56) 
 
(-2.27) 
 
(2.14) 
       U.S. -0.81 
 
0.71 *** 
      
0.20 174 
 
(-1.50) 
 
(-2.63) 
         
 
-0.89 
 
0.75 ** 0.20
     
0.20 174 
 
(-1.64) 
 
(-2.24) 
 
(1.34) 
       
 
-0.81 
 
0.53 *** 0.27 * 0.59 *** -0.34 *** 0.31 174 
 
( -1.58) 
 
(-4.18) 
 
(1.79) 
 
( 4.11) 
 
( -3.77) 
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Table 1.11: continued. 
Panel B: Using Regional / Global Market Portfolioc 
  Rp - Rf = a + b [Rm - Rf] +c [HML]+d [SMB] + e [WML]+ ε(t)   
Rp-Rf a   b   c   d   e   Adj. R2 Nobd 
Australia -0.96 ** 0.51 *** -0.29 ** -0.05 
 
0.05 
 
0.23 171 
 
(-2.02) 
 
(-6.82) 
 
(-2.18) 
 
(-0.37) 
 
(0.49) 
   Asia 0.23 
 
0.37 *** -0.05 
 
0.26 ** -0.15 * 0.45 111 
 
(0.72) 
 
(-12.03) 
 
(-0.43) 
 
(2.35) 
 
(-1.93) 
   Europe -0.15 
 
0.34 *** 0.19 
 
0.27 ** -0.10 
 
0.22 151 
 
(-0.43) 
 
(-10.63) 
 
(1.54) 
 
(2.12) 
 
(-1.39) 
   
North America -0.28 
 
0.50 *** 0.28 ** 0.71 *** -0.30 
**
* 0.39 176 
 
(-0.72) 
 
(-6.01) 
 
(2.51) 
 
(6.02) 
 
(-4.37) 
        
Global -0.05 
 
0.51 *** 0.29 *** 0.49 *** -0.14 
**
* 0.48 177 
 
(-0.21) 
 
(-9.94) 
 
(3.32) 
 
(5.08) 
 
(-2.79) 
   Global (ex US) -0.02 
 
0.50 *** 0.35 *** 0.20 *** -0.03 
 
0.49 177 
  (-0.10)   (-12.08)   ( 4.68)   (2.50)   ( -0.81)       
             
aT-statistics are shown in parentheses.  Following Fama and French (1998), the t-statistics for the market slope b tests 
for the null hypothesis (b=1) and is computed by taking the coefficient minus one and dividing it by its standard error. 
bThe dependent variable in the regression is the equally-weighted monthly return (with dividends) of a country’s 
portfolio of REIT IPOs (within the first 3 years of going public) minus the risk-free rate, Rf (the one-month U.S. 
Treasury bill rate).  Rm and the factors (HML, SMB and WML) used in the regressions are country-specific.  For all 
countries except South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan and Turkey, Rm, Rf and other factors are obtained from Kenneth 
French’s website.  Rm for each of these four countries is calculated using the local stock market index obtained from 
DataStream.   
cThe dependent variable is the equally-weighted monthly return (with dividends) of REIT IPO portfolios formed by 
region (Australia, Asia, Europe, and North America) and for the global market (including and excluding the U.S.).  Rm 
is the regional/global market return and Rf is the one-month U.S. Treasury bill rate. Rm, Rf and the regional/global 
factors (HML, SMB and WML) are sourced from Kenneth French’s website.  
dNob denotes the number of observations used in the regressions.  
*, **, and *** Significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 1.12: Factor regressions for REIT IPOs in their 5 years after going publica 
 
Panel A: Use Local Market Portfoliob 
 
Rp - Rf = a + b [Rm - Rf] +c [HML]+d [SMB] + e [WML]+ ε(t)   
Rp-Rf a 
 
b 
 
c 
 
d 
 
e 
 
Adj. R2 Nobd 
Australia -0.93 ** 1.11 
       
0.39 173 
 
(-2.26) 
 
(1.02) 
         
 
-1.09 *** 1.17 * 0.49 *** 
   
0.46 173 
 
(-2.81) 
 
(1.68) 
 
(4.90) 
       Asia 
            Japan 0.56
 
0.79 * 
      
0.26 111 
 
(0.92) 
 
(-1.66) 
         
 
0.32 
 
0.84 
 
0.41
     
0.27 111 
 
(0.52) 
 
(-1.29) 
 
(1.56) 
       
 
0.15 
 
0.80 
 
0.58 ** 0.20 
 
-0.38 ** 0.29 111 
 
(0.24) 
 
(-1.56) 
 
(2.13) 
 
(0.88) 
 
(-2.24) 
   South Korea 0.52 * 0.18 *** 
     
0.15 107 
 
(1.87) 
 
(-20.47) 
         Singapore 0.30 
 
1.08 
       
0.73 101 
 
(0.73) 
 
(1.25) 
         
 
-0.05 
 
1.02 
 
0.32 *** 
   
0.76 101 
 
(-0.13) 
 
(0.37) 
 
(3.71) 
       Thailand -0.07 
 
0.19 *** 
     
0.31 86 
 
(-0.34) 
 
(-27.22) 
         Taiwan 0.10 
 
0.31 *** 
     
0.27 54 
 
(0.20) 
 
(-10.09) 
         Malaysia 0.29 
 
0.55 *** 
     
0.34 64 
 
(0.73) 
 
(-4.73) 
         Hong Kong 0.28 
 
0.73 *** 
     
0.50 61 
 
(0.42) 
 
(-2.84) 
         
 
0.19 
 
0.70 *** 0.13 
     
0.49 61 
 
(0.27) 
 
(-2.83) 
 
(0.68) 
       Europe 
            Turkey 0.41
 
0.51 *** 
     
0.18 68 
 
(0.33) 
 
(-3.81) 
         Belgium 0.33 
 
0.24 *** 
     
0.18 111 
 
(1.20) 
 
(-15.42) 
         
 
0.28 
 
0.22 *** 0.11 ** 
    
0.21 111 
 
(1.02) 
 
(-15.88) 
 
(2.33) 
       France -0.02 
 
0.52 *** 
     
0.41 62 
 
( -0.04) 
 
(-5.96) 
         
 
0.03 
 
0.52 *** -0.10 
     
0.40 62 
 
(0.06) 
 
(-6.00) 
 
(-0.83) 
       U.K. 0.08 
 
0.68 *** 
     
0.17 176 
 
(0.16) 
 
(-2.83) 
         
 
0.08 
 
0.63 *** 0.19 * 
    
0.18 176 
 
(0.17) 
 
(-3.20) 
 
(1.66) 
       North America 
           Canada 0.75 * 0.64 *** 
     
0.26 157 
 
(1.86) 
 
(-4.21) 
         
 
0.68 * 0.70 *** 0.14 ** 
    
0.28 157 
 
(1.69) 
 
(-3.42) 
 
(2.03) 
       U.S. 0.10 
 
0.82 ** 
      
0.30 176 
 
(0.22) 
 
(-1.98) 
         
 
-0.21 
 
0.95 
 
0.72 *** 
   
0.43 176 
 
(-0.49) 
 
(-0.61) 
 
( 6.16) 
       
 
-0.16 
 
0.69 *** 0.81 *** 0.72 *** -0.38 
 
0.61 176 
 
(-0.44) 
 
(-3.99) 
 
(7.79) 
 
(7.32) 
 
(-6.20) 
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Table 1.12: continued. 
Panel B: Use Regional / Global Market Portfolioc  
  Rp - Rf = a + b [Rm - Rf] +c [HML]+d [SMB] + e [WML]+ ε(t)   
Rp-Rf a   b   c   d   e   Adj. R2 Nobd 
Australia -0.34 
 
0.53 *** -0.37 *** 0.07 
 
-0.06 
 
0.28 173 
 
(-0.73) 
 
(-6.61) 
 
( -2.83) 
 
(0.54) 
 
(-0.64) 
   Asia 0.32 
 
0.40 *** -0.12 
 
0.27 ** -0.15 * 0.48 111 
 
(1.00) 
 
(-11.27) 
 
(-1.12) 
 
( 2.41) 
 
(-1.91) 
   Europe 0.10 
 
0.38 *** 0.27 ** 0.37 *** -0.05 
 
0.27 177 
 
(0.34) 
 
(10.96) 
 
( 2.41) 
 
(3.21) 
 
(-0.77) 
   North America 0.06 
 
0.67 *** 0.62 *** 0.80 *** -0.31 *** 0.55 176 
 
(0.19) 
 
(-4.30) 
 
(6.28) 
 
(7.52) 
 
(-5.00) 
        
Global 0.13 
 
0.59 *** 0.42 *** 0.57 *** -0.18 *** 0.55 177 
 
(0.55) 
 
(-8.23) 
 
( 4.68) 
 
(5.87) 
 
(-3.46 ) 
   Global (ex US) 0.10 
 
0.55 *** 0.34 *** 0.26 *** -0.07 
 
0.53 177 
  (0.49)  (-10.59)   (4.45)   (3.09)   (-1.64)      
             
aT-statistics are shown in parentheses.  Following Fama and French (1998), the t-statistics for the market slope b tests for the 
null hypothesis (b=1) and is computed by taking the coefficient minus one and dividing it by its standard error. 
bThe dependent variable in the regression is the equally-weighted monthly return (with dividends) of a country’s portfolio of 
REIT IPOs (within the first 5 years of going public) minus the risk-free rate, Rf (the one-month U.S. Treasury bill rate).  Rm 
and the factors (HML, SMB and WML) used in the regressions are country-specific.  For all countries except South Korea, 
Thailand, Taiwan and Turkey, Rm, Rf and other factors are obtained from Kenneth French’s website.  Rm for each of these four 
countries is calculated using the local stock market index obtained from DataStream.   
cThe dependent variable is the equally-weighted monthly return (with dividends) of REIT IPO portfolios formed by region 
(Australia, Asia, Europe, and North America) and for the global market (including and excluding the U.S.).  Rm is the 
regional/global market return and Rf is the one-month U.S. Treasury bill rate. Rm, Rf and the regional/global factors (HML, 
SMB and WML) are sourced from Kenneth French’s website.  
dNob denotes the number of observations used in the regressions.  
*, **, and *** Significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Does A Firm’s Entry or Exit Affect 
Competitors’ Value? Evidence from The 
REIT industry 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the other puzzling phenomena in the finance literature is the pricing behavior of 
the stock market’s reaction to the initial public offerings of new securities.  In the first chapter, 
we examine IPOs initial-day, short-run (up to 190 days) and long-run aftermarket performance 
focusing on REIT industry and compare our results with the industrial firm IPOs. While Ritter 
(2012a) reports a significant positive initial trading-day return of 7,617 IPOs issued during the 
1980-2011 period, we are also interested to know what is the stock performance of rival firms of 
the new issues? Whether the IPOs have impact on the stock returns and operating performance of 
their incumbent firms?  In this study, we aim to (1) review empirical evidence and theoretical 
explanation in the finance literature working on the impact of issuance of new securities or exits 
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of existing firms on the security performance of competing firms, (2) examine if a change in 
asset supply affects the stock returns of incumbent firms, and (3) identify the explanation(s) for 
the stock responses of incumbent firms to the entry and exit events within the same industry.  
E.S. Browning noted in a Wall Street Journal article on 24 November 2003 that, “In the 
stock market, supply and demand works the same way as with anything else. When demand goes 
up, or when supply falls, that is good for stock prices”. In the finance literature, with regards to 
the demand side, Sorensen (1982) cites quite a few studies that connect changes in the rate of 
growth in money supply to the associated movements in stock prices.  He concludes that there is 
a relationship between money supply and stock returns. Thorbecke (1997) provides direct 
empirical evidence supporting the contention that an expansionary monetary policy increases ex-
post stock returns. Ling and Naranjo (2003) report that REIT capital inflows appear to have a 
significant influence on equity REIT returns. If an increase in money supply (thus an increase in 
asset demand) affects stock returns, it is reasonable to assume that a change in asset supply will 
also have an impact on stock returns.  
In the industry reports, E.S. Browning noted in a Wall Street Journal article on 24 
November 2003 that, “When the supply of new stock (from both new and already-public 
companies) has been on the rise, as demand seems to be leveling off, it would be a worrisome 
trend”. He documented that “Early in 2000, when the gains in stock supply began to outpace 
demand, the stocks fell”. Gretchen Morgenson wrote in a New York Times article on 27 August 
2000 that “The law of supply and demand is a powerful thing”. He also wrote that “The action in 
Nasdaq is inextricably linked to changes in the supply of and the demand for its companies' 
stocks. As supply dwindled, stocks rallied. When supply rose, stocks stalled. The biggest source 
of Nasdaq supply is the issuance of new shares by fledgling companies”. Constance Mitchell and 
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Susan Scherreik reported in a Wall Street Journal article on 23 January 1990 that “Skittish 
investors boycotted the bond market for fear that a deluge of new supply will hammer prices”.   
On the other hand, the stock market could reflect to the change of supply due to market 
timing issue. E.S. Browning wrote in a Wall Street Journal article on 10 November 2013 that 
“Flurry of Issuance Is a Danger Sign for Markets”. In the article, he mentioned “When new 
issues become as massive as they are today, it can mean markets are overheating and getting 
ready to give back some gains. Companies are racing to issue stock and bonds because markets 
are high, offering great prices for sellers”.   
Recent empirical evidence in the finance literature indicates that an issuance of securities 
has negative short run and long run effects on the security performance of competing firms. 
Baker and Wurgler (2000) empirically document that the stock market price level tends to fall 
after a period of active issuances of securities.  Chod and Lyandres (2011) establishes a model 
predicting that IPOs induced from intense aggressiveness of product market have adverse effects 
on the market shares and valuations of the newly public firm’s product market rivals. Their 
empirical results support the predictions that a firm’s entry (going public) has an adverse effect 
on the values of the IPO firm’s product market rivals. Hsu, Reed and Rocholl (2010) empirically 
show that the competitive firms in an industry show significant negative stock returns around 
IPOs’ filing days and issuing days.  
Braun and Larrain (2009) study over 254 IPOs in 22 emerging markets, finding that IPOs 
have negative impact on the prices of other assets in the market of issuance, especially those 
firms with high return covariance with the IPO firms. They perform the regression analysis, 
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demonstrating that asset prices of close competitors tend to fall during the month of new equity 
issuance.  
If the entry of new firms can affect the stock performance of the incumbents, this study 
would expect an exit of an existing firm to have an opposite effect. For example, Slovin, Sushka 
and Bendeck (1991) report that the going-private bids induces significant positive effects on 
industry rivals of target firms and the 2-day average excess return for industry rivals is 1.32%. 
Eckel, Eckel and Singal (1997) report that the stocks of U.S. competitors fell 7% upon the 
privatization announcement of British Airways, which implies that the market expects a more 
efficient British Airways. However, Huschelrach and Muller (2013) find that routes exits due to 
liquidations in the airline industry lead to significant fare increases. Given this, at least in an 
oligopoly market, a reduction in the number of competitors might have a positive effect in the 
product market.  
This study gathered 483 REIT entry and 439 REIT exit events during the 1973-2011 
period for our analyses. Among these events, we can identify the announcement dates and 
reasons for 386 entry events and 364 exit events.  The main finding is that change of asset supply 
explains the price reaction of incumbent REITs.  An increase (decrease) in the number of REITs 
decreases (increases) the stock returns of incumbent REITs. In addition, the stock responses of 
incumbent firms are not mainly due to signaling effect about the industry from firm’s restricting 
decision, a change in operating environment in the same industry or market timing explanation.  
This study aims to provide empirical evidence on whether the change in supply through 
entries or exits of firms affect the stock performance of incumbent firms by using REIT industry. 
We examine the reasons and motives for each REIT entry or exit and categorize them into 
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different corporate restructuring activities.  The advantage of analyzing the subgroups instead of 
only focusing on all entry or exit events provide this study an opportunity to disentangle the 
possible explanations of the price impacts that have been reported in previous studies. The 
announcement date and market date (first trading date and delisting date) information for each 
REIT entry and exit sample provide this study a chance of testing the signaling effect. The 
subgroups of asset type and management style of REITs allow this study to test whether the 
change of operating environment in the same industry explain the stock price reactions of 
incumbents firms.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the impact of firms’ 
entry or exit decision on stock returns of competing firms and summarizes the explanation for 
the stock market reaction of incumbent firms. Section 3 explains why this study uses REITs as a 
laboratory and discusses issues related to firms’ entry and exit events. Section 4 describes the 
sample collection process and provides a general description of the reasons for REITs’ entry and 
exit events. Section 5 describes the methodologies for assessing the stock price reaction of 
incumbent REITs to REITs’ entry and exit events. Section 6 analyses the empirical results for the 
market-adjusted monthly returns of REITs in relation to REITs’ entry and exit events. This 
section also discusses the average abnormal returns (at both the announcement date and market 
date) of incumbent REITs when there is an entry or exit event by another REIT. The abnormal 
returns of REITs are then partitioned to see if signaling, a change in competitive environment or 
market timing might be the reason for the stock response.  Section 7 concludes.  
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2. Related literature 
Although empirical studies consensus that an increase in the supply of securities in the 
stock market via IPOs depresses the stock returns of competing firms, the explanations for the 
negative stock reactions differ significantly among previous studies. The empirical evidence and 
explanations on the impact of firms’ exits on the returns of rivals are also mixed.  
The first type of studies believes that the negative effect might be caused by a change in 
the asset supply in the market. Braun and Larrain (2009) theoretically discuss how the 
introduction of a large asset permanently affects the prices of existing assets in a market. Their 
empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that that shocks to asset supply have a significant 
effect on asset prices. However, it should be noted that the authors did not try to rule out the 
signaling or the change in competitive environment explanations for their result.  
Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008) document that firms located in regions with relatively few 
firms per capita tend to have higher market-to-book valuations. They term this the “only-game-
in-town” effect, which means that the supply level of firms in each region affects firm valuation.   
The second type of stories is related to market timing issue.  Baker and Wurgler (2000) 
suggest that equity issues tend to cluster around market peaks and issues try to time both their 
idiosyncratic return and the market return. Their study suggests that that equity issuing could 
predict significantly negative one-year-ahead market returns and concludes that market timing 
mainly drives their results. They believe that equity issuing firms might have better information 
and can time the market component of their returns when they issue equity. The managers time 
the market when issuing securities indicating that market is inefficient which is periodically 
driven by irrational investors.  
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Kim and Ritter (1999) suggest that private firms try to time their IPOs when the publicly-
traded firms are overvalued. Ritter (1991) finds that firms experience declining share prices in 
the 3-year period after the issuance day. He attributes the post IPO decline to a decline in the 
industry because an IPO may signal the corresponding industry is near the stock price peak.  
Akhigbe, Johnson, Madura and Springer (2004) find that an increase in REIT IPO 
activities has a negative impact on the stocks returns (on the issuance dates) of other REITs and 
matching real estate related firms. They believe that the negative effect is caused by the signals 
from the issuing firms that the market is at the peak. 
The third type of stories is related to signaling effect about the industry from firm’s 
restructuring decision.  Ferris, Jayaraman and Makhija (1997) find that the stocks of rival firms 
(who should benefit from the exits of competitors) still react negatively to the announcement of 
bankruptcy. This is due to the contagion effects from the announcements of bankruptcy, which 
means that the signaling effect dominates the competitive effect.  Slovin, Sushka and Bendeck 
(1991) report that the bids to take a firm private reveal valuable information about the expected 
future cash flows of the target firm in the same industry. The announcements of going-private 
bids generate significant positive valuation effects to targets and intra-industry rivals. This means 
the exits convey a positive signal to the market under this circumstance. 
The fourth group of researchers explains the negative effect by appealing to a change in 
the competitive environment. Hsu, Reed and Rocholl (2010) believe that new firms entering the 
market might have a better competitive advantage (recent certification by underwriters and a 
higher level of knowledge capital) over existing competing firms. Consequently, a new IPO 
lowers the returns of the competitors. The operating performance of the competitors in the 
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industry such as return on assets (ROA), asset growth, sales growth, etc. also experience 
significant deterioration after the IPOs.  
 Chod and Lyandres (2011) demonstrate that a firm’s entry could hurt product market 
rivals, especially within industries with strong competitive interactions and large demand 
uncertainty. They establish a model of product market competition among public and private 
firms under the demand uncertainty, interpreting that the product market competition is an 
important determinant on a firm’s decision to go public.  Their model predicts that IPOs induced 
from intense aggressiveness of product market have adverse effects on the market shares and 
valuations of the newly public firm’s product market rivals. The empirical results support the 
predictions that going public has an adverse effect on the values of the IPO firm’s product 
market rivals.  The weighted average raw and abnormal returns of rival firms during the three-
day window around IPOs’ filing days are negative and significant, ranging between -0.38% and -
0.52%. 
Eckel, Eckel and Singal (1997) report that stock price of U.S. Airlines Competitors fell 
significantly upon the privatization announcement of British Airways. This is because the market 
expects British Airways would perform more efficient after privatization and therefore the 
competition increases among airline industry. This study applies the change in competitive 
environment story to explain the competitor’s reaction.  
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3. The use of REIT as a laboratory 
Different from previous studies which use 4-digit (or 2-digit) SIC codes, 6-digit NAICS 
codes, or Fama 48 industry classifications to a homogeneous group as competitors, this study 
focuses on REIT industry.  This is because firms within the same SIC code can still differ in firm 
characteristics to certain degrees as industrial firms may operate in several main lines of 
business. In addition, there are no generally established guidelines that could help researchers to 
select matched firms from the stock market to use as competitors.  Therefore, this study decides 
to select the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) industry as the laboratory for analyzing the 
research question for four reasons. 
First of all, focusing on REIT industry makes the study easier to identify the rivals of a 
firm. In order to qualify as a REIT, a firm (or trust) must meet several requirements. For 
example, a significant portion of a firm’s assets and income (for example, 75%) must be real 
estate related assets. A REIT has to pay out a significant portion (for example, 90%) of its 
taxable income as dividends. Since REITs own homogeneous assets and have similar dividend 
payout constraints, it is reasonable to argue that REITs are similar to each other and, therefore, 
can be viewed as competitors of each other.  
The second advantage is related to signaling issues. It is reasonable to argue that an entry 
or an exit of a REIT might not convey additional information about the future property markets 
in the REIT market. The reason is that REITs hold a portfolio of properties or mortgages that are 
constantly traded in the property or debt markets. Investors can obtain valuations of the 
underlying properties from the property markets, and thus there is low information asymmetry 
about the value of REIT stocks. In Chapter 1, we report that the mean initial-day return of 323 
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IPOs issued in the U.S. during the 1996-2010 period is 2.78%. The low price uncertainty of the 
underlying assets is one of the main reasons for the observed low mean REIT IPO initial-day 
return. Therefore, an entry or an exit of a REIT might not signal the changes in the REIT market. 
This helps to disentangle the price reaction of the competing firms from the possible signal effect 
explanation. In addition, if this study partitions the REIT samples by focusing on REIT entry and 
exit events that have previously been announced, it might be able to judge whether the price 
response can also be caused by the signaling conveyed by the events.  
Thirdly, this study could examine all types of entry and exit events by focusing on REIT 
industry. For example, it is reasonable to argue that IPOs could be the biggest source of 
increased supply in the REIT market. If a REIT entering the market via an IPO induces a 
stronger market reaction than a REIT entering the market via conversion, then we might 
conclude that a change in asset supply might be a better explanation than the signaling story 
because REIT entering via an IPO or via conversion could both signal the REIT market 
environment. Given this, instead of examining a single entry or exit event (such as an IPO or 
liquidation) across all industries, this study examines all types of entry and exit events occurring 
in the REIT industry with the hope to disentangle the possible explanations for the results. 
Additionally, this study could test the change in competitive environment hypothesis by 
further partitioning the sample based on asset type and management style of the REITs.  For 
example, we would expect that REITs that own properties (mortgages) have a stronger price 
impact on equity (mortgage) REITs than on mortgage (equity) REITs, as this study expects that a 
REIT entry or exit event would have more direct impact on REITs with similar assets or similar 
management style under the change in competitive environment explanation. Therefore, using 
REITs as a laboratory and examining all types of entry and exit events in the industry helps us 
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disentangle the two alternative hypotheses (competition versus supply) and focus solely on 
testing the hypothesis that the price reaction of incumbent firms upon an entry or exit of a rival 
firm is associated with a change in supply level. 
Finally, in general, the greater the homogeneity a researcher imposes on firms for 
analysis, the smaller the sample size will be.  This, however, might not be the case with using 
REITs as the laboratory.  As shown in the next section, the REIT industry provides a reasonably 
sized sample for our study. Since its establishment in 1962, a total of 606 publicly traded REITs 
were formed by the end of 2011. Among them, 440 had ceased to exist in the stock market.  
During our 1973-2011 sample period, the minimum number of REITs in the market was 90 in 
1984 and the maximum number of REITs was 230 in 1994. The total number of REITs and their 
entry and exit events offer this study a reasonable sample size to perform the analysis. 
 
 
4. Sample selection and description 
4.1 The establishment of the list of REITs 
The initial list of REITs from 1962 to 2009 is gathered from two sources. The first source 
comprises of various publications from the National Association of Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (NAREIT). Those publications include 13 issues of annual REIT Fact Book (form 1974 to 
1986), State and Course of the 1987 Real Estate Investment Trust Industry, REIT Facts: A 
Statistical Proﬁle of the REIT Industry in 1988, REIT Sourcebook (for the 1989–1990 period), 
REIT Formation: Getting the Deal Done (for the 1991–1992 period), seven issues of the REIT 
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Handbook: The Complete Guide to the Real Estate Investment Trust Industry (from 1993 to 
2000), and 114 monthly issues of the REITWatch (form July 1999 to December 2009). REIT 
information prior to 1974 was obtained primarily from the security issuance (IPOs and secondary 
issues) information listed in the appendices of the 1974 REIT Fact Book. We have also collect 
the information on the type of assets (equity or mortgage) the REIT holds for all REITs and its 
management structure (external or internal) and most REITs from the aforementioned sources.  
Then we added the REITs from 2010 to 2011 to the database by checking 28 monthly 
issues of the REITWatch (from January 2010 to December 2011) and REIT Initial Public 
Offering File during the period 2010 to 2011 downloaded from NAREIT website. However, as 
reported by Chan, Erickson and Wang (2003), some of the REITs reported in the publications 
were not REITs (but they were members of NAREIT).  In addition, NAREIT might not follow 
REITs that are not its members. Such problems appear mostly in the early REIT publications. 
To address this problem, we use the CRSP database as my second source to establish the 
REIT list.  We search the CRSP database for firms with SIC codes 6798 and 6799.  REITs are 
generally classified under SIC code 6798 but quite a few REITs may also be found under SIC 
code 6799 (and sometimes under other SIC codes).  From our search, we find quite a few firms 
that are classified as REITs by CRSP but are not included in the NAREIT publications and vice 
versa.  To verify that these firms are indeed REITs, we examine their annual reports, Standard 
and Poor’s Stock Reports or the LEXIS–NEXIS database to ascertain their REIT status. 
Additionally, we use SNL REIT database as my third source to establish the REIT list. SNL 
database has its own classification of REITs. If the firms are classified as REITs in SNL database 
but not in our list, we also need to examine their annual reports, Standard and Poor’s Stock 
Reports or the LEXIS–NEXIS database to ascertain their REIT status. Finally, to make sure this 
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study includes the most comprehensive list of REITs,we compare our list with the equity REIT 
list provided by Feng, Price, and Sirmans (2011).  This process verifies the tax-qualified status of 
606 REITs spanning the 1962–2011 period.  
To make sure the REITs are classified into correct type (equity or mortgage), we compare 
our classification with that of SNL database. If there are conflicts, we examine their annual 
reports, or the LEXIS–NEXIS news database to ascertain the REITs’ asset types. We also collect 
the management structure (external or internal) for the REITs if the information in the original 
database is not available.  
In this study, it is very important to identify the beginning and ending date for each 
publicly traded REIT. While for those REITs entering as new lists on (or exiting as delists from) 
major stock exchange, the market dates of REIT entry (or exit) are usually the first (or last) price 
appearance of a stock on CRSP. For those REITs converting from (or converting to) a publicly 
traded firm in corporation/limited partnership structure, whenever the company changes its name 
to reflect the structure change, the beginning or ending date is defined as the start (or end) date of 
the effective company name under REIT status. If there is no name change during the REIT 
status conversion, we use the dates reported on the firm’s annual report or news as the REIT 
beginning (or ending) date. 
The second column of Table 2.1 reports the number of REITs entering the REIT industry 
in each year, while the third column reports the number of REIT exiting.  There are totally 606 
entries and 440 exits from 1962 to 2011. Column four reports the total number of public traded 
REITs in each year (after considering entries and exits). Column five (six) reports the number of 
entries (exits) in each year as a percentage of the total number of entries (exits) during the 1962-
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2011 period. Clearly, the percentage of REIT entries (exits) in each year varies during the period 
examined.  Column seven highlights the significant growth (from $42 million to $452 billion) in 
total REIT market capitalization (based on year end stock price) from 1962 to 2011.  
We would like to see if the entry and exit patterns in the REIT market are similar to that 
of the general stock market. To accomplish this, we first identify the beginning date and the 
ending date of all the CRSP PERMNOs (including those for REITs).  From this information, we 
calculate the number of entries and exits for all firms traded in the stock market during the same 
1962-2011 period. Columns 8 to 13 in Table 2.1 report the set of summary statistics for stocks 
similar to those we reported for REITs. Columns 14 to 17 compare REITs to stocks in terms of 
the number of entries, exits, listed stocks, and total market capitalization. 
Panel A (Panel B) of Figure 2.1 plots the yearly percentage of entries (exits) in the REIT 
market and in the general stock market from 1962 to 2011. The Pearson correlation coefficient 
between the percentage of new REITs and the percentage of new stocks is a significant 0.67, 
while that between the percentage of terminated REITs and the percentage of delisted stocks is a 
significant 0.69.  It appears that, in terms of the percentages of entries and exits, the REIT market 
and the general stock market are quite similar, although the entry and exit patterns in the REIT 
market seem more volatile than that in the general stock market.   
 
4.2 Sample description 
An examination of Table 2.1 and Panel A of Figure 2.1 indicate that a large number of 
firms entered the market in 1972. For example, the 68 REITs entering the market in 1972 
accounts for 11.2% of the total number of REIT entries during the 1962-2011 period. An 
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examination of the beginning dates of these 68 REITs indicates that 48 of them had a same 
beginning date (12/14/1972) in the CRSP tapes.   From a reading of CRSP manual, we learn that 
CRSP tapes added Nasdaq data to the tape in 1972.6  Since we are not able to identify the exact 
entry dates for Nasdaq firms entering the market in 1972 and it is difficult to obtain 
announcement information for REIT events during the 1962-1972 period, we start this analysis 
in 1973.   
We use a number of sources, including the Securities Database Corporation (SDC) 
Platinum New Issues database, firm’s annual reports, SEC filings of S-11 form (from Edgar 
Online's I-Metrix database), LEXIS–NEXIS database, Factiva News release, NAREIT 
publications and NAREIT REIT Initial Public Offering file, to identify the methods REITs use to 
enter the publicly traded market.7  We use information from the SDC Platinum Merger and 
Acquisition database, SNL database, REITWatch issues, Factiva News release and LEXIS–
NEXIS database to verify the reasons for a REIT exit.  When available, we also obtain the 
announcement date of each event from the LEXIS–NEXIS database, Factiva News release and 
REITWatch issues.  For merger and acquisition related events, we also check the announcement 
date from the SDC and SNL databases.8  Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show the number of REIT entry and 
the number of REIT entry (exit) with announcement information, respectively that we identified 
in each year from 1973 to 2011.  Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show the information for REIT exiting. In 
                                                          
6 See http://www.crsp.com/products/documentation/development-crsp-stock-files for this information.  
7 The NAREIT website, http://www.reit.com/DataAndResearch/Statistical-Publications/REITWatch.aspx, also 
provides historical information on REIT initial public offerings. Form S-11 is used to register securities that are 
issued by REITs or firms whose main business is acquiring or holding real estate for the purpose of investment. 
Edgar Online filing is available from 1995. 
8 SNL Mergers & Acquisitions database defines the announcement date as “the date on which the deal was agreed 
upon if available, otherwise the date on which the earliest official public information regarding the event was 
obtained from a company, news outlet, or regulatory agency”.  In the SDC database, announcement date is 
defined as “the date one or more parties involved in the transaction makes the first public disclosure of common 
or unilateral intent to pursue the transaction (no formal agreement is required)”. 
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total, there are 483 REIT entry events and 439 REIT exit events over the whole period.  Of these, 
we can identify 386 announcement dates for the entry events and 364 announcement dates for 
the exit events. 
Figure 2.2 plots the number of REITs entering and exiting the market by month during 
the 1973-2011 period.  A total of 483 (439) REITs enter (exit) the REIT market during this 
period.  The Pearson correlation coefficient between the number of entering and exiting REITs is 
an insignificant -0.07 when we include the months without any entering and exiting REITs. This 
result shows that entry events and exit events in the REIT industry are independent of each other. 
We define a firm becoming a new publicly-traded REIT as a new REIT entry event. New 
REIT entries can be classified into eight categories based on the entry mode: IPO, spin-off from 
a non-REIT, spin-off from a REIT, consolidation of LPs or funds into a REIT, merger of REITs 
into new REITs, conversion from a public firm to a REIT, a move from OTC to a major stock 
exchange, and an unknown mode. Table 2.2 and 2.3 reports the number of new REITs formed 
and whether they have available announcement date information under each of the above 
categories in each year during the 1973-2011 period.   
Correspondingly, we define an exit of a publicly-traded REIT from the REIT market as a 
REIT exit event. The REIT exits are classified into nine categories based on the exit mode: 
conversion to a non-REIT public firm, acquisition by an existing or a new public REIT, 
acquisition by a non-REIT public firm, going private, liquidation (wholesale, retail and 
unspecified), performance- related delisting, and an unknown mode.  Table 2.4 and 2.5 report the 
number of REIT exits and whether they have available announcement date information in each 
of the above categories in each year during the 1973-2011 period. 
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It should be noted that, to sort the entry and exit events into different categories, we relied 
heavily on the information obtained from an examination of changes in the PERMNOs of the 
firms in the CRSP database.  Comparing the PERMNOs of firms before and after an entry or exit 
event enables us to classify the event into different categories in a systematic way.  Appendix IV 
provides details of this classification scheme. 
 
4.3 REIT entry types 
Table 2.2 reports the formation of new REITs and the methods of entry in each year 
during the 1973-2011 period. Table 2.3 reports the number of entries for which we can find the 
event announcement date. Of the 483 REIT entry events, we can find the announcement dates for 
386 of them. 355 REITs enter the market via IPOs (including both firm commitment and best 
efforts offerings) and 332 of them have announcement dates of the IPO events.  We verified that 
the CRSP tape assigns brand new PERMNOs to those IPO firms and that the beginning trading 
dates of the new PERMNOs are close to the IPO prospectus dates.  
An additional 15 REITs were spin-offs from either non-REIT firms or from existing 
REITs. Among them, 11 have announcement information. After the spin-offs, the newly created 
REITs will receive new PERMNOs. Three new REITs were formed through the consolidation of 
existing traded partnerships or funds and four new REITs were created as the result of 
consolidating existing traded REITs. We can find the announcement dates for five of them. The 
CRSP PERMNOs of the existing partnerships and funds terminate after the consolidation and 
each new REIT receives a new PERMNO.  Forty REITs were converted from publicly traded 
companies or partnerships. After the conversion, the new REIT retains either the original 
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PERMNO of the converting firm or receives a new CRSP PERMNO (and, in this case, the 
PERMNO of the converting firm terminates).  We are able to identify 34 announcement dates for 
this conversion group. We find 27 REITs that were traded over-the-counter before they were 
listed on the major exchanges.  However, We can only find 4 announcements for this group. We 
fail to identify the method of entry (and, therefore, the announcements) for 39 newly formed 
REITs. 
 
4.4 REIT exit types 
Table 2.4 reports the termination of existing REITs and the methods of exit in each year 
during the 1973-2011 period. Table 2.5 reports the number of exits for which we can find the 
event announcement date. There are two major ways a REIT can exit the public REIT market. 
The first is for a REIT to give up its REIT status voluntarily (and change to an MLP or a 
corporation). The second way is via a (voluntary or involuntary) delisting from a stock exchange.  
In Table 2.4, we observe 439 REIT exits during the 1973-2011 period and of these 74 were 
conversions from a REIT to a publicly traded non-REIT firm. The remaining 365 REITs were 
delisted from the stock exchange for various reasons. The delisting code that CRSP provides for 
each delisted REIT serves as a starting point for identifying the reason a REIT exits the public 
market. CRSP classifies delisted firms into several categories. For example, mergers and 
acquisitions (200–399), liquidation (400-499), and involuntary performance-related delistings 
(codes ≥ 500). 
Of the 74 conversion events from a REIT status to a non-REIT status, 56 events have a 
news announcement. For the 365 observations with a delisting code, 129 REITs were delisted 
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because they were either acquired by other publicly traded REITs or merged to form a new 
public REIT.  Of these 129 events, 126 have announcement dates. We also find 47 REITs that 
were acquired by publicly traded non-REIT firms. Among them we can find a total of 46 
announcements.  
It should be noted that when we classify an exit as a merger or acquisition event, we 
require that the acquirer be a publicly traded company (could be a REIT or a non REIT). When a 
publicly traded REIT is voluntarily acquired by a non-traded firm, we classify this exit as a going 
private event. (In many cases, the non-traded acquirers are the majority shareholders of the 
acquired REITs.)  We obtain information on the acquirers from SDC, SNL databases, and 
REITWatch issues. Under this classification, we identify 80 going private events, of which 75 
have announcement dates. 
When a REIT decides to liquidate, there are two ways to do so.  First, the REIT can sell 
all or most of its properties in a single transaction when the REIT announces its liquidation 
decision. The second method is for the REIT to sell its assets based on market conditions or just 
transfer the assets to a liquidating trust after adopting a liquidation plan.  Among our exit events, 
we identify a total of 48 exit events with a liquidation motive. Among them, 43 have 
announcement dates.  Forty-seven REIT exits are classified as performance-related delistings, 
most of which were due to bankruptcy or failure to meet stock exchange requirements. Among 
these 47 events, we can find a total of 18 announcements. Finally, we fail to identify the reason 
and announcement dates of 14 REIT exits. 
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5. Methodology 
In this section, we employ two methodologies to analyze if the entry or exit of REITs 
affects the stock performance of incumbent REITs. First of all, we examine individual REIT’s 
monthly market-adjusted stock returns to see if they are affected by an increase or a decrease in 
the supply of REIT stocks in the market using multivariate regression analysis. Secondly, we 
analyze the market-adjusted abnormal returns (and market-model abnormal returns) of 
incumbent REITs at the date when there is an announcement of a REIT entry or exit as well as at 
the dates when the new REITs are actually traded in the stock market (or when existing REITs 
are delisted from the market). We then partition my entry and exit events into Full, Single, Pure 
groups to eliminate the contaminated and diluted effects.   
 
5.1 Assessing monthly stock price reaction of incumbent REITs using multivariate 
regression analysis 
To analyze if an entry and/or exit of REITs affects the market-adjusted stock returns of 
all other incumbent REITs in the market, we regress the incumbent REITs’ market-adjusted 
monthly stock returns on REIT entry and/or exit variables with and without control variables 
during the 1973-2011 period.  Specifically, we estimate the following panel regression: 
Market-adjusted Stock Returni,t = α + β × Entry and/or Exit indicatorsi,t + Controlsi,t + εi,t                 (1) 
The dependent variable is the market-adjusted stock return (Rit - EWRETDt), where Rit is 
the return of REITi in month t and EWRETDt is the return on the CRSP equally-weighted index 
in month t. The selection of the dependent variable and control variables follows closely the 
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variables used in Table 5 of Hsu, Reed and Rocholl (2010). We establish five variables to 
capture the effects of REIT entry and/or exit on incumbent REITs’ stock returns.  
D_Entries_Only is a dummy variable equal to one if there are only REIT entries and no REIT 
exits in month t.  D_Exits_Only is a dummy variable equal to one if there are only REIT exits 
and no REIT entries in month t.  It should be noted that our definitions of the entry and exit 
dummy variables exclude the months that have both entry and exit events in the same month. 
This is necessary since we expect the entry and exit events to have opposite effect on the stock 
returns. Since multiple entry or exit events in the same month might have a stronger supply 
effect on competitors than a single event, we use the variable # of Entries (# of Exits) to denote 
the number of REIT entries (exits) in month t and the variable # of (Entries - Exits) to denote the 
number of REIT entries minus the number of REIT exits in month t.  A positive (negative) # of 
(Entries - Exits) indicates that there are more (less) entries than exits during the month t.  We 
expect the coefficient of this variable to be negative. 
We also establish three control variables that might affect the market-adjusted stock 
returns of REITs.  The first control variable is the lag market-adjusted stock return. This variable 
captures the impact of the past performance of a REIT on its current stock return. The second 
and third control variables are Size and B/M (book-to-market equity ratio).  We measure Size as 
the natural log of REITi’s market value of equity in June of year t computed using CRSP data.  
Following Fama and French (1992), we compute the book-to-market equity ratio (B/M) using a 
REIT’s book equity at end of fiscal year t-1 from Compustat and its market equity at the end of 
December of year t-1 from CRSP. 9  It should be noted that out of the 606 REITs that have 
information from CRSP, only 573 have book equity value data in Compustat. We also exclude 
                                                          
9 We use the market equity data from CRSP because CRSP has less missing information on this data item than 
Compustat. 
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from our sample 143 monthly observations with negative book equity. This means that when 
controls variables are included in the analysis, the number of observation will be reduced. 
We run 14 panel regressions based on Equation (1) using data during the 1973-2011 
period to detect if the stock performance of incumbent REITs are significantly affected by 
competitors’ entry or exit events.  Panel A (B) of Table 2.6 reports the regression results when 
control variables are excluded (included).  The sample comprises as many months as possible for 
each REIT during this period. We estimate the regressions using firm fixed effects and, therefore, 
have a separate constant term for each REIT in the sample.  The standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering in firm.  
 
5.2 Assessing abnormal returns of incumbent REITs around event dates  
We use the event study methodology to compute the market-adjusted abnormal return 
and market-model abnormal return of incumbent REITs around REIT entry or exit events.  We 
analyze the events around their announcement dates as well as their market dates (the date at 
which a REIT officially trades in the REIT stock market or delists/exits from the REIT stock 
market). 
To measure the stock price response of incumbent REITs to a new REIT entry or an 
existing REIT exit, we form an equally-weighted portfolio of all incumbent REITs that are 
publicly-traded at the time of a particular event.  The REITs we use to form the REIT portfolio 
includes all the 606 REITs we identified in the 1962-2011 period (see Table 2.1). Braun and 
Larrain (2009) document that forming portfolio instead of working with individual firms could 
correct for the unbalanced nature of the panel with individual firms since the number of firms 
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varies substantially across time. Working with individual firms would give unequal weight to 
certain events.  In addition, working with portfolio takes into account the possibility that returns 
of rival REITs could be correlated and correct for the correlation among REITs around the 
events.  
The market-adjusted abnormal returns for the incumbent REIT portfolio (Apt = Rpt  - Rmt) 
are computed by subtracting the return on the market index on day t, Rmt, from the return on the 
REIT portfolio on day t, Rpt . We use the CRSP equally-weighted index return to proxy for the 
market return.  To calculate market-model abnormal return of the incumbent REIT portfolio, we 
assume that the portfolio returns follow a single factor market model, Rpt = αj + βj Rmt + εpt.  The 
market-model abnormal return for the REIT incumbent portfolio p on day t is defined as Apt = Rpt 
- (  ?̂?𝑗 + ?̂?𝑗 Rmt ).  The coefficients  ?̂?𝑗   and ?̂?𝑗 are ordinary least squares estimates of αj  and βj, 
estimated from the market model using a 255-day period (from 316 to 61 days prior to the event).   
Similar to Eckel, Eckel, and Singal (1997), Ferris, Jayaraman, and Makhija (1997), and Chod 
and Lyandres (2011), we report the three-day (-1, +1) mean cumulative average abnormal return.  
Appendix V reports the estimated betas βj using the ordinary least squares regression 
from market model partitioned by REIT type and time period.  As shown in Appendix V, the 
betas vary by the sample period. The βj are higher, approximately approaching one, during the 
period 1973-1985, than during the recent period 1986-2011. The REIT industry shows a higher 
sensitivity to the general stock market during the old breed of REIT period than during the recent 
modern REIT era. The estimated betas also vary by REIT type and management style. On 
average, mortgage REITs have higher betas and thus higher market sensitivities than equity 
REITs. Externally advised REITs are with higher estimated betas than those internally advised 
REITs. Given that the estimated βj from REIT industry is not necessary equal to one and it 
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significantly varies by sample period and REIT type, it is necessary for us to report the market-
model adjusted cumulative abnormal return as well as the market adjusted cumulative abnormal 
return.  
 
5.3 Defining Full, Single, Pure entry and exit groups 
Recall that in Table 2.2, we report that we can identify 483 REIT entry market dates 
during the 1973-2011 period. Of these 483 entry dates, 280 are not preceded nor followed by 
another REIT entry in the three days (-1, +1) surrounding the market date. We refer these 280 
events as the Single Entry group. To avoid the problem that the impact of an entry of a REIT 
could be contaminated and diluted by the exit of another REIT, we establish a Pure Entry group. 
This Pure Entry group contains 229 entry dates that are not preceded nor followed by any other 
REIT entry or exit in the three days surrounding the market date.  Table 2.3 also reports that we 
can find the announcement dates of 386 REIT entry decisions. Of these 386 entry 
announcements, 230 can be categorized as Single Entry and 184 can be classified as Pure Entry. 
We expect to see a negative stock response from incumbent REITs at the announcement date 
and/or at the market date of an entry event.  
Similarly for the 439 exit market dates that reported in Table 2.4, we classify the 291 (out 
of the 439) exit dates that are not preceded nor followed by another REIT exit in the three days 
surrounding the exit market date as the Single Exit group. The Pure Exit group contains 246 exit 
dates that are not preceded nor followed by any other entry or exit dates in the three day window.  
Of the 364 REIT exit decisions with an announcement date reported in Table 2.5, 261 
announcements can be categorized in the Single Exit group and 213 can be classified in the Pure 
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Exit group.  We expect to find a positive stock reaction from the incumbent REITs at the 
announcement dates and/or at the market dates of an exit event.  
Note that a REIT entry (or exit) event announcement date precedes the market date as the 
latter refers to the beginning (or ending date) for each publicly traded REITs. The market date of 
a REIT entry (or exit) is usually the first (or last) price appearance of the REIT in CRSP. For 
those REITs converting from (or converting to) another form of publicly traded firm (normally 
associated with a name change to reflect the organizational structure change), the market date of 
a REIT entry (or exit) is defined as the start (or end) date of the effective company name under 
REIT status. If there is no clear change during the REIT status conversion, we use the date 
reported in the firm’s annual report or news report as the REIT entry (or exit) market date.  
 
6. Empirical results 
This section reports the empirical results for (1) monthly abnormal returns of incumbent 
REITs from the multivariate regression, and (2) the abnormal returns of incumbent REITs 
around event dates. We then analyze the market-adjusted abnormal returns (and market-model 
abnormal returns) of incumbent REITs at the date when there is an announcement of a REIT 
entry or exit as well as at the dates when the new REITs are actually traded in the stock market 
(or when existing REITs are delisted from the market).  Since there are several potential 
explanations for the stock response results, we partition the entry and exit events into different 
categories with a hope to isolate the effect of a change in supply level on the stock returns of 
incumbent REITs.  
 
82 
 
 
 
8
2
 
6.1 Monthly stock price reaction of incumbent REITs to the change of REIT stock supply 
Regressions 1 to 3 in Panel A of Table 2.6 report the result when the dummy variables for 
entry and exit are used.  In Regression 1, the coefficient of D_Entries_Only is significantly 
negative while the coefficient of D_Exits_Only in Regression 2 is significantly positive.  When 
both variables are included in Regression 3, the signs of these two variables stay the same as in 
Regressions 1 and 2. The results indicate that the entry of new REITs decreases the market-
adjusted monthly stock returns of the incumbent REITs. The exit of existing REITs increases the 
market-adjusted monthly stock returns of the incumbent REITs.   Regressions 4 to 6 in Panel A 
report the results when the number of entries and the number of exits are used for the analysis. 
The coefficient of # of Entries in Regression 4 is insignificant while the coefficient of # of Exits 
in Regression 5 is significantly positive. When both variables are included in Regression 6, the # 
of Entries coefficient remains insignificant while the # of Exits coefficient is positive and 
significant as in Regressions 4 and 5.  As a robustness check, Regression 7 runs the panel 
regression using the # of (Entries – Exits) as the independent valuable. The coefficient of this 
variable is significantly negative, indicating that an increase in the supply of REIT stocks 
decreases the stock returns of incumbent REITs. 
Regressions 8 to 14 in Panel B of Table 2.6 repeat the analyses of Regressions 1 to 7 with 
the inclusion of the additional three control variables (Lag Dependent Variable, Size and B/M). 
The results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Panel A, with the exception that the # of 
Entries coefficients in Regressions 11 and 13 are now negative and significant. Overall, the 
results from Regressions 8 to 14 support those generated from Regressions 1 to 7. 
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We also perform a robustness check on Table 2.6. Instead of testing the entry and/or exit 
of REITs affects the market-adjusted stock returns of other incumbent REITs, we choose the 
dependent variable to be the publicly-listed incumbent REITs’ monthly stock return in excess of 
the monthly risk-free rate Rit - Rft,.  We keep the same five key independent variables to capture 
the REIT entry and/or exit activities while the control variables are selected to be Fama and 
French (1993) factors plus Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor (1973-2011).  The panel 
regression analysis results are shown in Appendix VI. The results are qualitatively similar to 
those reported in Panel A of Table 2.6.  
To summarize, the finding indicates that REIT entry or exit affect the stock performance 
of incumbent REITs. The empirical evidence so far indicates that market-adjusted monthly 
return of incumbent REITs decreases if the month has new REIT(s) entering into the market. On 
the other hand, the market-adjusted monthly return increases if there are one or more REITs 
exiting the market during the month. However, one might wonder why the stocks of incumbent 
REITs react at the month of entry or exit. Since the decisions of entries and exits might be 
known in advance, should the stocks react at the dates when the information is released to the 
market?  In the next subsection, we will report the empirical results from the standard event 
study testing on when and to what extent incumbent REITs react to entry and exit events.  
 
6.2 Abnormal returns of incumbent REITs around event dates  
Panel A of Table 2.7 reports the mean cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return, 
CMAR, and the mean cumulative market-model abnormal return, CMMAR, of incumbent REIT 
portfolios in the 3-day window surrounding a REIT entry or exit announcement date. Panel B of 
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Table 2.7 reports the results surrounding a REIT entry or exit market date. In each panel, we 
report the CMAR and CMMAR results for entry events categorized into the three groups, Entry, 
Single Entry, and Pure Entry, as previously defined.  Similarly, we categorized the results for 
exit events into Exit group, Single Exit Group, and Pure Exit Group. 
The results from Panel A of Table 2.7 seem to be surprising because none of the CMARs 
and CMMARs around the announcement date are significant. This means that the stock returns 
of incumbent REITs do not react to REIT entry or REIT exit events at the announcement dates. 
On the other hand, Panel B of Table 2.7 reports that the mean CMARs and the mean CMMARs 
at REIT entry market dates are all negative and significant.  The mean CMARs and mean 
CMMARs around the exit market dates are all positive but are significant only for the Single Exit 
and Pure Exit groups. Our results are consistent with Akhigbe, Johnston, Madura and Springer 
(2004) that the REIT rival portfolios do not have significant valuation response on REIT IPO 
filing date, but show significant negative abnormal returns around the issue date. Braun and 
Larrain (2009) document the significant price effects of other assets at issuance because they 
don’t have the announcement dates information in their study.   
Overall, these results are consistent with my expectations. The results also support my 
findings reported in Table 2.6 that when REITs enter (or exit from) the public REIT market, 
there are significant negative (positive) stock price responses from incumbent REITs. This 
finding also demonstrates that a change in the supply level of REIT stocks affects the stock 
returns of rival REITs.  
It is a puzzle, however, as to why the supply effect is only significant at the market date 
and not at the announcement date of the event. One would expect that once the market receives 
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information on a REIT’s entry or exit decision, the stock prices of incumbent REITs should 
immediately react to the information on the announcement date.  If this conjecture is correct, 
then the price response of incumbent REITs should not be very significant when the event 
actually happens (that is, at the first trading date or at the delisting date).  
Findings from a study by Braun and Larrain (2009) may offer a possible explanation for 
the insignificant price reaction at the announcement date of entry decisions. The study 
documents that incumbent firms with high return covariance with IPO firms tend to be affected 
by the entry of the new firms.  Given this, it is possible that the market does not have all the 
information about the return characteristics of the new entering firms at the announcement date 
as the new stocks have yet to trade. In addition, it is possible that the announced new entries 
might be withdrawn at a later date. For example, Hsu, Reed and Rocholl (2010) analyze the 
impact of both completed IPOs and withdrawn IPOs on the performance of their rival firms.  
Given these two possible explanations, some of the supply effect could be revealed at the market 
date, and not at the announcement date.   
It is also possible that announcements of exits (such as liquidations) might convey to the 
market information other than a reduction in supply. Ferris, Jayaraman and Makhija (1997) 
discuss the contagion and competitive effects of bankruptcy announcements on the stock returns 
of rivals suggesting that signaling effect of the poor prospectus of the industry dominates the 
competitive effect. Since there might be confounding signals conveyed by an exit decision, it is 
reasonable to explain why exit announcements do not trigger significant price responses.  While 
there are possible explanations for this result, there seems to be a need to further analyze the 
relationship between the market price response on the announcement day and that on the market 
date. 
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6.3 Relationship between announcement and market dates 
This section tests if there is a significant difference in the abnormal returns around the 
market dates between a group of REIT entry and exit events that are preceded by an 
announcement and a group that does not have a prior announcement. An insignificant difference 
between the two groups would indicate that the significant market date result is independent of a 
prior news announcement of the event. Table 2.8 reports the result based on this partitioning. 
Columns 2 to 4 of Panel A report the CMARs of the group without a prior news 
announcement of the event while columns 5 to 7 report the same result for the group with a prior 
news announcement. Panel B reports the results for the CMMARs. The last two columns of the 
table report the difference (and its significance level) in the abnormal returns between the two 
groups. We use the difference-in-means t-test to analyze if the difference is significantly 
different from zero. It is noteworthy that the number of observations of the group with prior 
news announcements is about three times larger than that of the group without prior news 
announcements. 
First of all, the difference-in-means results reported in the last two columns of the Table 
2.8 show no significant difference in the cumulative abnormal returns between these two groups, 
regardless of the sample and estimation method used. This indicates that the price response at the 
market date is, on average, the same regardless of whether there are prior news announcements 
of the events. Most importantly, columns 5 to 7 report that the cumulative abnormal returns of 
both entry and exit events with prior announcements are, in general, significant and with the 
expected signs.  This is an important result because it indicates that the market reaction to the 
events are significant at the market dates even if the events have been announced at earlier dates, 
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which in turn suggests that market timing stories might be suitable to explain this result. 
However, columns 2 to 4 report a different result for the events without prior announcements. 
Except for the entry sample and single entry sample, when the CMMAR method is used, all the 
cumulative abnormal returns for the other groups are insignificant. This result is difficult to 
interpret and this study suspects that they are caused by the small sample sizes.  
Columns 8 and 9 of Table 2.8 also show that, although the differences are not statistically 
significant, the cumulative abnormal returns of the groups without prior announcements are 
generally larger than that of the groups with prior announcements.  Given this, this study 
suspects that there might be a relationship between the abnormal returns at the announcement 
date and at the market date. Table 2.9 explores this possibility by regressing the cumulative 
abnormal returns of the market date on the cumulative abnormal returns of the announcement 
date.  
For the entry events, Column 2 to 4 of Table 2.9 report that none of the coefficients of the 
regression is significant, regardless of whether CMAR or CMMAR is used to calculate the 
abnormal returns. This result indicates that, for the entry events, the abnormal return at the 
announcement date does not predict the price response at the market date. This result makes 
sense since, at the announcement date, the market does not know much about the return 
characteristics of the new entry firm. However on the actual market date, incumbent firms have 
improved the understanding about the new entry firm due. According to Braun and Larrain (2009) 
that incumbent firms with high return covariance with IPO firms tend to be affected by the entry 
of new firms. Therefore, there are significant price reactions on the incumbent REITs at the 
market date but not at the announcement date.  Additionally, there is no correlation between the 
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abnormal return at the announcement date and abnormal return at the market date for the entry 
events. 
However, for the exit events, columns 5 to 7 of Table 2.9 report that a high abnormal 
return at the announcement date predicts a high abnormal return at the market date of an exit 
event. This positive relationship suggests that the impact of an exit event on the incumbents’ 
stock prices should be similar to both the announcement date and the market date.  This study 
suspects that, probably because an exit event at the announcement date and market date (such as 
a liquidation event) both contains some signals (probably negative) about the condition of the 
market (although this study does not find a significant price response for exit events at the 
announcement date). Therefore, there is positive correlation between the abnormal return at the 
announcement date and abnormal return at the market date for the exit events. However, it is 
important to note that the significant price reactions at the market date are independent of 
whether there was an announcement about the event. 
 
6.4 Reasons behind entry and exit events 
Table 2.10 to Table 2.12 reports the market date abnormal returns for full sample, pure 
sample and single sample respectively when all the entry and exit events are partitioned by 
formation and termination reasons. All the entry events are classified into one of five categories: 
IPO; spinoff (or conversion) from non-REITs and consolidation of LPs and funds; spinoff from 
REIT and consolidating & merging REITs into new REITs; move from OTC; and unknown.  
The exit events include five categories: conversion to a non-REIT public firm or acquisition by a 
89 
 
 
 
8
9
 
non-REIT public firm; acquisition by an existing public REIT; going private; liquidation (whole 
sale, retail and unspecified); and delisting or unknown. 
For the entry events, since the hypothesis of the study is that an increase (decrease) in the 
supply level of firms will affect the stock performance of the incumbents, an entry through an 
IPO might have more impact on the stock responses than other entry types (such as a spinoff, 
consolidation, merger, and move from another exchange). The reason is that an IPO introduces a 
brand new asset into the market and thus adds new supply to the market. A spin off, 
consolidation or merger might be viewed as a restructure of existing assets. A move from the 
OTC to a stock exchange, although add liquidity, is just a change in trading.  
The results related to the entry events reported from Table 2.10 to Table 2.12 seem to 
support the hypotheses. Among the five subcategories, the negative stock responses of the 
incumbent REITs are significant for REIT entries via IPOs, regardless of the estimation method 
used.  The stock response of incumbent REITs to the entry events via a spinoff or conversion 
from a non-REIT is significant only when the CMAR method is used.  As expected, the stock 
reactions to the other categories are not significant. 
It should be noted that there is a significant difference between the CMAR (-0.49%) and 
CMMAR (0.07%) for this subsample. The problem is caused by some outliers. Using the pure 
sample (with 27 observations) as the example, we find three observations with low betas (less 
than 0.5), while the corresponding 3-day cumulative market returns (Rm) are very high (around 
4%).  We also find another observation with very a high beta (1.65) and the 3-day cumulative 
market return (Rm) is -3.55%. This explains the result since CMAR - CMMAR = α + (β -1) * 
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Rm. However, since these events are not clustered over time, this study decided not to handle 
this outlier issue. 
If an entry of a new firm should convey signals to the market about the current and future 
market conditions, then an entry should convey the same signals regardless of whether it is an 
entry via an IPO, spin off, conversion or other methods. Since only the stock reaction is 
significant for entries via an IPO, it gives less support to the signaling argument and more weight 
to the argument that a change in the supply level of competing stocks affects the value of the 
stocks.  
For the exit events, when a REIT converts to a non-REIT or is acquired by a non-REIT, 
its assets are completely removed from the REIT industry.  However, when a REIT exits the 
market because it is acquired by an existing REIT, its assets still remain in the REIT market even 
though the firm ceases to exist. Given this, the price impact of the first group should be stronger 
than the second group at the market date. When a REIT go private or liquidate from the REIT 
market, we would expect these events to have a strong price reaction on incumbent REITs since 
the REIT’s assets will be removed from the stock market completely.  However, a going private 
or a voluntary liquidating event normally happens when the value of a REIT’s stock is lower 
than the value of its underlying assets.  Since this undervaluation condition usually happens 
when the REIT industry is performing poorly, the going private or liquidating events might 
signal the poor performance of REIT industry. It might not be easy to detect a positive abnormal 
return from the incumbent firms due to the supply effect under these circumstances. We also 
check the mean CMARs and mean CMMARs of entry and exit announcements categorized by 
the reason for the pure entry and pure exit samples (the results are not reported here). Except for 
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the liquidation group, all the mean abnormal returns of the entry and exit announcement 
subcategories are not significant. 
The second half of Table 2.10 – Table 2.12 reports the stock price reactions of incumbent 
REITs to REIT exit events at the market date via various exit modes. As expected, when a REIT 
exits the REIT market by converting to a non-REIT and becoming part of a non-REIT firm, the 
stock price reactions of incumbent REITs are significantly positive. When a REIT is acquired by 
an existing REIT, the positive reaction is not conclusive.  It is only significant when the 
CMMAR method is used for the pure exit and single exit samples and the magnitude of the 
positive responses are lower than that of the first group (acquired by non-REITs).  As expected, 
the stock responses for the other two groups are insignificant, probably due to the unfavorable 
market conditions when these types of events normally happen. This study also fails to detect a 
significant stock price response when REIT exits are due to delisting or unknown reasons. 
This evidence also provides some support to supply story. A conversion to a non-REIT 
means that the assets of the exiting REIT will be totally removed from the REIT industry. An 
acquisition by existing REITs means that the assets of the exiting REIT will still remain in the 
REIT industry, although the number of REITs in the market decreases due to the exit.  This 
seems to indicate that a reduction in the number of competitors might be the main reason for the 
positive response from the incumbent REITs. 
 
6.5 Asset composition and management structure 
Table 2.13 to Table 2.15 partitions the entry or exit events for full sample, pure sample 
and single sample respectively by the REIT assets type and management style. The hypothesis is 
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that, while both equity REITs (owning properties) and mortgage REITs (owning mortgage 
related assets) share the same REIT structure, an equity REIT should be a more direct competitor 
to other equity REITs than to mortgage REITs. Similarly, while both externally advised REITs 
and internally advised REITs share the same REIT status, investors who prefer internally 
(externally) advised REITs might select their investment from the group of internally (externally) 
advised REITs. Given this argument, an externally advised REIT might be a more direct 
competitor to other externally advised REITs than to internally advised REITs. Under the 
assumption that the entry of a new firm or the exit of an existing firm might affect a change in 
the competitive environment of the incumbent firms because they are sharing and competing 
with the same pool of property or management resources, this study would expect that an entry 
or exit of equity REITs will have effects only on equity incumbent REITs, and not on mortgage 
incumbent REITs. This study would also expect that an entry or exit of internally advised REITs 
will have effects only internally advised incumbent REITs, and not on externally advised 
incumbent REITs. 
Panel A of Table 2.13 to Table 2.15 test the price responses of incumbent equity REITs 
and incumbent mortgage REITs respectively at the market dates when the entries and exits are 
equity REITs. Similarly, we also test the price responses of incumbent equity REITs and 
incumbent mortgage REITs respectively at the market dates when the entries and exits are 
mortgage REITs. It should be noted that this study excluded hybrid REITs from the tables 
because the sample of hybrid REITs is small and all the price responses are insignificant.10  
                                                          
10 For example, among the 483 REIT entries during the 1973 – 2011 period, we find 328 equity REITs, 118 
mortgage REITs, and 37 hybrid REITs.  
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Panel B of Table 2.13 to Table 2.15 performs the same analyses as in Panel A, except that we 
replace the equity and mortgage REITs with internally and externally advised REITs.  
The results reported in Panel A of Table 2.13 to Table 2.15 show that for the entry events, 
equity REITs have stronger negative price effects on mortgage incumbent REITs than on equity 
incumbent REITs. Mortgage REITs have stronger price impacts on equity incumbent REITs than 
on mortgage incumbent REITs. For the exit events, mortgage REITs have an expected positive 
impact on the equity REIT rivals but not on mortgage REITs rivals. There finds are inconsistent 
with the hypotheses derived from the change in the competitive environment argument, which in 
turn could help the study to exclude this possible explanation.   
Panel B of Table 2.13 to Table 2.15 reports the results when we partition the samples 
based on the REIT advisor style. The results do not show a clear pattern. The difference of the 
impact on the stock returns between internally and externally advised incumbent REITs is not 
obvious.   
To summarize, this study does not find conclusive evidence to support the hypothesis that 
entry or exit events of REITs should have a significant (no) impact on the returns of incumbent 
REITs with similar (different) assets and management structures. This result implies that, at least 
for the REIT industry (which owns and/or manage property related investments), the change in 
competitive environment caused by the entry of new REITs might not be the reason that triggers 
a negative stock price response from incumbent REITs.  Instead, this evidence gives more weight 
to the argument that a change in the supply level affects the prices of competing stocks.  
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6.6 Test on market timing effect 
This section aims to test whether the stock price reaction of incumbent REITs are due to 
the market timing hypothesis. Assuming that REITs tend to cluster to issue equities when the 
market is around its peaks, we firstly need to see if the entry patterns for the non-IPO group are  
similar to that of the IPO group. Figure 2.3 plots the monthly percentage of REIT IPOs and non-
IPO entering the market by month during the 1973-2011 period. A total of 355 (128) IPOs (non-
IPO) enter the REIT market during this period. The Pearson correlation coefficient between the 
percentage of REIT IPOs and non-IPOs entering is an insignificant 0.07 when we exclude the 
months without any IPO and non-IPO REITs entering. This result shows that IPO entry events 
and non-IPO entry events in the REIT industry are independent of each other.  
Table 2.16 reports the market date abnormal returns for the full sample, pure sample and 
single respectively when all the entry events are partitioned to IPO and non-IPO two categories. 
First of all, the cumulative abnormal returns of IPO entries are significant negative. The 
cumulative abnormal returns of non-IPO entries are all with the expected negative signs when 
the CMAR method is used. The CARs of non-IPO entries are negative for the single samples 
when the CMAR method is used. Because the non-IPO entry events do not have similar entry 
patterns to the IPO entry events, which in turn suggests that the non-IPO entries are less affected 
by the market timing issue. Therefore the negative stock price reactions of incumbent REITs 
from non-IPO entries might not be explained by the market timing argument.  
Additionally, this section aims to test if there is a significant difference in the abnormal 
returns around market dates between REIT IPOs issued during hot REIT IPO period and those 
issued during non-hot REIT IPO periods. Following Buttimer et al. (2005) and Chan et al. (2013), 
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this study defines a REIT IPO hot period to be ten or more IPOs in any given year or consecutive 
years. The periods: 1973, 1985-1986, 1988, 1993-1994, 1996-1998, 2004-2005 are defined as 
hot periods. The remaining periods are defined as non-hot periods.  Under the assumption of 
market timing argument, the incumbent firms would react more negative to the equity issuance 
activities during the hot periods than during the non-hot periods, because the market might signal 
it is already around its peaks during the hot IPO periods and would have significant negative  
one-year ahead market return (see Baker and Wurgler (2000)).  
The difference-in-means results reported in the last two columns of the Table 2.17 show 
no significant difference in the cumulative abnormal returns during the IPO hot and non-hot 
periods. The CARs of incumbent REITs are, in general, more negative during the non-hot 
periods. The insignificant difference between the two groups would indicate the stock price 
reactions of incumbent REITs are less likely due to the market timing argument. The evidence 
reported in this section further helps this study to disentangle the market timing explanation and, 
in turn, support that the price reaction of competing firms is due to the change in the supply level 
effect.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 This chapter examines if changes in asset security supply affect the stock returns of 
competing firms in the stock market.  Past studies in the literature typically examine the price 
impact of one particular type of entry (such as an IPO) or exit (such as a bankruptcy) events.  
This study analyzes all the types and reasons of entry and exit events using REITs as the 
laboratory. The use of REITs as our laboratory allows this study to identify competitors with 
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ease, as a firm must meet a set of requirements to be qualified as a REIT.  Furthermore, since 
REITs hold similar real properties (or mortgages) and have small operating components relative 
to industrial firms, an entry or exit of a REIT is less likely to carry significant signals to 
incumbent REITs or change the operating environment of the REIT industry. 
This study finds that changes in asset equity supply affect the stock performance of 
incumbents. By analyzing the reasons for entry and exit events and partitioning the sample by 
asset type, management style, entry formation method and time period, this chapter could 
conclude that signaling effects, market timing effects together with changes in the competitive 
environment might not adequately explain the observed price responses from the competing 
REITs.  We also examine the price responses at the market dates of events that had been 
announced to the public prior to the market dates, finding similar significant responses from 
incumbent REITs.   Given this, this study fails to find evidence to indicate that the significant 
stock price reactions of incumbent firms to the entry or exit of rival firms are caused by the 
signals conveyed by the entry or exit events. 
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Table 2.1: REIT versus stock entries and exits 
This table presents the distribution by year of REIT versus stock entries and exits during the period 1962 to 2011.  An entry (exit), with the exception 
of a REIT conversion event, is identified by the first (last) price appearance of a REIT or stock (PERMNO) in the CRSP tape.  In the case of REITs 
converting from (or to) a public corporation or limited partnership, an entry (exit) is identified by the start (end) date of the effective company name 
under REIT status (if there is a name change) or from the firm’s annual report or news articles (if there is no name change).  The entry and exit dates 
for each REIT in the sample are jointly verified from the LEXIS–NEXIS database and Factiva News release.  The percentage of entries (exits) in 
each year is the number of entries (exits) in that year divided by the total number of entries (exits) in the 1962-2011 period.  Market capitalization is 
computed as the year end price multiplied by the year end number of outstanding shares. 
 
 REITs Stocks REITs/stocks (%) 
Year 
# of 
entrie
s 
 
# of 
exits 
# 
listings 
% of 
entries 
 
% of 
exits 
Total 
market cap 
($ millions) 
# of 
entries 
 
# of 
exits 
# 
listings 
% of 
entries 
 
% of 
exits 
Total 
market cap 
($ millions) Entries Exits Listings 
Total 
market  
cap 
1962 2 
 
2 0.3 0.0 42 950 42 2,047 3.5 0.2 360,094 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 
1963 
  
2 0.0 0.0 41 113 91 2,069 0.4 0.4 424,618 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
1964 1 
 
3 0.2 0.0 63 129 75 2,123 0.5 0.3 490,135 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.0 
1965 1 
 
4 0.2 0.0 133 128 86 2,165 0.5 0.4 552,708 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.0 
1966 
  
4 0.0 0.0 108 111 87 2,189 0.4 0.4 495,610 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 
1967 1 
 
5 0.2 0.0 165 135 138 2,186 0.5 0.6 628,636 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.0 
1968 1 1 5 0.2 0.2 342 170 144 2,212 0.6 0.7 718,332 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.0 
1969 6  11 1.0 0.0 712 213 89 2,336 0.8 0.4 641,071 2.8 0.0 0.5 0.1 
1970 21 
 
32 3.5 0.0 1,588 179 74 2,441 0.7 0.3 639,976 11.7 0.0 1.3 0.2 
1971 22 
 
54 3.6 0.0 3,280 195 55 2,581 0.7 0.3 747,604 11.3 0.0 2.1 0.4 
1972 68 
 
122 11.2 0.0 7,035 3,193 68 5,706 11.6 0.3 1,011,663 2.1 0.0 2.1 0.7 
1973 22 3 141 3.6 0.7 5,169 254 484 5,476 0.9 2.2 798,548 8.7 0.6 2.6 0.6 
1974 4 2 143 0.7 0.5 1,679 76 306 5,246 0.3 1.4 552,909 5.3 0.7 2.7 0.3 
1975 1 5 139 0.2 1.1 1,840 137 170 5,213 0.5 0.8 743,848 0.7 2.9 2.7 0.2 
1976 4 5 138 0.7 1.1 2,499 201 189 5,225 0.7 0.9 921,792 2.0 2.6 2.6 0.3 
1977 2 9 131 0.3 2.1 2,687 161 267 5,119 0.6 1.2 865,894 1.2 3.4 2.6 0.3 
1978 2 4 129 0.3 0.9 2,406 208 301 5,026 0.8 1.4 898,690 1.0 1.3 2.6 0.3 
1979 2 7 124 0.3 1.6 3,108 228 311 4,943 0.8 1.4 1,068,238 0.9 2.3 2.5 0.3 
1980 8 9 123 1.3 2.1 3,788 469 280 5,132 1.7 1.3 1,385,317 1.7 3.2 2.4 0.3 
1981 2 18 107 0.3 4.1 3,632 664 277 5,519 2.4 1.3 1,288,270 0.3 6.5 1.9 0.3 
1982 6 13 100 1.0 3.0 4,504 500 399 5,620 1.8 1.8 1,475,300 1.2 3.3 1.8 0.3 
1983 6 14 92 1.0 3.2 5,695 998 367 6,251 3.6 1.7 1,829,189 0.6 3.8 1.5 0.3 
1984 7 9 90 1.2 2.1 6,982 636 517 6,370 2.3 2.4 1,763,946 1.1 1.7 1.4 0.4 
1985 31 8 113 5.1 1.8 9,690 628 614 6,384 2.3 2.8 2,204,319 4.9 1.3 1.8 0.4 
1986 17 10 120 2.8 2.3 10,914 1,030 676 6,738 3.7 3.1 2,478,157 1.7 1.5 1.8 0.4 
1987 11 3 128 1.8 0.7 10,355 998 509 7,227 3.6 2.3 2,481,981 1.1 0.6 1.8 0.4 
1988 17 17 128 2.8 3.9 11,868 535 744 7,018 1.9 3.4 2,717,084 3.2 2.3 1.8 0.4 
1989 7 9 126 1.2 2.1 12,232 460 623 6,855 1.7 2.8 3,305,673 1.5 1.4 1.8 0.4 
1990 3 6 123 0.5 1.4 8,694 452 559 6,748 1.6 2.5 2,979,583 0.7 1.1 1.8 0.3 
1991 22 4 141 3.6 0.9 12,959 598 490 6,856 2.2 2.2 3,997,265 3.7 0.8 2.1 0.3 
1992 8 6 143 1.3 1.4 15,811 812 628 7,040 3.0 2.9 4,396,430 1.0 1.0 2.0 0.4 
1993 50 4 189 8.3 0.9 33,775 1,147 363 7,824 4.2 1.7 5,055,730 4.4 1.1 2.4 0.7 
1994 50 9 230 8.3 2.1 45,520 936 519 8,241 3.4 2.4 5,000,485 5.3 1.7 2.8 0.9 
1995 10 14 226 1.7 3.2 57,977 884 626 8,499 3.2 2.8 6,785,382 1.1 2.2 2.7 0.9 
1996 12 28 210 2.0 6.4 88,926 1,201 630 9,070 4.4 2.9 8,306,022 1.0 4.4 2.3 1.1 
1997 32 21 221 5.3 4.8 137,772 886 831 9,125 3.2 3.8 10,794,170 3.6 2.5 2.4 1.3 
1998 26 21 226 4.3 4.8 138,223 684 1,083 8,726 2.5 4.9 13,297,391 3.8 1.9 2.6 1.0 
1999 8 16 218 1.3 3.6 125,080 764 1,046 8,444 2.8 4.8 17,017,329 1.0 1.5 2.6 0.7 
2000 1 18 201 0.2 4.1 138,130 776 1,048 8,172 2.8 4.8 15,589,380 0.1 1.7 2.5 0.9 
2001 4 15 190 0.7 3.4 152,759 314 949 7,537 1.1 4.3 13,841,834 1.3 1.6 2.5 1.1 
2002 7 12 185 1.2 2.7 162,653 302 707 7,132 1.1 3.2 11,026,989 2.3 1.7 2.6 1.5 
2003 13 14 184 2.1 3.2 231,663 270 581 6,821 1.0 2.6 14,577,774 4.8 2.4 2.7 1.6 
2004 30 13 201 5.0 3.0 311,134 462 450 6,833 1.7 2.0 16,449,407 6.5 2.9 2.9 1.9 
2005 13 11 203 2.1 2.5 338,474 481 500 6,814 1.7 2.3 17,369,920 2.7 2.2 3.0 1.9 
2006 8 26 185 1.3 5.9 441,543 547 478 6,883 2.0 2.2 19,599,795 1.5 5.4 2.7 2.3 
2007 4 30 159 0.7 6.8 313,460 728 579 7,032 2.6 2.6 20,190,505 0.5 5.2 2.3 1.6 
2008 2 14 147 0.3 3.2 193,087 319 561 6,790 1.2 2.6 12,128,796 0.6 2.5 2.2 1.6 
2009 12 7 152 2.0 1.6 272,259 293 513 6,570 1.1 2.3 15,803,268 4.1 1.4 2.3 1.7 
2010 11 2 161 1.8 0.5 394,481 464 440 6,594 1.7 2.0 18,488,716 2.4 0.5 2.4 2.1 
2011 8 3 166 1.3 0.7 451,981 471 412 6,653 1.7 1.9 17,886,640 1.7 0.7 2.5 2.5 
1962-2011 606 440 
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Table 2.2: Distribution of REIT entries by entry types 
 
This table presents the annual distribution of the number of REIT entries by entry type in the period 1973 to 2011.  REITs 
entries are classified into eight categories using information from various sources (the SDC Platinum New Issues 
database, annual reports, SEC filings, LEXIS–NEXIS database, Factiva News, and NAREIT publications).  IPOs create 
brand new publicly traded REITs while spin-offs create new publicly traded REITs from either existing publicly-traded 
non-REITs or REITs.  New REITs are also formed via the consolidation of existing publicly-traded partnerships/funds, 
via the consolidation of existing traded REITs, via conversion from a public corporation, or via a move of an existing 
OTC REIT to a major stock exchange. Entries where we cannot determine the entry mode are classified as Unknown.   
Year 
Number of 
entries IPO 
Spin off 
from  
non-REIT 
Spin off 
from 
REIT 
Consolidate  
LPs/funds 
 into REIT 
Merge 
REITs 
into new 
REIT 
Convert 
 to REIT 
Move 
from 
OTC Unknown 
1973 22 13 
      
9  
1974 4  
       
4  
1975 1  
       
1  
1976 4  1 
      
3  
1977 2  
       
2  
1978 2  
       
2  
1979 2  1 
      
1  
1980 8  2 
    
1  
 
5  
1981 2  1 1  
      1982 6  5 
     
1  
 1983 6  3 
    
3  
  1984 7  6 
      
1  
1985 31  30 
      
1  
1986 17  15 
    
1  1  
 1987 11  6 3  
   
2  
  1988 17  13 
  
2  
 
2  
  1989 7  3 
    
1  
 
3  
1990 3  3  
       1991 22  4  1  
    
17  
 1992 8  6  
    
2  
  1993 50  45  
 
1  
  
2  1  1  
1994 50  46  1  
   
2  
 
1  
1995 10 8  
   
1  1  
  1996 12  10  
 
1  
 
1  
   1997 32  26  
   
1  3  1  1  
1998 26  18  2  1  1  
 
4  
  1999 8  2  
 
2  
  
1  1  2  
2000 1  
    
1  
   2001 4  
     
1  3  
 2002 7  3 
    
2  1  1  
2003 13  8  1  
   
4  
  2004 30  28  
    
1  1  
 2005 13  12  
      
1  
2006 8  5  
    
3  
  2007 4  4  
       2008 2  2  
       2009 12  9  
    
3  
  2010 11  9  1  
   
1  
  2011 8  8  
       1973-2011 483 355  10  5  3  4  40  27  39  
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Table 2.3: Distribution of REIT entries with announcement date information by entry types 
This table presents the annual distribution of the number of REIT entries with announcement date information by entry type in the 
period 1973 to 2011.  REITs entries are classified into eight categories using information from various sources (the SDC Platinum 
New Issues database, annual reports, SEC filings, LEXIS–NEXIS database, Factiva News, and NAREIT publications). We also use 
the aforementioned sources to identify the announcement date information. IPOs create brand new publicly traded REITs while 
spin-offs create new publicly traded REITs from either existing publicly-traded non-REITs or REITs.  New REITs are also formed 
via the consolidation of existing publicly-traded partnerships/funds, via the consolidation of existing traded REITs, via conversion 
from a public corporation, or via a move of an existing OTC REIT to a major stock exchange. 
 
 
 
Year Number of 
entries IPO 
Spin off 
from 
non-
REIT 
Spin off 
from 
REIT 
Consolidate  
LPs/funds 
into REIT 
Merge 
REITs into 
new REIT 
Convert 
to REIT 
Move 
from 
OTC 
1973 12 12 
      1974 
        1975 
        1976 
        1977 
        1978 
        1979 1 1 
      1980 1 1 
      1981 
        1982 3 3 
      1983 6 3 
    
3 
 1984 5 5 
      1985 27 27 
      1986 16 15 
     
1 
1987 7 4 1 
   
2 
 1988 13 9 
  
2 
 
2 
 1989 4 3 
    
1 
 1990 3 3 
      1991 5 4 1 
     1992 8 6 
    
2 
 1993 48 44 
 
1 
  
2 1 
1994 49 46 1 
   
2 
 1995 9 8 
    
1 
 1996 9 7 
 
1 
 
1 
  1997 26 23 
    
3 
 1998 25 18 2 1 1 
 
3 
 1999 4 2 
 
1 
  
1 
 2000 1 
    
1 
  2001 1 
     
1 
 2002 4 3 
     
1 
2003 13 8 1 
   
4 
 2004 30 28 
    
1 1 
2005 12 12 
      2006 8 5 
    
3 
 2007 4 4 
      2008 2 2 
      2009 11 9 
    
2 
 2010 11 9 1 
   
1 
 2011 8 8 
      1973-2011 386 332 7 4 3 2 34 4 
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Table 2.4: Distribution of REIT exits by exit types 
This table presents the annual distribution of the number of REIT exits by exit type in the period 1973 to 2011.  REIT exits are 
classified into ten categories using the delisting code in CRSP as the starting point for identifying the reason a REIT exits the public 
market. We also use additional sources (SDC Platinum Merger and Acquisition database, SNL database, REITWatch issues, and 
LEXIS–NEXIS database) to verify the reason a REIT delists from CRSP or abandons its REIT status. Exit types include conversions, 
acquisitions, going private, liquidation and performance related delisting. Liquidations can be in the form of a bulk sale where all or 
most assets are sold off in a single transaction (wholesale), or a phased sale where assets are sold based on market conditions or are 
transferred to a liquidating trust after adopting a liquidation plan (retail). Liquidations that do not specify the mode are classified 
under Liquidate (unspecified).  Performance-related delists are tied to bankruptcy or a failure to meet stock exchange requirements 
(see CRSP delisting code >=500).  Exits without an identified reason are classified as Unknown. 
 
 
 
Year 
Number 
of exits 
Convert to a 
non-REIT  
public firm 
Acquired 
by an 
existing/new 
public REIT 
Acquired 
by a non-
REIT 
public firm 
Go 
private 
Liquidate 
(wholesale) 
Liquidate 
(retail) 
Liquidate 
(unspecified) 
Performance-
related 
delisting Unknown 
1973 3  
 
1 1 
     
1  
1974 2  
        
2  
1975 5  1  
      
4 
 1976 5  2  
   
1 
  
1 1  
1977 9 
 
1 1 1  
   
3 3  
1978 4  1  
  
1  
 
1 
 
1 
 1979 7  3  2  
 
2  
     1980 9  8  
  
1  
     1981 18  9  
 
2 3  2 
  
1 1  
1982 13  2  1  2 3  3 1 
  
1  
1983 14  5  2  3 3  
    
1  
1984 9  3  
 
3 1  1 1 
   1985 8  2  
 
2 2  2 
    1986 10  4  
 
3 2  
    
1  
1987 3 
 
1  1 
 
1 
    1988 17 1  8  
 
1  1 1 2 2 1  
1989 9  
 
3 1 2  1 
  
2 
 1990 6  1  
 
2 
 
1 2 
   1991 4  
 
1 
    
1 1 1  
1992 6  1  
  
1  
 
1 
 
2 1  
1993 4  
  
1 
  
1 
 
2 
 1994 9  3  3  1 
 
1 1 
   1995 14  3  4 2 1  2 1 
 
1 
 1996 28  2  18  1 2  
 
3 
 
2 
 1997 21  1  16 1 1  
 
1 
 
1 
 1998 21  1  14 1 1  
   
4 
 1999 16  1  7 3 4  1 
    2000 18  3  7 3 2  1 2 
   2001 15  2  6 
 
5  
   
2 
 2002 12  2  2 
 
1  1 4 1 1 
 2003 14  2  8 1 3  
     2004 13  2  5 
 
1  
 
4 
 
1 
 2005 11  1  4 
 
6  
     2006 26  1  7 5 10  1 
  
2 
 2007 30  1  4 7 13  
   
5 
 2008 14  3  2 
 
4  
   
5 
 2009 7  2  
  
3  
   
2 
 2010 2  1  
      
1 
 2011 3  
 
2 
     
1 
 1973-
2011 439  74 129 47 80  20 24 4 47  14 
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Table 2.5: Distribution of REIT exits with announcement date information by exit types 
This table presents the annual distribution of the number of REIT exits with announcement date information by exit type in the period 
1973 to 2011.  REIT exits are classified into ten categories using the delisting code in CRSP as the starting point for identifying the 
reason a REIT exits the public market. We also use additional sources (SDC Platinum Merger and Acquisition database, SNL database, 
REITWatch issues, LEXIS–NEXIS database, and Factiva News database) to verify the reason a REIT delists from CRSP or abandons 
its REIT status as well as the announcement date information. Exit types include conversions, acquisitions, going private, liquidation 
and performance related delisting. Liquidations can be in the form of a bulk sale where all or most assets are sold off in a single 
transaction (wholesale), or a phased sale where assets are sold based on market conditions or are transferred to a liquidating trust after 
adopting a liquidation plan (retail). Liquidations that do not specify the mode are classified under Liquidate (unspecified).  
Performance-related delists are tied to bankruptcy or a failure to meet stock exchange requirements (see CRSP delisting code >=500).  
Exits without an identified reason are classified as Unknown.  
 
Year 
Number 
of exits 
Convert to a 
non-REIT  
public firm 
Acquired by an 
existing/new 
public REIT 
Acquired by a 
non-REIT public 
firm 
Go 
private 
Liquidate 
(wholesale) 
Liquidate 
(retail) 
Liquidate 
(unspecified) 
Performance-
related 
delisting 
1973 1 
 
1 
      1974 
         1975 1 
       
1 
1976 3 1 
   
1 
  
1 
1977 3 
  
1 1 
   
1 
1978 2 1 
    
1 
  1979 5 1 2 
 
2 
    1980 7 6 
  
1 
    1981 14 6 
 
2 3 2 
  
1 
1982 12 2 1 2 3 2 1 
  1983 10 3 2 3 2 
    1984 8 2 
 
3 1 1 1 
  1985 7 1 
 
2 2 2 
   1986 7 2 
 
3 2 
    1987 3 
 
1 1 
 
1 
   1988 12 1 8 
 
1 1 1 1 
 1989 7 
 
3 1 2 1 
   1990 6 1 
 
2 
 
1 2 
  1991 2 
 
1 
    
1 
 1992 1 1 
      
 
1993 2 
  
1 
  
1 
 
 
1994 8 2 3 1 
 
1 1 
 
 
1995 12 3 4 2 1 2 
  
 
1996 24 2 16 1 2 
 
2 
 
1 
1997 21 1 16 1 1 
 
1 
 
1 
1998 20 1 14 1 1 
   
3 
1999 16 1 7 3 4 1 
   2000 18 3 7 3 2 1 2 
  2001 14 2 6 
 
5 
   
1 
2002 10 1 2 
 
1 1 4 1  
2003 14 2 8 1 3 
   
 
2004 12 2 5 
 
1 
 
4 
 
 
2005 11 1 4 
 
6 
    2006 25 1 7 5 10 1 
  
1 
2007 27 1 4 7 13 
   
2 
2008 11 3 2 
 
3 
   
3 
2009 4 1 
  
2 
   
1 
2010 1 1 
       2011 3 
 
2 
     
1 
1973-2011 364 56 126 46 75 19 21 3 18 
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Table 2.6: The effect of REIT entry and exit events on incumbent REITs’ market-adjusted stock returns 
This table reports estimates from a panel regression (with firm fixed effects) of publicly-listed incumbent REITs’ market-adjusted 
monthly stock return on REIT entry and/or exit indicator variables, without and with control variables (1973-2011).  The 
dependent variable is Rit - EWRETDt, where Rit is the return on REIT i in month t, and EWRETDt is the return on the CRSP 
equally-weighted index in month t. D_Entries_Only is a dummy variable equal to one if there are only REIT entries and no REIT 
exits in month t. D_Exits_Only is a dummy variable equal to one if there are only REIT exits and no REIT entries in month t.  # of 
Entries is the number of REITs entries in month t.  # of Exits is the number of REITs exits in month t.  # of (Entries - Exits) is the 
number of REITs entries minus the number of REIT exits in month t.  Lag dependent variable, Size and B/M serve as control 
variables in Panel B. Size is the natural log of REIT i’s market value of equity in June of year t computed from CRSP.  B/M is the 
book-to-market equity ratio computed using a REIT’s book equity at end of fiscal year t-1 from Compustat and its market equity at 
the end of December of year t-1 from CRSP.  575 of the 606 REITs (1973-2011) are in Compustat but only 573 have book equity 
data.  We exclude 143 monthly observations with negative book equity.  Further, we match Size and B/M data with the monthly 
returns for July of year t to June of t+1.  The above requirements reduce the NOBs in Panel B.  Reported R2 values for models 
including fixed effects are ‘‘within’’ R2 statistics.  T-values are reported within parentheses. ** and *** indicate significance at 
the 5% and 1% levels, respectively, using t-tests with standard errors adjusted for clustering in firm.   
Dependent variable = Ri,t-EWRETDt 
Panel A: Regression models without control variables (NOBs = 71,523) 
Variable (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  
D_Entries_Only -0.52  
  
-0.28 
 
 
   
  
  
 
(-5.84) *** 
  
(-3.15) ***  
   
  
  D_Exits_Only 
  
0.71 
 
0.62 
 
 
   
  
  
   
(6.89) *** (5.74) ***  
   
  
  # of Entries 
      
-0.01 
   
0.01    
       
-(0.33) 
   
(0.33)    
# of Exits 
      
 
 
0.17 
 
0.17    
     (4.27) *** (4.24) ***   
# of (Entries - Exits)             -0.05  
             (-3.24) *** 
Intercept -0.10  -0.42  -0.33  -0.22  -0.40  -0.40  -0.22  
 (-4.58)  *** (-14.49) *** (-7.79) *** (-10.16) *** (-9.93) *** (-8.10) *** (-148.35) *** 
Firm fixed effect? Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R2 0.0004  0.0008  0.0009  0.0000  0.0003  0.0003  0.0001  
Panel B: Regression models with control variables (NOBs = 58,882) 
Variable (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  
D_Entries_Only -0.77 
   
-0.65 
     
  
  
 
(-8.23) *** 
  
(-6.65) *** 
    
  
  D_Exits_Only 
  
0.51 
 
0.30 
     
  
  
   
(4.64) *** (2.62) *** 
    
  
  # of Entries 
      
-0.07 
   
-0.06  
       
(-3.32) *** 
  
(-2.84) ***  
# of Exits 
        
0.15 
 
0.14    
         
(3.71) *** (3.48) ***  
# of (Entries - Exits)             -0.09  
            (-4.93) *** 
Lag  dependent variable  -0.09  -0.09  -0.09  -0.09  -0.09  -0.09 -0.09  
 (-11.42) *** (-11.21) *** (-11.34) *** (-11.31) *** (-11.32) *** (-11.33) *** (-11.32) *** 
Size -0.46 
 
-0.45 
 
-0.46 
 
-0.46 
 
-0.46 
 
-0.46 -0.47 
  (-6.63) *** (-6.52) *** (-6.61) *** (-6.60) *** (-6.65) *** (-6.70) *** (-6.68) *** 
B/M 0.19 
 
0.18 
 
0.19 
 
0.18 
 
0.18 
 
0.18 0.18 
 
 
(2.37) ** (2.33) ** (2.38) ** (2.33) ** (2.33) ** (2.35) ** (2.36) ** 
Intercept 2.08  1.70  1.94  1.97  1.72  1.82 1.91 
 (5.35) *** (4.45) *** (5.06) *** (5.11) *** (4.46) *** (4.70) *** (4.96) *** 
Firm fixed effect? Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R2 0.0101  0.0097  0.0102  0.0094  0.0095  0.0096  0.0096 
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Table 2.7: Cumulative abnormal returns of incumbent REITs around REIT entries and/or exit 
events 
This table reports the mean cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return (CMAR) and the mean 
cumulative market-model abnormal returns (CMMAR) of incumbent REIT portfolios in the 3-day 
window (-1, +1) surrounding REIT entry and/or exit announcement dates (in Panel A) and market dates 
(in Panel B).  MAR (MMAR) is the difference between the return on the incumbent REIT portfolio 
based on events and the CRSP equal-weighted market index return (expected market model return).  We 
estimate the market model using 255 days of daily returns ending 61 days prior to the entry or exit 
announcement or market date. The announcement date of the event corresponds to the first appearance 
of public news about a REIT entry or exit.  The market date of entry (exit) corresponds to the date of 
first (last) price appearance of a REIT (PERMNO) in CRSP, or in the case of conversions, the start (end) 
date of the effective company name under REIT status (if there is a name change) or the date given in 
the firm’s annual report or news articles (if there is no name change). In all cases, the announcement 
date precedes the market date.  Entry (Exit) includes all entry (exit) events. Single Entry (Single Exit) 
excludes events preceded or followed by another entry (exit) event in the 3-day window. Pure Entry 
(Pure Exit) denotes events not preceded nor followed by any entry or exit events in the 3-day window.  
Statistical significance of the means is examined with Patell Z-statistic.  *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Event # of 
events 
Mean 
CMAR 
 
Patell Z 
Mean 
CMMAR 
 
Patell Z 
 
Panel A: Around announcement date 
Entry 386 -0.04% -1.20 -0.04% -0.88 
Single Entry 230 0.05% -0.41 0.01% 0.27 
Pure Entry 184 0.04% 0.32 0.01% 0.24 
     Exit 364 0.06% 1.26 0.02% 1.15 
Single Exit 261 0.00% 0.00 0.01% 0.68 
Pure Exit 213 0.01% 0.44 0.03% 1.24 
      
Panel B: Around market date 
Entry 483 -0.17% -4.23*** -0.08% -2.27* 
Single Entry 280 -0.15% -3.14*** -0.08% -1.95* 
Pure Entry 229 -0.16% -2.97** -0.08% -1.94* 
      
Exit 439 0.02% -0.14 0.05% 1.20 
Single Exit 291 0.13% 1.77* 0.16% 2.41** 
Pure Exit 246 0.16% 2.43** 0.18% 2.53** 
  
 
 
1
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Table 2.8: Cumulative abnormal returns of incumbent REIT portfolios around market dates of REIT entry and exit events, without and 
with prior news announcements   
This table reports in Panels A and B, respectively, the 3-day mean cumulative market-adjusted and market-model abnormal returns (CMAR and 
CMMAR) of incumbent REIT portfolios around the market dates of entry and exit events categorized by whether the market date is preceded by 
a news announcement of the event.  The news announcement corresponds to the first appearance of public news about an REIT entry or exit 
event.  The market date of an entry (exit) event corresponds to the date of first (last) price appearance of a REIT (PERMNO) in the CRSP tape, 
or in the case of conversions, the start (end) date of the effective company name under REIT status (if there is a name change) or the date given 
in the firm’s annual report or news articles (if there is no name change).  Entry (Exit) includes all entry (exit) events, Single Entry (Single Exit) 
excludes events preceded or followed by another entry (exit) event in the 3-day window and Pure Entry (Pure Exit) denotes events not preceded 
nor followed by any entry or exit events in the 3-day window.  Statistical significance of the means is examined with Patell Z-statistic and the 
difference in means is examined with t-tests.  *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Without prior news announcement 
 
With prior news announcement 
 
Event 
 
(a)  
Mean 
# of 
events Patell Z 
 
 
(b) 
Mean 
# of 
events Patell Z 
 
(a)-(b) 
Difference t-value 
Panel A: CMAR 
Entry -0.12% 97 -1.70* 
 
 -0.19% 386 -3.89***  0.07% 0.64 
Single Entry -0.16% 62 -1.91* 
 
 -0.14% 218 -2.55**  -0.02% -0.13 
Pure Entry -0.11% 53 -1.28 
 
 -0.18% 176 -2.70**  0.07% 0.42 
Exit 0.08% 75 -0.95 
 
 0.01% 364   0.41  0.07% 0.24 
Single Exit 0.14% 58 -0.45 
 
 0.13% 233   2.28*  0.01% 0.03 
Pure Exit 0.16% 47 -0.25 
 
 0.16% 199   2.90**  0.00% 0.00 
 
Panel B: CMMAR 
Entry 0.01% 97 -0.51   -0.11% 386 -2.29*  0.11% 1.16 
Single Entry -0.06% 62 -1.11   -0.09% 218 -1.63  0.03% 0.18 
Pure Entry -0.03% 53 -0.72   -0.10% 176 -1.82*  0.08% 0.49 
Exit 0.09% 75 -0.12 
 
 0.04% 364   1.46 
 
0.04% 0.16 
Single Exit 0.17% 58 -0.07 
 
 0.16% 233   2.78** 
 
0.01% 0.06 
Pure Exit 0.21% 47 0.15 
 
 0.17% 199   2.81** 
 
0.04% 0.22 
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Table 2.9:  Relation between market date and announcement date cumulative abnormal returns 
of incumbent REITs  
This table reports in Panel A (Panel B) the OLS regression result where the 3-day (-1, +1) mean 
cumulative market-adjusted (market-model) abnormal return, CMAR (CMMAR), of incumbent REIT 
portfolios around a REIT entry or exit event market date is regressed on their 3-day CMAR (CMMAR) 
around the event announcement date in Panel A.  The results are reported for the full, single and pure 
REIT entry or exit event samples. The full sample comprises of all entry or exit events.  The single 
sample excludes entry (exit) events preceded or followed by another entry (exit) event in the 3-day 
window.  The pure sample comprises of events not preceded nor followed by any entry or exit events in 
the 3-day window.  Statistical significance is examined with t-tests.  *, ** and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Regression model:  
Abnormal return at market date = Intercept + Coefficient * Abnormal return at announcement date 
 
 
Entry 
 
Exit 
Sample 
# of 
events Coefficient t-value 
 
# of 
events Coefficient  t-value 
 
Panel A: Abnormal return is CMAR 
 
Full 386 -0.01 -0.24 
 
364 0.02 0.53 
Single 218 0.05 0.70 
 
233 0.10 1,68* 
Pure 176 -0.04 -0.49 199 0.11 1.68* 
 
Panel B: Abnormal return is CMMAR 
 
Full 386 0.02 0.38 
 
364 0.14 3.36*** 
Single 218 0.06 0.86 
 
233 0.09 1.97** 
Pure 176 0.02 0.21 199 0.10 2.02*** 
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Table 2.10: Cumulative abnormal returns of incumbent REITs around market dates for REIT entry or exit 
events of full sample, by sample and event type 
 
 
 
 
 
This table reports the mean cumulative market-adjusted (market-model) abnormal return, CMAR (CMMAR), of 
incumbent REIT portfolios in the 3-day window (-1, +1) surrounding REIT entry and exit market dates, categorized by 
sample and entry/exit type.  IPOs create brand new publicly traded REITs while spin-offs create new publicly traded 
REITs from either existing publicly-traded non-REITs or REITs.  New REITs are also formed via the consolidation of 
existing publicly-traded partnerships/funds, via the consolidation of existing traded REITs, via conversion from a public 
corporation, or via a move of an existing OTC REIT to a major stock exchange. Entries where we cannot determine the 
entry mode are classified as Unknown. Exit types include conversions, acquisitions, going private, liquidation and 
performance related delisting. Exits without an identified reason are classified as Unknown.  CMAR is the mean 
cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return and CMMAR is the mean cumulative market-model abnormal returns of 
incumbent REIT portfolios in the 3-day window (-1, +1) surrounding REIT entry and/or exit market dates. MAR 
(MMAR) is the difference between the return on the incumbent REIT portfolio based on events and the CRSP equal-
weighted market index return (expected market model return).  The full sample comprises of all entry or exit events.  
Statistical significance of the means is examined with Patell Z-statistic.  *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
# of 
events 
Mean 
CMAR Patell Z 
Mean 
CMMAR Patell Z 
Full sample 
By entry type (# of events = 483): 
(1) IPO 355 -0.15% -3.10*** -0.13% -2.77** 
(2) Spinoff or conversion from non-REIT to REIT or 
consolidation of LPs/funds into REITs 53 -0.52% -3.95*** 0.04% 0.38 
(3) Spinoff from REIT or merge REITs into new REITs 9 -0.26% -1.19 0.03% 0.03 
(4) Move from OTC 27 -0.04% -0.43 0.11% 0.44 
(5) Unknown 39 0.05% -0.05 0.01% -0.45 
By exit type (# of events = 439):      
(1) Conversion to a non-REIT public firm or acquisition 
by a non-REIT public firm 121 0.10% 1.19 0.07% 1.89* 
(2) Acquisition by an existing public REIT 129 0.01% -0.18 0.05% 0.57 
(3) Going private  80 -0.13% -0.47 -0.12% -0.52 
(4) Liquidation 48 -0.12% -1.37 -0.01% -0.39 
(5) Delisting (delist code>=500) or unknown 61 0.21% -0.02 0.27% 0.64 
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Table 2.11: Cumulative abnormal returns of incumbent REITs around market dates for REIT entry or exit 
events of single sample, by event type 
 
This table reports the mean cumulative market-adjusted (market-model) abnormal return, CMAR (CMMAR), of 
incumbent REIT portfolios in the 3-day window (-1, +1) surrounding REIT entry and exit market dates, categorized by 
sample and entry/exit type.  IPOs create brand new publicly traded REITs while spin-offs create new publicly traded 
REITs from either existing publicly-traded non-REITs or REITs.  New REITs are also formed via the consolidation of 
existing publicly-traded partnerships/funds, via the consolidation of existing traded REITs, via conversion from a public 
corporation, or via a move of an existing OTC REIT to a major stock exchange. Entries where we cannot determine the 
entry mode are classified as Unknown. Exit types include conversions, acquisitions, going private, liquidation and 
performance related delisting. Exits without an identified reason are classified as Unknown.  CMAR is the mean 
cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return and CMMAR is the mean cumulative market-model abnormal returns of 
incumbent REIT portfolios in the 3-day window (-1, +1) surrounding REIT entry and/or exit market dates. MAR 
(MMAR) is the difference between the return on the incumbent REIT portfolio based on events and the CRSP equal-
weighted market index return (expected market model return).  The single sample excludes entry (exit) events preceded 
or followed by another entry (exit) event in the 3-day window.  Statistical significance of the means is examined with 
Patell Z-statistic.  *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
# of 
events 
Mean 
CMAR Patell Z 
Mean 
CMMAR Patell Z 
Single sample 
By entry type (# of events =280): 
(1) IPO 196 -0.15% -2.77** -0.11% -1.77* 
(2) Spinoff or conversion from non-REIT to REIT or 
consolidation of LPs/funds into REITs 37 -0.37% -2.00* -0.01% -0.35 
(3) Spinoff from REIT or merge REITs into new REITs 8 -0.15% -0.79 0.11% 0.29 
(4) Move from OTC 9 -0.13% -0.21 -0.22% -0.60 
(5) Unknown 30 0.14% 0.22 -0.01% -0.86 
By exit type (# of events =291):      
(1) Conversion to a non-REIT public firm or acquisition 
by a non-REIT public firm 85 0.36% 3.14*** 0.30% 2.83** 
(2) Acquisition by an existing public REIT 74 0.13% 1.27 0.23% 2.12* 
(3) Going private  49 -0.14% -0.02 -0.10% -0.02 
(4) Liquidation 37 -0.15% -1.50 -0.09% -1.00 
(5) Delisting (delist code>=500) or unknown 46 0.22% -0.06 0.25% 0.37 
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Table 2.12: Cumulative abnormal returns of incumbent REITs around market dates for REIT entry or exit 
events of pure sample by event type 
 
 
 
This table reports the mean cumulative market-adjusted (market-model) abnormal return, CMAR (CMMAR), of 
incumbent REIT portfolios in the 3-day window (-1, +1) surrounding REIT entry and exit market dates, categorized by 
sample and entry/exit type.  IPOs create brand new publicly traded REITs while spin-offs create new publicly traded 
REITs from either existing publicly-traded non-REITs or REITs.  New REITs are also formed via the consolidation of 
existing publicly-traded partnerships/funds, via the consolidation of existing traded REITs, via conversion from a public 
corporation, or via a move of an existing OTC REIT to a major stock exchange. Entries where we cannot determine the 
entry mode are classified as Unknown. Exit types include conversions, acquisitions, going private, liquidation and 
performance related delisting. Exits without an identified reason are classified as Unknown.  CMAR is the mean 
cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return and CMMAR is the mean cumulative market-model abnormal returns of 
incumbent REIT portfolios in the 3-day window (-1, +1) surrounding REIT entry and/or exit market dates. MAR 
(MMAR) is the difference between the return on the incumbent REIT portfolio based on events and the CRSP equal-
weighted market index return (expected market model return).  The pure sample comprises of events not preceded nor 
followed by any entry or exit events in the 3-day window.  Statistical significance of the means is examined with Patell 
Z-statistic.  *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
# of 
events 
Mean 
CMAR Patell Z 
Mean 
CMMAR Patell Z 
Pure sample 
By entry type (# of events =229): 
(1) IPO 165 -0.18% -2.74** -0.13% -1.90* 
(2) Spinoff or conversion from non-REIT to REIT or 
consolidation of LPs/funds into REITs 27 -0.49% -2.62** 0.07% -0.57 
(3) Spinoff from REIT or merge REITs into new REITs 2 0.09% 0.04 0.57% 1.10 
(4) Move from OTC 8 0.07% 0.40 -0.03% 0.02 
(5) Unknown 27 0.18% 0.48 0.01% -0.68 
By exit type (# of events =246):      
(1) Conversion to a non-REIT public firm or acquisition 
by a non-REIT public firm 70 0.44% 3.63*** 0.34% 2.84** 
(2) Acquisition by an existing public REIT 64 0.08% 0.94 0.19% 1.74* 
(3) Going private  42 -0.07% 0.67 -0.07% 0.34 
(4) Liquidation 33 -0.07% -0.78 -0.03% -0.48 
(5) Delisting (delist code>=500) or unknown 37 0.24% -0.02 0.29% 0.34 
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Table 2.13: Cumulative abnormal returns of incumbent REITs by asset type and advisor style for full sample 
This table reports the 3-day (-1, +1) CMAR and CMMAR of incumbent REIT portfolios around REIT entry and 
exit market dates for the full sample of entry and exit events.  The full sample comprises of all entry or exit events, 
CMAR is the mean cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return and CMMAR is the mean cumulative market-
model abnormal returns of incumbent REIT portfolios in the 3-day window (-1, +1) surrounding REIT entry and/or 
exit market dates. The results are partitioned by the asset type of both the newly entered (exited) REIT and the 
incumbent REIT portfolio (Panel A), and by the advisor style of both the newly entered (exited) REIT and the 
incumbent REIT portfolio (Panel B).  To illustrate, the category “Equity on Mortgage” in Panel A reports the effect 
of a newly entered (or exited) equity REIT on the abnormal returns of a portfolio of incumbent mortgage REITs.  
Similarly in Panel B, the category “Internal on External” reports the effect of a newly entered (or exited) internally 
advised REIT on an incumbent REIT portfolio comprising of only externally advised REITs.  We report Patell Z 
statistics within parentheses.  *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
 
 
 
Sample Entry 
NOBs 
Full Sample 
(N=483) 
Exit 
NOBs 
Full Sample 
(N=439) 
Partition by  CMAR CMMAR  CMAR CMMAR 
 
Panel A: New entry/exit REIT asset type on incumbent REIT asset type 
Equity on:       
Equity 328 -0.18% 
(-3.12)*** 
-0.12% 
(-2.31)* 
254 0.02% 
(0.32) 
0.11% 
(1.86)* 
Mortgage 328  -0.25% 
(-3.59)*** 
-0.11% 
(-1.77)* 
254 -0.07% 
(-0.98) 
0.00% 
(-0.07) 
Mortgage on:       
Equity 118  -0.24% 
(-2.50)** 
-0.09% 
(-1.08) 
89 0.15% 
(0.65) 
0.04% 
(0.20) 
Mortgage 118 -0.17% 
(-1.53) 
-0.08% 
(-0.57) 
89 -0.50% 
(-2.97)** 
-0.58% 
(-2.99)** 
 
Panel B: New entry/exit REIT advisor style on incumbent REIT advisor style 
Internal on:       
Internal 236 -0.18% 
(-2.16)* 
-0.08% 
(-1.21) 
204 -0.03% 
(0.06) 
-0.03% 
(0.59) 
External 240 -0.12% 
(-1.32) 
-0.07% 
(-0.66) 
204 -0.06% 
(-0.87) 
-0.12% 
(-1.41) 
External on:       
Internal 102 -0.27% 
(-2.62)** 
-0.19% 
(-1.93)* 
105 -0.13% 
(-1.40) 
0.03% 
(0.41) 
External 243 -0.20% 
(-3.46)*** 
-0.16% 
(-2.35)** 
235 -0.03% 
(-0.79) 
0.02% 
(0.37) 
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Table 2.14: Cumulative abnormal returns of incumbent REITs by asset type and advisor style for single 
sample 
This table reports the 3-day (-1, +1) CMAR and CMMAR of incumbent REIT portfolios around REIT entry and 
exit market dates for the full, single and pure samples of entry and exit events.  The single sample comprises of 
entry (exit) events not preceded nor followed by another entry (exit) event in the 3-day window.  CMAR is the 
mean cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return and CMMAR is the mean cumulative market-model abnormal 
returns of incumbent REIT portfolios in the 3-day window (-1, +1) surrounding REIT entry and/or exit market 
dates. The results are partitioned by the asset type of both the newly entered (exited) REIT and the incumbent REIT 
portfolio (Panel A), and by the advisor style of both the newly entered (exited) REIT and the incumbent REIT 
portfolio (Panel B).  To illustrate, the category “Equity on Mortgage” in Panel A reports the effect of a newly 
entered (or exited) equity REIT on the abnormal returns of a portfolio of incumbent mortgage REITs.  Similarly in 
Panel B, the category “Internal on External” reports the effect of a newly entered (or exited) internally advised 
REIT on an incumbent REIT portfolio comprising of only externally advised REITs.  We report Patell Z statistics 
within parentheses.  *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
 
Sample Entry 
NOBs 
Single Sample 
(N= 280 ) 
Exit 
NOBs 
Single Sample 
(N=291 ) 
Partition by  CMAR CMMAR  CMAR CMMAR 
 
Panel A: New entry/exit REIT asset type on incumbent REIT asset type 
Equity on:       
Equity 173 -0.17% 
(-2.14)* 
-0.11% 
(-1.56) 
155 0.17% 
(2.56)** 
0.24% 
(3.12)*** 
Mortgage 173  -0.33% 
(-3.79)*** 
-0.24% 
(-3.01)** 
155 0.14% 
(1.09) 
0.21% 
(1.71)* 
Mortgage on:       
Equity 79  -0.17% 
(-1.81)* 
-0.14% 
(-1.38) 
61 0.29% 
(1.51) 
0.23% 
(1.40) 
Mortgage 79 -0.20% 
(-1.94)* 
-0.16% 
(-1.41) 
61 -0.46% 
(-2.31)* 
-0.44% 
(-2.17)* 
 
Panel B: New entry/exit REIT advisor style on incumbent REIT advisor style 
Internal on:       
Internal 118 -0.27% 
(-1.60) 
-0.13% 
(-0.62) 
117 0.16% 
(2.41)** 
0.19% 
(2.57)** 
External 122 -0.03% 
(-0.29) 
0.04% 
(0.26) 
117 0.23% 
(2.16)* 
0.20% 
(1.53) 
External on:       
Internal 67 -0.35% 
(-2.94)** 
-0.32% 
(-2.18)* 
62 0.02% 
(-0.66) 
0.09% 
(0.09) 
External 158 -0.19% 
(-2.69)** 
-0.20% 
(-2.38)** 
174 0.05% 
(0.07) 
0.08% 
(0.80) 
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Table 2.15: Cumulative abnormal returns of incumbent REITs by asset type and advisor style for pure 
sample 
This table reports the 3-day (-1, +1) CMAR and CMMAR of incumbent REIT portfolios around REIT entry and exit 
market dates for the full, single and pure samples of entry and exit events.  The pure sample comprises of events not 
preceded nor followed by any entry or exit events in the 3-day window.  CMAR is the mean cumulative market-
adjusted abnormal return and CMMAR is the mean cumulative market-model abnormal returns of incumbent REIT 
portfolios in the 3-day window (-1, +1) surrounding REIT entry and/or exit market dates. The results are partitioned 
by the asset type of both the newly entered (exited) REIT and the incumbent REIT portfolio (Panel A), and by the 
advisor style of both the newly entered (exited) REIT and the incumbent REIT portfolio (Panel B).  To illustrate, the 
category “Equity on Mortgage” in Panel A reports the effect of a newly entered (or exited) equity REIT on the 
abnormal returns of a portfolio of incumbent mortgage REITs.  Similarly in Panel B, the category “Internal on 
External” reports the effect of a newly entered (or exited) internally advised REIT on an incumbent REIT portfolio 
comprising of only externally advised REITs.  We report Patell Z statistics within parentheses.  *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
 
Sample Entry 
NOBs 
Pure Sample 
(N=229) 
Exit 
NOBs 
Pure Sample 
(N=246 ) 
Partition by  CMAR CMMAR  CMAR CMMAR 
 
Panel A: New entry/exit REIT asset type on incumbent REIT asset type 
Equity on:       
Equity 140 -0.15% 
(-1.71)* 
-0.06% 
(-1.11) 
132 0.20% 
(2.81)** 
0.27% 
(3.29)*** 
Mortgage 140  -0.43% 
(-4.54)*** 
-0.32% 
(-3.83)*** 
132 0.18% 
(1.58) 
0.25% 
(2.10)* 
Mortgage on:       
Equity 64  -0.23% 
(-2.02)* 
-0.20% 
(-1.70)* 
48 0.33% 
(1.67)* 
0.23% 
(1.12) 
Mortgage 64 -0.16% 
(-1.47) 
-0.14% 
(-1.08) 
48 -0.57% 
(-2.67)** 
-0.59% 
(-2.82)** 
 
Panel B: New entry/exit REIT advisor style on incumbent REIT advisor style 
Internal on:       
Internal 92 -0.34% 
(-1.97)* 
-0.14% 
(-0.77) 
97 0.13% 
(2.31)* 
0.16% 
(2.24)* 
External 95 -0.06% 
(-0.36) 
0.06% 
(0.40) 
97 0.23% 
(2.10)* 
0.20% 
(1.33) 
External on:       
Internal 51 -0.42% 
(-2.81)** 
-0.41% 
(-2.15)* 
50 0.09% 
(-0.38) 
0.15% 
(0.20) 
External 134 -0.20% 
(-2.51)** 
-0.24% 
(-2.66)** 
149 0.12% 
(1.07) 
0.12% 
(1.29) 
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Table 2.16: Cumulative abnormal returns of incumbent REITs around market dates for 
IPO and non-IPO entries 
This table reports the mean cumulative market-adjusted (market-model) abnormal return, CMAR 
(CMMAR), of incumbent REIT portfolios in the 3-day window (-1, +1) surrounding REIT entry 
and exit market dates, partitioned by entry type (IPOs vs. Non-IPOs) for full,, single and pure 
samples. Statistical significance of the means is examined with Patell Z-statistic.  *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
# of 
events 
Mean 
CMAR Patell Z 
Mean 
CMMAR Patell Z 
Pure sample (# of events =229): 
(1) IPO  165 -0.18% -2.74** -0.13% -1.90* 
(2)-(5) Other Entries (except for IPO) 64 -0.13% -1.30 0.04% -0.64 
 
Single sample  (# of events =280): 
(1) IPO  196 -0.15% -2.77** -0.11% -1.77* 
(2)-(5) Other Entries (except for IPO) 84 -0.14% -1.56 -0.02% -0.89 
 
Full sample (# of events =483): 
(1) IPO  355 -0.15% -3.10*** -0.13% -2.77** 
(2)-(5) Other Entries (except for IPO) 128 -0.23% -3.12*** 0.04% 0.18 
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Table 2.17: Cumulative abnormal returns of incumbent REIT portfolios around market dates of REIT IPO events, in IPO hot 
and non-hot periods   
This table reports the 3-day mean cumulative market-adjusted and market-model abnormal returns (CMAR and CMMAR) of 
incumbent REIT portfolios around the market dates of IPO events categorized by whether the IPOs in the hot or non-hot IPO periods. 
Following Buttimer et al. (2005) and Chan et al. (2013), this study defines a REIT IPO hot period to be ten or more IPOs in any given 
year or consecutive years. The periods: 1973, 1985-1986, 1988, 1993-1994, 1996-1998, 2004-2005 are defined as hot periods. The 
remaining periods are defined as non-hot periods. Statistical significance of the means is examined with Patell Z-statistic and the 
difference in means is examined with t-tests.  *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
REIT IPO non-hot periods  
 
REIT IPO hot periods 
 
Event 
 
(a)  
Mean 
# of 
events Patell Z 
 
 
(b) 
Mean 
# of 
events Patell Z 
 
(a)-(b) 
Difference t-value 
Panel A: CMAR 
Entry -0.29% 99 -2.75** 
 
 -0.10% 256 -1.93*  -0.19% -1.81** 
Single Entry -0.20% 85 -2.45** 
 
 -0.11% 111 -1.54  -0.10% -0.73 
Pure Entry -0.26% 74 -2.70** 
 
 -0.12% 91 -1.25  -0.14% -0.98 
 
Panel B: CMMAR 
Entry -0.15% 99 -1.07   -0.12% 256 -2.60**  -0.03% -0.35 
Single Entry -0.13% 85 -1.36   -0.09% 111 -1.17  -0.04% -0.29 
Pure Entry -0.16% 74 -1.49   -0.11% 91 -1.22  -0.05% -0.37 
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Figure 2.1: Plot of the percentage of new (terminated) REITs versus new (delisted) stocks in each year during the 1962-2011 period 
We define a new (terminated) REIT or stock listing as the first (last) price appearance of the REIT or stock (PERMNO) in the CRSP tape.  The percent of new REITs (stocks) in 
each year is measured as the number of new REITs (stocks) entering the public REITs (stock) market during the year divided by the total number of new REITs (stock listings) 
during the 1962-2011 period.   The percent of terminated REITs (delisted stocks) in each year is measured as the number of REITs (stocks) exiting from the public REIT (stock) 
market during the year divided by the total number of terminated REITs (delisted stocks) during the 1962-2011 period.  The Pearson correlation coefficient between the two data 
series in panel A (panel B) is a significant 0.67 (0.69). 
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Figure 2.2:  Plot of the number of REITs entering and exiting the market by month during the 1973-2011 period  
The entry (exit) month is the month when a REIT price first (last) appears in the CRSP tape. A bar above (below) zero indicates the number of REITs entering 
(exiting) the public REIT market in each month during the period.  A total of 483 (439) REITs enter (exit) the REIT market during this period.  The Pearson 
correlation coefficient between the number of entering and exiting REITs is a significant -0.26 (an insignificant -0.07) when we exclude (include) the months 
without any entering and exiting REITs. 
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Figure 2.3:  Plot of the percentage of REIT IPOs (non-IPOs) entering the market by month during the 1973-2011 period  
A bar above (below) zero indicates the percent of REIT IPOs (non-IPOs) entering the public REIT market in each month during the period. The 
percent of REIT IPOs entering in each month is measured as the number of REIT IPOs entering the market during the month divided by the total 
number of REIT IPOs during the 1973-2011 period.  The percent of REIT non-IPOs entering in each month is measured as the number of REIT 
non-IPOs entering the market during the month divided by the total number of REIT non-IPOs during the 1973-2011 period.  The Pearson 
correlation coefficient between the percentage of REIT IPOs and non-IPOs entering is an insignificant 0.07 when we exclude the months without 
any IPO and non-IPO REITs entering. 
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Appendix I: Structure of Global REITsa
Panel A: Australia and Asia  
  Australia  Japan  South Korea  Singapore  Thailand Taiwan  Malaysia   Hong Kong  
  (LPTs) (J-REITs) (CR-REITs/K-REITs) (S-REITs)   (T-REITs) (M-REITs)
 d (H-REITs) 
Year of 1st 
IPO 
1971 2001 2002 2002 2003 2005 2005 2005 
Management 
Structure 
  
All external  
except Stapled 
REITs 
External 
External (CR-REIT) 
Internal (K-REIT)  
External External 
Both permitted 
(but only external 
in sample) 
External 
All external 
except Link 
REIT 
% Invested in 
Real Estate 
> 50% of 
revenue  
>75%  > 70% >70% 
> 75% of NAV 
in property 
> 75% of the 
NAV 
>50% 100% 
Geographical 
Restrictions  
No No b  No No 
Yes, only 
Thailand  
No, but subject to 
approval 
No, but subject 
to approval 
No 
Leverage No restriction No restriction 
Borrowing up to 
1000% of equity 
capital, upon special 
approval of 
shareholders c 
Over 35% of total 
assets permitted 
with disclosed 
credit rating 
(capped at 60%) 
Not more than 
10% of NAV 
50% or 35% or 
25% based on 
credit rating 
50% of total 
asset value 
(revised from 
35%) 
Capped at 
45% of gross 
asset value 
Payout 
100% of 
annual income 
and capital 
gains 
>90% of taxable 
income 
>90%  income 
90% of taxable 
income 
>90% of net 
profits 
>90% of 
distributable 
income 
Not specified in 
the REIT 
guideline 
90% of after 
tax income 
Tax Benefit  Tax exempt 
Tax exempt on 
income 
distributed 
Tax exempt on 
income distributed 
Tax exempt for 
rental income 
distributed 
Tax exempt on 
income 
distributed 
Tax exempt on 
income 
distributed 
Tax exempt on 
distribution, but 
undistributed 
earnings are 
taxed at 25%. 
Tax exempt 
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Appendix I: Continued 
 Panel B: Europe and North America  
  Turkey Belgium France U.K. Canada U.S 
  (REIC) (SICAFI) (SIIC) (U.K.-REIT) 
(C-REIT) MFT - Mutual 
Fund Trust 
(REITs) 
Year of 1st 
IPO 
1997 e 1995 2005 2007 1993 1961 
Management 
Structure 
Internal Mostly internal Internal Mostly internal Mostly internal Mostly internal 
% Invested in 
Real Estate 
>50% 
In principle only real 
estate investments are 
allowed 
Principal RE properties restricted 
to rental purpose; No required 
asset level; RE development not 
exceed 20% of gross book value 
>75% of net income 
and assets from rental  
>95% of income from 
properties 
>75% 
Geographical 
Restrictions  
No No No No No No 
Leverage No restriction 
Loans <65% TA; Interest 
Expenses <80% total 
income 
No specific provision, general 
principles apply (thin 
capitalization rules) 
Interest cover at least 
1.25 times 
No restriction No restriction 
Payout >20% profit >80% of net earnings 
>85% of rental income; 50% of 
capital gain;  100% of other 
income 
90% of income profits 100% of taxable income 
>90% of ordinary 
taxable income 
Tax Benefit  
Tax exempt 
on income 
distributed 
Capital gain and income 
from property is tax 
exempt. 
Rental income and capital gains 
exempt 
Tax exempt at entity 
level 
Tax exempt on income 
distributed 
Tax exempt on 
income 
distributed 
a Data sources include NAREIT (for U.S. REITs), CBRE 2010 research report (for Asian REITs), EPRA 2010 report (for Australia, Asia, Europe and North America REITs), Ernst 
& Young Global Real Estate Investment Trust Report (2010), Real Estate Securitization Handbook (2005), Real Estate Investment Trusts: A Global Analysis (2006), and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Worldwide REIT Regimes 2007 report covering Australia, North America, and several countries in Europe as well as Asia.  
b In May 2008, the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) amended its listing regulation to allow an inclusion of overseas real estate to the portfolio of J-REIT funds. 
c In June of 2007, South Korea amended its Real Estate Investment Trust Act and raised the borrowing rate from 200% of equity to 1000%  of equity. 
d In June 2009, the Malaysian government liberalized its regulation of foreign ownership and shareholdings in M-REITs (see 2009 CBRE research report). 
e The enacted year is 1995 (see EPRA, 2010) but the first public listing on the Turkish Stock Exchange is in 1997 (see EuroProperty Magazine, Nov. 17, 2008). 
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Appendix II: Data collection procedure for U.S. REIT IPOs during the 1996-2010 period 
 
 
 
 
National Association of 
Real Estate Investment 
Trust (NAREIT) Database  
Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) Database 
SIC = 6798 
Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) IPO Database 
SIC = 6798 
- Obtain and verify offering price from SDC, 
NAREIT and REIT’s IPO prospectus (from 
EDGAR online). 
- Obtain 1’st trading day close price from CRSP and 
check with Standard and Poor’s Daily Stock Price 
Record.  
Eliminate 3 REIT IPOs:  
- A unit (common share plus warrant) offering in which the 1’st 
trading day and the offering date are about six months apart.  
- A publicly listed finance company converting to a REIT and 
filing to list on the NYSE under a new stock symbol.  
-  An existing NASDAQ traded REIT that made public offering 
on the NYSE.  
Using at least two data sources, we verified 132 
U.S. REIT IPOs spanning the period 1996-2010.   
Merged “NAREIT + CRSP + SDC” Database and 
retain firms that are not duplicates.  
Final sample: 129 U.S. REITs IPOs in the 1996-2010 period. 
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Appendix III: Data collection procedure for Non-U.S. REIT IPOs during the 1996-2010 period 
Thomason DataStream 
Database  
Industry Sector = REIT  
Bloomberg Database 
ICB Sector = REIT 
Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) IPO DatabaseSIC = 6798 
Verify the firm to be REIT using one of following 
additional sources:  
- Stock Exchange website the firm is listed. 
- Firm’s website. 
- CBRE report.  
- EP RA report. 
- Company’s Record, Profile or Report through 
LexisNexis Academic Database 
Yes 
No 
Verified 312 non-U.S. REITs that have an initial 
trading date in the 1996-2010 period 
All DataStream, Bloomberg, SDC Database 
verify the firm to be REIT.  
Merged “DataStream + Bloomberg + SDC” 
Database and retain firms that are not duplicates.  
Yes 
Delete the 
firms from 
REITs sample  
No 
We have 266 firms with non-missing 
offer price and 1’st day close price.  
Whether we could find offer price from SDC, 
Bloomberg, IPO prospectuses, CBRE report, 
or market releases and 1st day closing price 
from Bloomberg, DataStream, Google/Yahoo 
Finance, Lexis-Nexis Academic News.  
Yes 
No 54 observations 
were excluded.  
Check whether there are discrepancies, whether the offer price 
and 1st day close price can be verified in at least two sources.    
Yes 
Final sample: 241 non-U.S. REITs IPOs in the 1996-2010 period. 
25 IPOs are 
eliminated.   
No 
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Appendix IV: Changes in the CRSP PERMNO of a publicly-traded REIT that enters (exits) the public REIT market via different modes 
of entry (exit) 
 
Entry or exit type Before entry or exit market date After entry or exit market date 
Panel A: REIT entry 
1. IPO No PERMNO One new REIT PERMNO 
2. Spinoff from non-REIT One non-REIT PERMNO One original PERMNO + one new REIT PERMNO 
3. Spinoff from REIT One REIT PERMNO One original REIT PERMNO + one new REIT PERMNO 
4. Consolidating LPs or funds into REIT  Multiple non-REIT PERMNOs  One new REIT PERMNO 
5. Merging REITs into new REITs Multiple REIT PERMNOs One new REIT PERMNO 
6. Converted  to REIT One non-REIT PERMNO One REIT PERMNO  (could be original or new) 
7. Moved from OTC No PERMNO One new REIT PERMNO 
8. Unknown No PERMNO One new REIT PERMNO 
   
Panel B: REIT exit 
1. Converted to non-REIT public firm One REIT PERMNO One non-REIT PERMNO (could be original or new) 
2. Acquired by an existing/new public REIT Two or more REIT PERMNOs (target's + acquirer’s) One REIT PERMNO (acquirer's) 
3. Acquired by a non-REIT public firm One REIT PERMNO + one non-REIT PERMNO One non-REIT PERMNO (acquirer’s) 
4. Going private  One REIT PERMNO No PERMNO 
5. Liquidate (wholesale and retail) One REIT PERMNO No PERMNO 
6. Delist (delist code>=500) One REIT PERMNO No PERMNO 
7. Unknown One REIT PERMNO No PERMNO 
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Appendix V: Estimated betas for REIT portfolios by REIT asset type, advisor style and 
sub-period
We form monthly REIT portfolios comprising of all existing publicly-traded REITs that we 
identified in each month during 1973-2011 period.  REIT portfolio betas are estimated using an 
ordinary least squares regression where the dependent variable is the monthly return on the 
equally-weighted portfolio of REITs and the independent variable is the monthly return on the 
CRSP equally-weighted index.  The table presents the estimated betas categorized by REIT 
asset type, by advisor type and by sub-periods.  REIT asset types comprise of equity REITs, 
which invest more than 75% of their assets directly in real property, mortgage REITs, which 
have at least 75% of their holdings in mortgages and short-term loans, and hybrid REITs, which 
invest in both real property and mortgages.  REIT advisor style is either internal (in-house) or 
external (using outside individuals as advisors).  Internally advised REITs are not available 
during the 1973 to 1985 sub-period because an external-advisor arrangement was mandatory 
for REITs until 1986.  T-values are reported within parentheses. * indicates significance at the 
1% level for a two-tailed test. 
 
 Estimated beta for 
 Full period Sub-periods 
 
1973-2011 1973-1985 1986-1998 1999-2011 
Full REIT Sample 0.79 1.03 0.51 0.72 
 
(23.24)* (16.50)* (13.52)* (11.96)* 
Partitioned by REIT asset type 
    - Equity 0.67 0.74 0.48 0.71 
 
(22.04)* (16.92)* (11.95)* (10.96)* 
- Mortgage 0.84 1.02 0.56 0.82 
 
(21.24)* (15.72)* (9.30)* (11.25)* 
- Hybrid 0.83 1.24 0.55 0.59 
 
(19.78)* (15.16)* (11.00)* (9.40)* 
Partitioned by REIT advisor style 
    - Internally advised 0.66 n.a. 0.48 0.73 
 
(11.24)* 
 
(4.17)* (11.18)* 
- Externally advised 0.78 1.03 0.51 0.69 
 
(23.32)* (16.50)* (11.61)* (12.65)* 
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Appendix VI: The effect of REIT entry and exit events on incumbent REITs’ stock risk-free excess 
returns.   
This table reports estimates from a panel regression (with firm fixed effects) of publicly-listed incumbent 
REITs’ monthly stock return in excess of the monthly risk-free rate on REIT entry and/or exit indicator 
variables with control variables and Fama and French (1993) factors plus Carhart’s (1997) momentum 
factor (1973-2011).  The dependent variable is Rit - Rft, where Rit is the return on REIT i in month t, and 
Rft is the risk-free return in month t from Kenneth R. French’s website. D_Entries_Only is a dummy 
variable equal to one if there are only REIT entries and no REIT exits in month t. D_Exits_Only is a 
dummy variable equal to one if there are only REIT exits and no REIT entries in month t.  # of Entries is 
the number of REITs entries in month t.  # of Exits is the number of REITs exits in month t.  # of 
(Entries - Exits) is the number of REITs entries minus the number of REIT exits in month t.  Rf and the 
factors (HML, SMB and WML) used in the regressions are obtained from Kenneth French’s website. We 
use EWRETDt, the equally-weighted index in month t from CRSP to proxy for Rm. Reported R2 values 
for models including fixed effects are ‘‘within’’ R2 statistics.  T-values are reported within parentheses. 
** and *** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively, using t-tests with standard errors 
adjusted for clustering in firm.   
Dependent variable = Ri,t – Rf,t 
      
  
Panel A: Regression models with FF factors (NOBs = 71,523)  
Variable (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  
D_Entries_Only -0.26    -0.10          
 
(-2.92) ***   (-1.11)          
D_Exits_Only   0.47  0.43          
 
  (4.45) *** (4.01) ***         
# of Entries       0.00    0.03  
 
      (0.15)    (1.28)  
# of Exits         0.30  0.31    
 
        (7.60) *** (7.60) ***   
# of (Entries - Exits)             -0.09  
            (-5.20) *** 
Rm - Rf  0.81  0.82  0.82  0.81  0.82  0.82 0.82  
 (36.01) *** (35.87) *** (35.89) *** (36.00) *** (36.05) *** (36.07) *** (35.97) *** 
SMB 0.09  0.08  0.08  0.09  0.09  0.09 0.09 
 (4.91) *** (4.60) *** (4.58) *** (5.05) *** (4.77) *** (4.83) *** (4.74) *** 
HML 0.78  0.78  0.78  0.78  0.79  0.79 0.78 
 
(27.57) *** (27.59) *** (27.56) *** (27.61) *** (27.63) *** (27.64) *** (27.59) *** 
WML -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03 -0.03 
 (-2.04) ** (-2.11) ** (-2.10) ** (-2.06) ** (-2.34) ** (-2.35) ** (-2.13) ** 
Intercept -0.31  -0.50  -0.47  -0.37  -0.68  -0.71 -0.36 
 (-9.44) *** (-10.90) *** (-8.51) *** (-10.79) *** (-12.08) *** (-11.07) *** (-13.71) *** 
Firm fixed effect? Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R2 0.1620  0.1622  0.1622  0.1619  0.1627  0.1628  0.1622 
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